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The Biometric systems are commonly used as a fundamental tool by both government 
and private sector organizations to allow restricted access to sensitive areas, to identify 
the criminals by the police and to authenticate the identification of individuals 
requesting to access to certain personal and confidential services. The applications of 
these identification tools have created issues of security and privacy relating to 
personal, commercial and government identities. Over the last decade, reports of 
increasing insecurity to the personal data of users in the public and commercial domain 
applications has prompted the development of more robust and sound measures to 
protect the personal data of users from being stolen and spoofing. The present study 
aimed to introduce the scheme for integrating direct and indirect biometric key 
generation schemes with the application of 6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVKDULQJDOJRULWKPLQRUGHU
to address the two disadvantages: revocability of the biometric key and the exception 
handling of biometric modality. This study used two different approaches for key 
generation XVLQJ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVKDULQJVFKHPH: template based approach for indirect 
key generation and template-free.  The findings of this study demonstrated that  the 
encryption key generated by the proposed system was not  required to be stored in the 
database which prevented the attack on the privacy of the data of the individuals from 
the hackers. Interestingly, the proposed system was also able to generate multiple 
encryption keys with varying lengths. Furthermore, the results of this study also 
offered the flexibility of providing the multiple keys for different applications for each 
user.  The results from this study, consequently, showed the considerable potential and 
prospect of the proposed scheme to generate encryption keys directly and indirectly 
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x Automated Biometric Identification System: ³1. Department of Defense (DOD) 
system implemented to improve the U.S. government's ability to track and identify 
national security threats. The system includes mandatory collection of ten rolled 
fingerprints, a minimum of five mug shots from varying angles, and an oral swab 
to collect DNA´>$%@ 
³2. Generic term sometimes used in the biometrics community to discuss a 
biometric system´>$%@ 
x Accuracy: ³A catch-all phrase for describing how well a biometric system 
performs. The actual statistic for performance will vary by task (verification, 
open-set identification (watchlist), and closed-set identification)´>$%@. 
x AFIS - Automated Fingerprint Identification System: ³A highly specialized 
biometric system that compares a submitted fingerprint record (usually of multiple 
fingers) to a database of records, to determine the identity of an individual. AFIS 
is predominantly used for law enforcement, but is also being used for civil 
applications (e.g. background checks for soccer coaches, etc)´>$%@. 
x Algorithm: ³A limited sequence of instructions or steps that tells a computer 
system how to solve a particular problem. A biometric system will have multiple 
algorithms, for example: image processing, template generation, comparisons, etc´
[A, B]. 
x Application Programming Interface: ³Formatting instructions or tools used by 
an application developer to link and build hardware or software applications´>$
B]. 
x Attempt: ³The submission of a single set of biometric sample to a biometric 
system for identification or verification. Some biometric systems permit more than 
one attempt to identify or verify an individual´>$%@. 
x Authentication: ³1. The process of establishing confidence in the truth of some 
FODLP 7KH FODLP FRXOG EH DQ\ GHFODUDWLYH VWDWHPHQW IRU H[DPSOH ³7KLV
LQGLYLGXDO¶V QDPH LV µ-RVHSK .¶ ´ RU ³7KLV FKLOG LV PRUH WKDQ  IHHW WDOO´ 
 ,Q ELRPHWULFV ³DXWKHQWLFDWLRQ´ LV VRPHWLPHV XVHG DV D JHQHULF V\QRQ\P IRU
verification´>$%@. 
x Behavioural Biometric Characteristic: ³A biometric characteristic that is 
learned and acquired over time rather than one based primarily on biology. All 
biometric characteristics depend somewhat upon both behavioural and biological 
characteristic. Examples of biometric modalities for which behavioural 
characteristics may dominate include signature recognition and keystroke 
dynamics´>$%@. 
x Biometrics Application Programming Interface: ³Defines the application 
programming interface and service provider interface for a standard biometric 
technology interface. The BioAPI enables biometric devices to be easily installed, 
integrated or swapped within the overall system architecture´>$%@. 
x Biological Biometric Characteristic: ³A biometric characteristic based primarily 
on an anatomical or physiological characteristic, rather than a learned behaviour. 
All biometric characteristics depend somewhat upon both behavioural and 
biological characteristic. Examples of biometric modalities for which biological 
characteristics may dominate include fingerprint and hand geometry´>$%@. 
x Biometric Data: ³A catch-all phrase for computer data created during a biometric 
process. It encompasses raw sensor observations, biometric samples, models, 
templates and/or similarity scores. Biometric data is used to describe the 
XV 
 
information collected during an enrollment, verification, or identification process, 
but does not apply to end user information such as user name, demographic 
information and authorizations´>$%@. 
x Biometric Sample: ³Information or computer data obtained from a biometric 
sensor device. Examples are images of a face or fingerprint´>$%@. 
x Biometric System: ³Multiple individual components (such as sensor, matching 
algorithm, and result display) that combine to make a fully operational system. A 
biometric system is an automated system capable of: 
1. Capturing a biometric sample from an end user. 
2. Extracting and processing the biometric data from that sample. 
3. Storing the extracted information in a database. 
4. Comparing the biometric data with data contained in one or more reference 
references. 
5. Deciding how well they match and indicating whether or not an 
identification or verification of identity has been achieved´>$%@. 
x Biometrics: ³A general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or a 
process. 
As a characteristic: A measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and 
behavioural characteristic that can be used for automated recognition. 
As a process: Automated methods of recognizing an individual based on 
measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioural 
characteristics´>$%@. 
x Capture: ³The process of collecting a biometric sample from an individual via a 
sensor´>$%@. 
x Claim of Identity: ³A statement that a person is or is not the source of a reference 
in a database. Claims can be positive (I am in the database), negative (I am not in 
the database) or specific (I am end user 123 in the database)´>$%@. 
x Crypto-Biometric: ³The field of study covering the design, development, 
evaluation, and analysis of crypto-biometric systems. The research in this field can 
be dated back since 1998´>$%@. 
x Crypto-Biometric system: ³A system that combines biometric with cryptography 
in order to remove one or more drawbacks of either of the two techniques´>$%@. 
x Crypto-bio Key: ³A key obtained from or with the help of biometric data´ >$
B].  
x Database: ³A collection of one or more computer files. For biometric systems, 
these files could consist of biometric sensor readings, templates, match results, 
related end user information, etc´>$%@.  
x Decision: ³The resultant action taken (either automated or manual) based on a 
comparison of a sLPLODULW\VFRUHRUVLPLODUPHDVXUHDQGWKHV\VWHP¶VWKUHVKROG´
[A, B]. 
x Biometric Direct Key Generation: ³A system that able to generate a biometric 
encryption key directly from the biometric samples with a template free which 
PHDQVWKHWHPSODWHGRHVQ¶WQeed to be stored´>$%@. 
x Biometric Indirect Key Generation: ³A system that required a biometric 
template to be stored in order to generate the biometric encryption key´>$%@. 
x Equal Error Rate: ³A statistic used to show biometric performance, typically 
when operating in the verification task. The EER is the location on a ROC or DET 
curve where the false accept rate and false reject rate are equal. In general, the 




HUURU UDWH´ VR WKH PHDVXUH¶V WUXH XVHIXOQHVV LV OLPLWHG WR FRPSDULQJ ELRPHWULF
V\VWHPSHUIRUPDQFH7KH((5 LV VRPHWLPHV UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH ³&URVVRYHU(UURU
5DWH´ ³>$%@ 
x Encryption: ³The act of transforming data into an unintelligible form so that it 
cannot be read by unauthorized individuals. A key or a password is used to 
decrypt (decode) the encrypted data´>$%@.  
x Enrollment: ³The process of collecting a biometric sample from an end user, 
FRQYHUWLQJ LW LQWR DELRPHWULF UHIHUHQFH DQG VWRULQJ LW LQ WKHELRPHWULF V\VWHP¶V
database for later comparison´>$%@. 
x Feature Extraction: ³The process of converting a captured biometric sample into 
biometric data so that it can be compared to a reference´ [A, B]. 
x Face Recognition: ³A biometric modality that uses an image of the visible 
SK\VLFDOVWUXFWXUHRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VIDFHIRUUHFRJQLWLRQSXUSRVHV´>$%@. 
x False Match Rate: ³A statistic used to measure biometric performance when. 
Similar to the False Acceptance Rate (FAR)´>$%@. 
x False Non-Match Rate: ³A statistic used to measure biometric performance. 
Similar to the False Reject Rate (FRR), except the FRR includes the Failure to 
Acquire error rate and the False Non-Match Rate does not ³>$%@. 
x False Acceptance Rate: ³A statistic used to measure biometric performance when 
operating in the verification task. The percentage of times a system produces a 
false accept, which occurs when an individual is incorrectly matched to another 
individXDO¶VH[LVWLQJELRPHWULF([DPSOH)UDQNFODLPVWREH-RKQDQGWKHV\VWHP
verifies the claim´>$%@. 
x Feature(s): ³Distinctive mathematical characteristic(s) derived from a biometric 
sample; used to generate a reference ³>$%@.  
x Fingerprint Recognition: ³A biometric modality that uses the physical structure 
RIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VILQJHUSULQWIRUUHFRJQLWLRQSXUSRVHV,PSRUWDQWIHDWXUHVXVHGLQ
most fingerprint recognition systems are minutiae points that include bifurcations 
and ridge endings´>$%@. 
x False Rejection Rate: ³A statistic used to measure biometric performance when 
operating in the verification task. The percentage of times the system produces a 
false reject. A false reject occurs when an individual is not matched to his/her own 
existing biometric template. Example: John claims to be John, but the system 
incorrectly denies the claim´>$%@. 
x Failure to Acquire: ³Failure of a biometric system to capture and/or extract 
usable information from a biometric sample´>$%@. 
x Failure to Enroll: ³Failure of a biometric system to form a proper enrollment 
reference for an end user. Common failures include end users who are not 
properly trained to provide their biometrics, the sensor not capturing information 
correctly, or captured sensor data of insufficient quality to develop a template´>$
B]. 
x Hamming Distance: ³The number of non-corresponding digits in a string of 
binary digits; used to measure dissimilarity. Hamming distances are used in many 
Daugman iris recognition algorithms´>$%@. 
x Identification: ³A task where the biometric system searches a database for a 
reference matching a submitted biometric sample and if found, returns a 
corresponding identity. A biometric is collected and compared to all the references 




person is not guaranteed to exist in the database. The system must determine 
whether the person is in the database, then return the identity´>$%@. 
x Impostor: ³A person who submits a biometric sample in either an intentional or 
inadvertent attempt to claim the identity of another person to a biometric system´
[A, B]. 
x Iris Recognition: ³A biometric modality that uses an image of the physical 
VWUXFWXUH RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V LULV IRU UHFRJQLWLRQ SXUSRVHV 7KH LULV PXVFOH LV WKH
colored portion of the eye surrounding the pupil´>$%@. 
x IrisCode©: ³A biometric feature format used in the Daugman iris recognition 
system´>$%@. 
x Minutiae Point: ³Friction ridge characteristics that are used to individualize a 
fingerprint image. Minutiae are the points where friction ridges begin, terminate, 
or split into two or more ridges. In many fingerprint systems, the minutiae (as 
opposed to the images) are compared for recognition purposes2 [A, B].  
x Modality: ³A type or class of biometric system. For example: face recognition, 
fingerprint recognition, iris recognition, etc´>$%@. 
x Multimodal Biometric System: ³A biometric system in which two or more of the 
modality components (biometric characteristic, sensor type or feature extraction 
algorithm) occurs in multiple´>$%@. 
x Noise: ³Unwanted components in a signal that degrade the quality of data or 
interfere with the desired signals processed by a system´>$%@. 
x Performance: ³A catch-all phrase for describing a measurement of the 
characteristics, such as accuracy or speed, of a biometric algorithm or system´>$
B]. 
x Personal Identification Number: ³$ VHFXULW\ PHWKRG XVHG WR VKRZ ³ZKDW \RX
NQRZ´'HSHQding on the system, a PIN could be used to either claim or verify a 
claimed identity´>$%@. 
x Pixel: ³A picture element. This is the smallest element of a display that can be 
assigned a colour value ³>$%@. 
x Recognition: ³A generic term used in the description of biometric systems (e.g. 
face recognition or iris recognition) relating to their fundamental function. The 
WHUP ³UHFRJQLWLRQ´ GRHV QRW LQKHUHQWO\ LPSO\ WKH YHULILFDWLRQ FORVHG-set 
identification or open-set identification (watchlist)´>$%@. 
x Reference: ³The biometric data stored for an individual for use in future 
recognition. A reference can be one or more templates, models or raw images2 [A, 
B]. 
x Resolution: ³The number of pixels per unit distance in the image. Describes the 
sharpness and clarity of an image´>$%@. 
x Receiver Operating Characteristics: ³A method of showing measured accuracy 
performance of a biometric system. A verification ROC compares false accept rate 
vs. verification rate. An open-set identification (watchlist) ROC compares false 
alarm rates vs. detection and identification rate´>$%@. 
x Similarity Score: ³A value returned by a biometric algorithm that indicates the 
degree of similarity or correlation between a biometric sample and a reference2 
[A, B]. 
x Spoofing: ³The ability to fool a biometric sensor into recognizing an illegitimate 
user as a legitimate user (verification) or into missing an identification of someone 
that is in the database´>$%@.  
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x Template: ³$ GLJLWDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V GLVWLQFW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV 
representing information extracted from a biometric sample. Templates are used 
during biometric authentication as the basis for comparison´>$%@. 
x Threat: ³An intentional or unintentional potential event that could compromise 
the security and integrity of the system´>$%@. 
x Threshold: ³A user setting for biometric systems operating in the verification or 
open-set identification (watchlist) tasks. The acceptance or rejection of biometric 
data is dependent on the match score falling above or below the threshold. The 
threshold is adjustable so that the biometric system can be more or less strict, 
depending on the requirements of any given biometric application´>$%@. 
x Token: ³A physical object that indicates the identity of its owner. For example, a 
smart card´>$%@. 
x Verification: ³A task where the biometric system attempts to confirm an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V FODLPHG LGHQWLW\ E\ FRPSDULQJ D VXEPLWWHG VDPSOH WR RQH RU PRUH
previously enrolled templates´>$%@. 
x Vulnerability: ³The potential for the function of a biometric system to be 
compromised by intent (fraudulent activity); design flaw (including usage error); 
accident; hardware failure; or external environmental condition´>$%@. 
 
Reference 
[A] National Science & Technology Council (NSTC), 14 September 06, 
http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/glossary.pdf 









Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
As both government and private sector organizations face a growing number and range 
of security threats, employees are increasingly given controlled access to their 
respective departments by means of biometric systems. The widespread application of 
Internet and related technologies has turned the world into a global village, with 
greater interconnectivity and unprecedented levels of communication giving access to 
a wealth of information and knowledge. While bringing people from different 
communities and cultures closer together, this unprecedented reliance on the Internet 
and digital devices and systems for the storage of sensitive and strategic data has 
created insecurity in the transfer of data from one system to another as malicious 
agents seeking to exploit these weaknesses attack databases and steal or misuse data 
for their own ends. In particular, this has exacerbated issues of security and privacy 
relating to personal, commercial and government identities. Over the last decade, the 
insecurity of the personal data of users in public and commercial domain applications 
has prompted the development of more robust and sound measures to protect the 
identity of users from being stolen and spoofing [1-6]This vulnerability is not confined 
WR LQGLYLGXDO XVHUV¶ GDWD EXW DOVR H[WHQGV WR V\VWHPV FRQWUROOHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW DQG
FRPPHUFLDORUJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWKROGXVHUV¶GDWDIRUVHFXULW\FKHFNVDQGRWKHUSXUSRVHV
To reduce the probability of theft and corruption of these public data, both government 
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and commercial organizations employ a range of security measures that include the 
application of traditional identification systems. These systems work by means of PINs 
and smaUWFDUGVOLQNLQJLQGLUHFWO\WRWKHXVHU¶VSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQWRDFFHVVVHQVLWLYH
data stored in the database. However, these PINs and smartcards can be forgotten or 
VWROHQDQGWKH\FDQEHH[SORLWHGWRPLVXVHWKHXVHU¶VLGHQWLW\ [1].  
For this reason, a more advanced approach to security based on so- FDOOHGµELRPHWULF¶
systems was introduced by government and commercial organizations to protect user 
identity. In public domain applications, these systems use biometric information linked 
intrinsically to thHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVRQDOGDWD±details that are uniquely characteristic of 
him/her²making biometric systems a powerful instrument for authenticating the 
XVHU¶VLGHQWLW\,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH3,167RNHQV-based identification system, biometrics-
based identification systems uniquely identify the person using their own characteristic 
features [1].  
1.2. Biometric Authentication Background 
In the last decade, as many government and commercial organizations introduce e-
commerce, e-government and Internet-based communications to the public domain for 
data sharing and teleconferencing, there has been an accompanying emphasis on the 
security and confidentiality of the data shared and disseminated through these services. 
In this regard, authentication systems have been developed to establish the identity of 
users using these systems and services. As an authentication mechanism, automated 
authorization system is considered the preferable approach in this context, as it does 
not require the supervision of these channels for each and every use. These automated 
authentication systems employ the existing triad of mechanisms, alone or in 
combination²token-based (something an individual possesses, such as a key or fob), 
specific knowledge-based (something an individual knows, such as a password or 
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personal identification number/PIN) and characteristic-based (something that defines 
an individual, such as biometric data). To achieve the high level of security required, 
the application of biometric systems has been widely recommended for every use of e-
commerce and e-government services [1, 2]. 
User authentication is the process by which a system tries to determine the truth of the 
claim made by the user by executing a one-to-one match between the query data and 
the registered data of the uVHUZLWKLQWKHV\VWHP1RUPDOO\WKHXVHU¶VGDWDDUHVWRUHG
by assignment of a unique identifier number at the time of registration. When a person 
subsequently attempts to establish their identity, the system matches the query data 
with the unique identifier linked to the relevant personal data. In this way, 
authentication is achieved by a successful match between the unique identifier and the 
query data. This process differs from the identification process executed. During 
identification, the query data is matched with all items of data stored in the system, one 
by one, and if a match is found with any of the data, the system displays a message to 
confirm that identity is established. Passwords, PINS and tokens are not considered 
suitable for identification purposes, as they can be easily stolen, forgotten, lost or 
transferred to an unauthorized person and easily copied in collusion with others who 
have knowledge of these secret keys; they can even be cracked by hackers to obtain 
DFFHVV WR WKH XVHU¶V SHUVRQDl data and are regarded as a weak method of protection 
when implemented for the purpose of authentication [1, 2]. 
In light of these issues, researchers have employed a combination of PINS/tokens and 
knowledge-based authentication to enhance the protection RI XVHUV¶ SHUVRQDO GDWD
VWRUHGZLWKLQWKHV\VWHPDVIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHµFKLSDQG3,1¶V\VWHPXVHGIRUPRVWH-
commerce services in the United Kingdom (UK). Yet despite these stringent measures, 
data can still be compromised, owing in part to negligence or collusion. Biometrics-
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based identification systems are given more credence in terms of security because 
biometrics, as characteristic features of individuals, can be copied, stolen and 
transferred to other people; additionally, the claimant must be present at the time of 
identification. Furthermore, biometrics-based systems automatically perform the 
functions of extraction and matching between stored and query data, and so it cannot 
be made known to people in the vicinity of the user. However, systems in the public 
domain such as fingerprint- or face-based biometric systems, the biometric data can be 
VXUUHSWLWLRXVO\DFTXLUHG IRU IUDXGXOHQWXVHRI WKHXVHU¶V LGHQWLW\6LPLODUO\ELRPHWULF
data can be stolen from a database in the absence of adequate spoof prevention 
measures and security of the biometric template, and further research is needed to 
bridge these gaps in the security of biometric systems [1, 2]. 
1.2.1.  Choosing a Biometric Modality 
Biometrics-based authentication systems compare the query biometric data with the 
stored template of the user. The comparison is strictly made on similarities of 
characteristics shared by the query data and the stored biometric template linked to the 
user, enabling the user to be uniquely identified through the authentication system. 
There are several modalities in use for the development of biometric systems, 
including face, voice, signature, fingerprint, iris and gait. These can broadly be divided 
into two categories of modality: physiological and behavioural. Physiological 
modalities relate to physiological characteristics of the person such as fingerprints, 
palmprints and retinal and iris patterns. Behavioural modalities are characteristic ways 
in which a person executes some action, such as a signature or keystroke. The 
application of these modalities in combination is considered best practice in boosting 
the security of a biometric system [1, 2].  
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The choice of modalities for construction of a biometric system depends on four 
important properties of the modality: 
x Universality: the biometric should be obtainable from everybody. 
x Uniqueness: It should provide a high degree of discriminatory information. 
x Permanence: It should be invariant as it ages. 
x Collectability: It should be practical to extract. 
Biometric modalities can be extracted in different ways. The extraction methods used 
will vary according to modality, and it is important to select the appropriate method for 
the chosen modality. The selected method should have the following features: high 
performance rate, universally accepted by users and robust to circumvention [1, 2]. 
Weaknesses and strengths of the various biometric modalities are presented in Table 
1.1. 
















































Face HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH 
Fingerprint MED HIGH HIGH MED HIGH MED MED 
Hand Geometry MED MED MED MED MED MED MED 
Iris HIGH HIGH HIGH MED HIGH LOW LOW 
Hand/Finger Vein MED MED MED MED MED MED LOW 
Signature LOW LOW LOW HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH 
Voice MED LOW LOW MED LOW HIGH HIGH 
 
Some of the ratings in the above table may be contentious and must be used with 
caution for the target biometric system, taking into account the subjectivity and 
purpose of the examiner. The construction of a matrix like Table 1.1 enables the 
examiner to choose the best biometric modality for use in different systems, based on 
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the requirements and utility of the particular situation. A single biometric modality or 
some combination of them may be used to build a biometric system, but there are four 
typical requirements that are universally applied: speed, accuracy, discriminative 
power and intrusiveness. 
The research presented in this thesis investigates direct key generation from 
multimodal biometric samples for implementation in a cryptosystem. To that end, it is 
important to select a specific modality to be examined; for various reasons, iris, 
fingerprint and face modalities were chosen for the purposes of this research. With 
reference to Table 1.1, it is clear that these three modalities rate highly for most of the 
properties desirable in a biometric modality. These are also the most mature biometric 
modalities and have been extensively researched [10]. Furthermore, the iris, fingerprint 
and face modalities also perform relatively well in large-scale applications by virtue of 
their high degree of inherent individuality and universality, which means that, 
logically, the extracted key-space should be very large and free of any repetitions [1]. 
For present purposes, the left and right iris were considered as two different biometric 
modalities; the third modality considered here for direct key generation is the user 
password. 
1.2.2. Typical Biometric System Framework 
Biometric systems are widely used for identification purposes in different settings 
around the globe such as Internet banking, law enforcement and ATMs. The most 
commonly employed biometrics in these systems include iris and fingerprint data. 
Although the biometric modality used may vary, the main working principle behind 
the operation of these systems is broadly similar, beginning with signal processing 
(image) and pattern recognition and ending with a message concerning authentication 
of the claim of the user [1]. 
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The fundamental biometric system processes involved in user enrollment and 
subsequent classification are shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure1.1 Processes of User Enrollment and Subsequent Classification [1] 
 
Biometric sample acquisition, signal processing and enhancement and feature 
extraction are common to all automated biometric systems. Comparison and 
classification of the query data are challenging because of certain issues associated 
with these processes, which will be highlighted in the next section. 
1.2.3. Challenges 
Signal processing and enhancement: Several issues arise in relation to signal 
processing and enhancement. The first step executed by the system is to acquire the 
query data in the form of an sample taken from the analogue (real) world. This sample 
is captured by means of a dedicated camera. The acquired sample is then presented to 
the sensors for conversion of the analogue version of the sample into a digitized and 
discrete version for subsequent processing and analysis. During the conversion of 
analogue data to discrete digital data, there is always some loss of information. 
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Furthermore, environmental factors also affect the quality of analogue data derived 
from the real world²for instance, background light can cause the image to be opaque.  
It is therefore useful and necessary to ensure that the signal is captured properly and 
enhanced effectively for further analysis. Both the signal preprocessing and 
enhancement stages are essential for normalization and minimization of the variance of 
signals. The enhancement functions improve image quality by accentuating 
characteristic features and filtering noise from the background of the sample. 
Preprocessing is executed to normalize the effects of important features so that all of 
them can pass equally and consistently through the feature extraction stage. During 
preprocessing, poorer quality features are highlighted so that they will be considered as 
noise for feature extraction. Simultaneously, those regions of features that do not 
belong to the user are also pinpointed through segmentation to exclude them from final 
processing and feature extraction. 
The foregoing steps are of great significance in minimizing intra-sample variations; if 
these were not minimized, they would continue to accumulate during every stage of 
the analysis and would be likely to affect the biometULF V\VWHP¶V pattern recognition 
performance. For this reason, intra-sample variations are minimized from the outset to 
disallow variations that might build up at the feature extraction stage. This paves the 
way for execution of the matching algorithm.  
Feature Extraction Stage: This is a very important stage as the performance of the 
automated biometric system ultimately depends on the quality of the features 
extracted. The feature extractors should show the characteristic parts of the obtained 
data clearly and distinctly. The features extracted must also be reproducible, highly 
discriminative (i.e. displaying the small variations in data obtained from the same 
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source and highlighting greater amount of variations of data obtained from the 
different sources) and invariant to scale and affine transformations.  
However, the extraction of features with characteristic signatures is not 
straightforward. Discriminative features might be prominent and identifiable with ease, 
which can affect the performance and quality of decisions made by the biometric 
system. For example, iris samples taken from the eyes of the same person may show 
5±25% variations in their binary codes, as is characteristic of False Reject Rate (FRR) 
in most iris recognition-based biometric systems. Those taken from different 
individuals may show similarities of up to 70%, which is alarming and may affect the 
outcomes of experiments involving iris recognition. Moreover, the comparison 
between two different iris codes taken from two different users may show similarities 
of up to 65 to 75 % which may affect the direct key generation from the iris samples 
within template free scheme, which will be discussed in Chapter 4 later on. Another 
example of such misrepresentation during the feature extraction stage involves the 
minutiae of the fingerprints. These are considered highly distinctive and characteristic 
of every individual, yet their representation may change across different samples 
collected from the same person at different points in time. The identification of a 
proper representation of the feature is therefore as important as the identification of the 
sample itself. The preferred approach is to take the optimum feature selection path for 
simplification of the classification procedures adopted by the biometric system. On the 
other hand, the selection of sub-optimal features is likely to increase classifier 
complexity as it needs to include modelling to reduce feature variations. 
1.2.4. Security Issues 
Breaches in system security are not always related to the quality of the biometrics and 
algorithms employed to perform pattern recognition tasks. Another component of the 
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problem relates to the fact that biometric systems are part of the public domain, where 
user data can be surreptitiously obtained by malicious agents²for example, recording 
DYRLFHFDSWXULQJLPDJHVRIWKHXVHU¶VIDFHDQGODWHQWILQJHUSULQWVPDNLQJLWSRVVLEOH
IRU D VSRRIHU WR FODLP VRPHRQH HOVH¶V LGHQWLW\ E\ IRROLQJ WKH V\VWHP &HUWDLQ
commercial products retain control of the biometric system by patenting to preserve 
intellectual rights, and users may request some level of transparency to minimize 
concerns about the storage of their data. These transparency requirements make more 
data from biometric systems available in the public domain, enabling attacks on the 
system using various combinations of characters to unlock it. Figure 1.2 illustrates 
possible attack points within a biometrics-based authentication system [15]. 
 
Figure1.2 Attack Points in a Biometric Based Security System [1] 
The part of a biometric system most susceptible to attack is the sensor, as biometric 
data can easily be recovered from this part by virtue of its accessibility to the public for 
presentation of samples. This high level of sensor accessibility makes the system more 
vulnerable to spoofing attacks, and prevention of such attacks will require further 
research [1].  
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The sensors in biometrics-based systems are also supplied by third party commercial 
agents, which means that documentation relating to their implementation may be 
available online, enabling potential attackers to educate themselves about the working 
principles of these sensors. For example, the attacker can retrieve user data from the 
transit channels between the sensors and the innards of the biometric system, which 
can then be relayed for copying or mutation. However, such attacks can easily be 
circumvented in supervised systems, primarily because of the access requirements of 
such systems. Furthermore, hardwired sensors connected physically to the biometric 
system make it still harder to surreptitiously sniff or mutate data [7, 156].  
While spoofing attacks can compromise individual security and privacy at the sensor 
level, spoofing attempts at other levels can wreak havoc on the system database. An 
attack on the sensors compromises the security and privacy of a single individual by 
breaching the data transition pathways, but the breaching of security measures at the 
decision, feature extraction and matching levels will allow unauthorized users to 
DFFHVVXVHUV¶ELRPHWULF GDWD LQPRUH UHILQHG IRUPV6XFKEUHDFKHV LQ WKH VHFXULW\RI
feature extraction and pattern matching recognition may allow unauthorized users to 
change the settings of the biometric framework, denying provision of services to the 
OHJLWLPDWHXVHUV WKLVVWDWH LVFDOOHG µGHQLDORIVHUYLFH¶'R6'HVSLWH WKHGLIILFXOWLHV
caused by the DoS state for both system administrators and users, this does not cause 
VHULRXV EUHDFKHV LQ WKH VHFXULW\ DQG SULYDF\ RI XVHUV¶ GDWa. Nevertheless, 
circumvention at the database level of the biometric system can compromise the 
VHFXULW\RIWKHHQWLUHGDWDEDVHKROGLQJKXQGUHGVRUWKRXVDQGVRIXVHUV¶GDWD [7, 156]. 
Clearly, then, protection of the database from spoofing attacks is critical in ensuring 
the security of all users registered on the biometric system. This can be achieved by 
use of encryption methods, which prevent attacks that aim to copy templates. 
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However, infringement of data by unauthorized users remains possible when the attack 
is launched in the guise of system administrator. In order to prevent this kind of attack, 
templates are decoupled from the biometric data directly, or using the one-way 
transformation method. This one-way transformation thwarts attempts by unauthorized 
persons to access the biometric data of users in the event of mutation or copying of 
templates [7, 156]. 
Although the encryption and template manipulation methods can ensure the security of 
XVHUV¶ biometric data, they are unable to prevent attacks on the database by 
unauthorized persons. The attack may be designed to delete, modify or overwrite 
existing templates in the database, which means that the system can be directly 
controlled by unauthorized persons or can deny services to users (DoS). The 
weaknesses and loopholes in remotely located communication channels can further 
undermine the security conditions of the database [7,156]. 
The templates of users can be stored in the biometric system at any four locations. A 
template  whether be stored remotely in token or smart card, in a central database on a 
server, on a workstation, or directly on individual biometric sensors. If the templates 
are being stored on individual tokens or sensors, users must present the personal data 
locally in order to obtain access, which means that users have no access to applications 
located at other sites. Furthermore, in the event of theft, the data is vulnerable to 
tampering by malicious agents [7,156]. 
The storage of template data on local workstations minimizes the possibility of loss or 
theft of the data, but again, users cannot avail of authentication at multiple sites. While 
these issues can be resolved by storing the template data on a centralized database, this 
approach also creates some security concerns. For instance, the centralized database is 
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normally located remotely, requiring transmission of data from local workstations to 
the centralized system through the communication channels, and so incoming and 
outgoing transmission of data can easily be intercepted. Even the transfer of data 
between the system and the database may be compromised by snooping on the 
communication channels. This may take several forms²for example, the attacker may 
alter the data or hijack the communication channels in order to copy certain packets of 
data. The data obtained by these methods can be analysed to extract required features 
of the data, which can further be manipulated by the attacker to his own ends. In order 
to protect the system from such attacks and to eliminate security concerns, some 
researchers have suggested removing database from the equation so that it cannot be 
accessible to anyone. However, the pattern recognition and matching stages require the 
availability of data to authenticate the identity of the user. Further research is required 
to extend the concepts of biometric encryption [7,156]. 
1.2.5. Biometric Encryption 
This method utilizes a single or combined instance of biometric data for encryption 
and decryption of data, which is achieved by obtaining a key from the biometric 
information of the user. Like the biometrics-based authentication process, encryption 
requires the user to present the claim to be identified. The system will process the 
request by comparing the submitted samples from the user with the existing enrolled 
samples in the database. The system then displays the decision in a Yes/No format. 
However, authentication systems convert the data into 1-bit representations while 
encryption transforms the data into n-bit representations taken as a unique value 
(PIN/password). In this way, the method identifies the user of the equation, who does 
not know the specification of the unique value assigned to his data. Moreover, 
encryption methodologies relieve the biometric system of the burden of knowing a 
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password/PIN, as authentication is executed through encryption or decryption of data 
[7].   
One widely-used approach to executing the encryption function is by 
assigning/binding the key to the template, which is released upon successful 
authentication [16]. Another common approach is to create an unknown key and store 
it within a metaphorical vault, which unlocks the biometric data on successful 
matching [17-23].  
The detail of these approaches will be elaborated in Chapter 2. However, the storage of 
data is an essential requirement for these approaches, which is likely to introduce some 
security loopholes as described earlier. The work presented in this thesis therefore 
investigates the generation of individual keys directly from biometric samples. By 
generating keys directly, the need for template creation, storage and matching is 
eliminated, so reducing the number of attack points. A further investigation into 
biometric encryption is described in Chapter 5. 
1.3. Research Motivation 
Despite the advantages of biometric based identification system as described in the 
above section, unsupervised operation of single-biometric identification systems may 
offer opportunities for malpractice to the would-be impostors, and it is important that 
the chosen technology can thwart attempts by malicious agents to spoof or copy the 
biometric data. Among the technologies that can prevent attackers from penetrating a 
system and spoofing biometric data is the multimodal biometric system. However, 
there remain many gaps in this approach requiring further research to make this 
technology more widely applicable to the needs of both public and commercial 
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organizations. One promising area of development relates to methodologies for the 
generation of secret keys and template-free biometric systems [1, 2]. 
Despite the advantages of biometric based identification system as described in the 
above section, unsupervised operation of single-biometric identification systems may 
offer opportunities for malpractice to the would-be impostors, and it is important that 
the chosen technology can thwart attempts by malicious agents to spoof or copy the 
biometric data. Among the technologies that can prevent attackers from penetrating a 
system and spoofing biometric data is the multimodal biometric system. However, 
there remain many gaps in this approach requiring further research to make this 
technology more widely applicable to the needs of both public and commercial 
organizations. One promising area of development relates to methodologies for the 
generation of secret keys and template-free biometric systems [1, 2]. 
The present study investigates how such a multimodal, template-free biometric system 
can be based on generating the secret key directly; specifically, it investigates 
ELRPHWULF H[FHSWLRQ KDQGOLQJ VWUDWHJLHV XVLQJ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6KDULQJ WHFKQRORJ\
which allows an arbitrary subset of biometric modalities to be employed in identifying 
an individual. This study focuses on solving the exception handling as it is a serious 
issue in the biometric security, especially in the cases where a user cannot produce the 
biometric modality at the time of identification due to changes in his/her physical 
condition , for example, loss of iris due to accident, finger cuts or surgical treatments 
etc. 
In the literature relating to biometrics and security, several researchers have 
emphasized the application of multimodal biometric systems to enhance the security of 
XVHUV¶LGHQWLWLHVDQGSURWHFW data against spoofing, stealing and other misuses.  
 16 
 
One immediate issue with token/passwords/PINs-based identification is the difficulty 
of remembering PINs, tokens or passwords; the multimodal biometric system relieves 
WKHXVHURI WKLVEXUGHQPDNLQJ LWHDV\ WRXVHZKLOHHIIRUWOHVVO\SURWHFWLQJ WKHXVHU¶V
data. However, the literature has also reported some weaknesses and difficulties in 
using biometric systems in terms of preventing attacks on the system. Some 
researchers have suggested use of the application encryption technique to develop a 
stronger and more robustly secured multi-biometric system [1, 7, 8].  
In addition, two potential drawbacks inherent in the previously developed encryption 
biometric security systems scheme are: a) it does not easily lend itself to revoking the 
generated encryption key and b) it is not robust in the exception-handling scenario, 
where a user is unable to provide a sample of the given biometric modality. These 
issues can reduce the potential of these single-modality biometric systems to identify 
the individual with the damaged features. The present research is trying to investigate 
the potential of existing techniques for development of a template-free multimodal 
biometric system. 
The security of biometrics-based systems will be greatly enhanced and strengthened by 
the ability of the proposed system to derive an encryption key directly from biometric 
samples provided by a given user. Such a system would entail that no copy of the 
encryption key need to be retained and also that no template or reference sample of the 
related biometrics would be required. Both of these features add value to the security 
potential of the system.  
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1.4. Aims and Objectives of the study 
The present research aims to introduce a scheme for integrating direct biometric key 
JHQHUDWLRQ VFKHPHV ZLWK 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VKDULQJ DOJRULWKP >11] in order to directly 
address the two disadvantages of revocability and exception handling.  
The thesis will describe techniques for:  
- An investigation of template-free multimodal biometric-based encryption in a 
number of scenarios. 
1. Direct generation of encryption keys from biometric multimodalities, using 
a suitable technique from the following three: 
i. Linear equation. 
ii. Quadratic equation. 
iii. Cubic curve. 
2. Generation of a secret share from each modality: 
- An investigation of biometric exception-handling strategiHV XVLQJ 6KDPLU¶V
secret sharing technology, allowing an arbitrary subset of biometric modalities 
to be employed to identify an individual. 
1.5. The Scope of the research 
This research investigated on developing the design of two template-free biometric 
systems, in which biometric data can be mapped onto repeatable unique binary code 
strings in both cases, opening the key only in the presence of biometric prints. The first 
system will use the Gray Level Co-Occurrence Matrix method (GLCM) to extract the 
iris feature, and the second system will use the 2D Gabor Filter. To generate the secret 
key, Shamir¶V secret scheme will be applied to the three data points provided (right 
iris, left iris and password). By use of the linear equation technique, two points of three 
 18 
 
will then be sufficient to release the biometric key, giving the user the desired 
flexibility while reducing the FRR. For both designs, a three-factor scheme is 
proposed, including smartcard, password and biometrics. Here, each component is 
crucial to reveal the biometric data specific to an individual, with the opportunity of 
either updating or revoking the key; all three factors would be required to compromise 
the integrity of key. 
1.6. Research Challenges 
1.6.1. Inter-Class and Intra-Class Variability 
These two types of variation play a fundamental role in the issues related to the pattern 
recognition stage of the biometric system, as they determine the level of receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) performance, which in turn depends on the false-
matching rate (FMR) and false non-matching rate (FNMR). Inter-class variations are 
FRQWUROOHGE\WKHµUDQGRPQHVV¶RIWKHJLYHQVDPSOHV²for instance, as the iris sample 
contains more random characteristics than the fingerprint, the system may perform the 
recognition task of the iris samples at extremely low FMR [24-28]. Nevertheless, the 
µUDQGRP SDWWHUQV¶ IDFWRU RI WKH VXEPLWWHG VDPSOH LQFUHDVHV WKH LQWUD-class variations 
determined at high FNMR. For instance, intra-class variations in the iris samples can 
be introduced by many factors such as pupil contraction/dilation, eyelash/eyelid 
occlusion and reflected light. These issues can be corrected to some extent by use of 
quality control measures at the time of sampling. For example, if the eye is overly 
occluded or blurred, the biometric system will reject the image [26]. However, such 
tactics undermine the ergonomics of the biometrics-based authentication system. There 
is also evidence that a less controlled mechanism can be applied to acquire the iris 
sample, including strategies like capturing the image from a frontal angle and 
obtaining a level position by setting the appropriate tilt of head and gaze direction. 
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1.6.2. Generation of Key Directly from Biometrics Samples 
It is very challenging to generate the key directly from the given biometric sample 
without storing the templates, which are considerably reproducible (key stability) with 
large numbers of effective bits (key entropy). If it is assumed that feature extraction 
from samples taken from the same modality are likely to be consistent, then the feature 
vectors of different irises will inevitably overlap in the feature space, especially when 
the feature space is small. Subsequently, the overlapping feature vectors are likely to 
generate the same potential binary code patterns. If there is a consistent group of irises 
and the multiple feature vectors of an iris overlap with them, the number of effective 
bits can be reduced dramatically because the consistent group will have potentially 
similar binary code patterns, which will inevitably decrease the unique characteristics 
associated with the key. This is one potential scenario for irises belonging to same 
group. 
These issues normally appear in relation to the consistent extraction of feature vectors 
from each iris. Together, these feature vectors will have almost differing degrees of 
variation, which raises many issues due to instability of the key. The issues of 
uniqueness and key stability are therefore associated with the method of generating the 
key directly from the iris sample.  
1.7. Thesis Outline 
The present research encompasses a number of fields. To minimize cross-referencing 
between chapters, the content is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents an in-depth literature review of the background to basic biometrics, 
biometric system errors, a comparison of various biometrics and the advantages and 
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disadvantages of biometrics, biometric cryptosystems and template-free biometrics and 
discussion of current work on direct key generation from the biometric sample. 
Chapter 3 outlines a technique for the extraction of a secret key from a multimodal 
ELRPHWULF V\VWHP XVLQJ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH DOJRULWKP ZKLFK LV DQ HVWDEOLVKHG
technique for protecting a given item of data by means of information distributed to 
several participants. This technique has been used for five different biometric 
modalities: face, index finger, thumb finger, left iris and right iris. 
Chapter 4 outlines a number of investigations of direct key generation from the iris 
modality. These investigations returned negative results and are described as failed 
schemes. The methodologies are discussed, along with reasons for their failure. 
Chapter 5: While the study presented in Chapter 4 returned some negative results, 
much has been gained in terms of knowledge. In light of these issues, Chapter 5 
presents the design of two template-free biometric systems, in both of which biometric 
data can be mapped onto repeatable unique binary code strings, opening the key only 
in the presence of biometric prints. The first system uses the Gray Level Co-
Occurrence Matrix method (GLCM) to extract iris features, and the second system 
XVHVWKH'*DERU)LOWHU7RJHQHUDWHWKHVHFUHWNH\6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHLVDSSOLHG
to the three data points provided (right iris, left iris and password). Two points from 
three are then sufficient to release the biometric key by use of the linear equation 
technique, giving the user the desired flexibility while reducing the FRR. For both 
designs, a three-factor scheme is proposed, to include smartcard, password, and 
biometrics. Here, each component is crucial in revealing the biometric data specific to 
an individual, with the opportunity of either updating or revoking the key; all three 
factors would be required to compromise the integrity of the key. 
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Chapter 6: The final chapter draws general conclusions about the research as a whole 





Chapter 2.  
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In the modern society, the leakage of the personal details through stealing, spoofing or 
unauthorized usage has increased to an alarming extent. [4-6]. Due to lack of security, 
several researchers have focussed on the development of foul-proof biometric systems. 
The literature on the biometric systems and recent advances in this field have showed 
that multi-modal biometric systems can play a vital role in securing the personal 
details from being unauthorized used, stealing and spoofing. This system can free the 
users from burden of remembering the password or carrying the key in pockets in all 
the time by providing the keyless solutions to access their personal bio-data in a 
particular system. However, even the multi-modality of biometric system does not 
make it fault-free due to some weaknesses and pitfalls; and that it can be subject to 
external threats of stealing the saved data in the system. Because the risk of these 
threats, new approach which is called biometric encryption being used to secure the 
public data by providing the key-sharing solution safely. The properties of this new 
approach made this system an exciting researchable area for those working on the 
development of safe and secure biometric solutions for the public and personal data. 
[1, 10, 29].  
Biometric encryption  allows the derivation of encryption keys directly from the 
sample data obtained from the users, thereby eliminating the necessity of the 
preservation of key or template or the reference sample relevant to the stored biometric 
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data. These features add an element of enhanced security to the stored data, and 
prevent any attacks on the system. However, like any other system, this method 
involves two inherent pitfalls in its functioning: difficulty in revoking the generated 
encryption key and its inability to handle the scenario in which user shows his/her 
inability to provide the sample having given biometric modality.  
These issues led to the development of schemes which would allow the integration of a 
direct biometric key using existing biometric key generation schemes by applying the 
6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVKDULQJDOJRULWKP7KHVHHIIRUWVWULHGWRUHPRYHWKHIRUJRLQJLVVXHVRI
exception handling and revocability.  
The proposed scheme in this thesis requires the provision of arbitrary sets of the 
biometric modalities, which will further allow the researcher to assign the arbitrary 
encryption key to each modality, thereby resolving the issue of revocability. This 
allowed the researcher to build a model in which arbitrary key can be supplied to those 
scenario which are unable to produce the required user biometric modality. 
Furthermore, this also allowed the derivation of multiple independent encryption keys 
from a single sub-set of biometric modality. 
Biometric encryption is a method which involves the derivation of keys for encryption 
and decryption by processing the physiological and behavioural characteristics of the 
individual supplying the biometric data. 
2.2 Background  
This section focuses on background information which will be discussed a brief 
literature in biometric and a multi-modal biometric system of implementing various 
aspects which is lead to the main point of this research which is Bio-Cryptosystems 
 24 
 
and template free investigating. Biometrics and cryptography can be combined 
together into a one system by Bio-Cryptosystems. In this chapter, introduction will be 
presented on field of multimodal biometrics and bio-cryptosystems. Then, a discussion 
of a bio-cryptosystem developing was involved by the various methodologies. After 
that, in bio-cryptosystems field the previous works will be carried out by different 
researchers. Finally, a template free technique will be carried and discussed in different 
points views. Moreover, list of previous work will be presented and explained the 
comparison between them.  
2.2.1 History of Biometric Analysis 
The human beings have several biological characteristics which help recognize the 
identity of the individual from each other. For centuries, the distinctive features of 
individual such as gait, voice, face etc are being used to recognize the people from 
each other.  However, it is the raw concept of recognition. Officially, the use of 
biological traits was approved by Alphonse Bertillon, chief of criminal identification 
unit in Paris, for the recognition of criminals in mid 19th century [1, 30]. However, it 
was far from the use of fingerprints for identification of criminals, and that idea was 
discovered in the late 1980s following the historic discovery of fingerprinting by Alec 
Jafferys at the department of Genetics, University of Leicester.  The major law-
enforcement agencies in the UK and the rest of the Europe embraced this method of 
genetic fingerprinting to identify the criminals. The methodology involved the 
collection of genetic fingerprints from the suspects and preservation in the data file 
also referred as a print. The fingerprints often in fragmentary shape gathered from the 
site of crime were compared with those in the database in order to infer the identity of 
the criminal. The accuracy of this method in terms of solving the crime cases produced 
the best results for the prevention of crimes in Europe. Later on, the popularity of this 
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method increased tremendously, and it was accepted by various countries across the 
globe.  There are some other body measurements which came in use for identification 
of the people such as voice and face. This concept of identification of the people were 
not restricted to only law-enforcement agencies, it was also adopted by civilian 
organizations in different countries for the identification of the people entering the 
sensitive areas. For example, the method was used to establish the parenthood, to 
identify the illegal immigrants, security clearance of workers etc [1, 30].  
The pertinent question is what kind of behavioural or physiological traits can qualify to 
be used as a biometric data [1, 30]. The following criteria are required to be met for 
being qualified as biometric data: 
Universality: The selected trait should be universal i.e. each person should have a 
characteristic feature which would define his /her personality 
Distinctiveness: The human physiological and behavioural trait must have distinct 
signatures, which are recognizable from other human beings.  
Permanence. The selected features to be used a biometric data should be invariant, 
which means it should change over the time or with age. 
Collectability: The physiological or behavioural trait used as biometric data should be 
collectable and quantifiable easily. 
There are some requirements for biometric for the practical biometric system which 
employs biometric information for the recognition of personal details. 
Performance:  The system should be accurate, fast and achieve the desired recognition 
level by taking into account different operational and environmental considerations. 
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Acceptability: The system should inferred minimally to the personal lives of the 
individuals, so that its use can be accepted by people easily 
Circumvention: The system should be made foul-proof from any vicious attacks on the 
system intended to steak the information or misuse the individual biometric data for 
fraudulent purpose. It should be robust in enhancing the security of stored data about 
the individuals. 
Harmless: The system should not harm the users physically or health-wise. 
Biometric system is the process of collection of behavioural or physiological data from 
the individuals, which should be able to extract the required set of data on request and 
compare with the template stored in the system in order to confirm the identity of the 
individuals. 
Depending on the requirements, the biometric system may be used in identification 
mode or the in the verification mode. 
Verification mode:  
In this mode, the system verifies the claim of the user which wish to be identified. In 
order to execute its function, the biometric system captured the biometric data from the 
user which might be in form of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or the access 
card smart card, chip card etc, then it makes one-to-one comparison of the individual 
claim of identity with the stored data about the user. On successful comparison, the 
system verifies the identity and allows user the access to the required facilities [30, 
31].  
This mode is applied for the positive recognition, when the motive is to prevent the 




In this mode, the biometric system identify the claim of the user being true or false. 
This is achieved by capturing the data about the users, the system asks the question 
³:KRVHELRPHWULFGDWDLVWKLV"´7KHRQH-to multiple comparison of the captured claim 
is made by the system with all biometric data sets stored in the system. IN the case of 
failure of any match within the database, the system rejects the claim or otherwise 
accepts it. Basic aim of this mode is negative recognition executed to prevent the user 
from taking on multiple identities [30].  
In contrast to positive recognition, the token, PIN, smart cards can not be used for the 
negative identification. This is only achieved using the biometric data provided by the 
user. Nevertheless, the user enrolment is common to both modes of the system [30]. 
+RZHYHUWKHUHVHDUFKHUZLOOXVHWKHWHUP³verification´WKURXJKRXWWKHWKHVLVZLWhout 
having any intention to make distinction between identification and recognition. The 
illustration of verification and identification modes of the biometric system has been 





The process of recognition of the user by verification mode can be given as follows: 
Feature vector extraction from the biometric data given as XQ and a claimed identity I, 
determine if (I, XQ) belongs to class w1 or w2. Where w1 indicate that the claim is a 
genuine user and w2 indicate that the claim  is an imposter user. Typically, XQ is 
matched against XI, where XI is the biometric template corresponding to user I. Thus, 
the following equation will helped to determine the category of the user claim identity.  
ሺ ?ǡ  ? ?ሻ א  ቊ  ? ? ? ? ൫ ? ?Ǥ  ? ?൯ ൒  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Where S represents the extent of similarity between X1 and the feature 
vector XQ DQG ³t´ GHQRWHV WKH SUH-defined threshold. The function S(XQ, 
X1) gives the matching score or similarity index between the claimed 
identity and the biometric data of the user stored in the system [30]. 
Main Modules of Biometric System: 
The biometric system may contain following modules based on the type of the 
function performed by them: 
Figure2.1 Block diagrams of enrollment, verification and identification tasks are shown using the four 
main modules of a biometric system, i.e., sensor, feature extraction, matcher, and system database [30]. 
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- Sensor Module: 7KLVPRGXOHVLV LPSRUWDQWIRUVHQVLQJRUFDSWXULQJWKHXVHU¶V
biometric data. This modules contain camera to take the image of the given 
biological feature of the user such as finger-prints. For instance, the sensor 
module of the finger-print based biometric system takes the image of the ridges 
and valleys of the finger of the user [1, 30]. 
- Feature Extraction Module: This application performs the task of extraction of 
minutiae features such as the local ridges and the valley details of the useU¶V
finger. This processing highlights and specifies the position and orientation of 
the minute structures in the fingerprint image, which are extracted for further 
processing [1, 30]. 
- Matcher Module: This module compares the extracted features of the user with 
the stored templates in the system in order to execute the recognition function. 
For example, the fingerprint biometric system make comparison between the 
minutes structures of ridges and valleys of input finger image to those in the 
template set in the database, the level of similarity between the input and the 
template is expressed by means of matching score which is reported by the 
system. The matcher module also contains the decision module, which takes 
WKHGHFLVLRQRQWKHXVHU¶VFODLPDV³FRQILUPHGYHULILHG´RUWKHXVHU¶VLGHQWLW\
LVHVWDEOLVKHGLGHQWLILFDWLRQ´EDVHGRQWKHPDWFKLQJVFRUH [1, 30]. 
- System database module: This module is also called enrolment module as it 
enrols the users for the provision of the personal data and its successive storage 
in the database of the system. During this phase, the biometric traits of the user 
such as fingerprint are taken by the system through scanning process of the 
fingers. The scanning is performed by the biometric reader, which may or may 
not be supervised by the human during its operation. The quality of the image 
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is checked by various quality control parameters of the image. After ensuring 
the quality and reliability of the image, the feature extractor become 
operational in order to extract the minute features of the biometric data, thereby 
resulting in the compact and illustrative image of the digital representation 
ZKLFKLVDOVRFDOOHGµWHPSODWH¶'HSHQGLQJRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKH
biometric system, the templates may be loaded onto the chip-cards, smart 
cards, issued in form of PINS, tokens or keys. Usually, the system keeps the 
record of multiple templates against a single individual which serves to 
compensate the variations occurring in the biometric data over a particular 
period of time [1, 30]. 
2.2.2 Comparison between Various Biometrics 
There are several biometric characteristics are being used to recognize the identity of 
the user in both police-cum-military and civilian worlds. Based on the characteristics 
of this biometrics, the software designers have developed several applications which 
use them and try to establish the identity of the person in a particular environment. 
However, it must be recognized that no single biometric meet all the requirements of 
the existing system and vice versa. Therefore, it comes down to the fact there is non-
existent of an optimal biometric application or biometric measurement. The 
performance of the applications depends on their operational mode and the properties 
of the biometric measurements for such applications. 
This section describes the various biometrics and their properties for the different 
applications used to develop the biometric system. 
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA):  
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DNA is the unique biochemical molecule which is associated with each individual 
with unique genetic make-up, which constitutes the basis of its utility for identification 
of a personality from the other. The use of DNA for identification purpose is restricted 
to the only forensic application such as to establish the parenthood and to identify the 
criminal in order to resolve the complicated criminal cases [1, 30].  
However there are many issues associated with its use, which must be taken into taken 
during the biometric-based recognition of the people, which are given below: 
Contamination and sensitivity: DNA samples can easily be contaminated or stolen 
from unsuspected person, which can be used to fulfil the ulterior motives [1,30]. 
Recognition issues: It is really difficult to isolate and identify the DNA samples as it 
requires the wet techniques and expertise of the forensic scientists to process such 
samples. Therefore, it can not be used for online applications available for most of 
applications employed for the other biometrics [1, 30]. 
Privacy issues: The genetic make-up of an individual contains some private 
information such the links of hereditary diseases and some other health disorders based 
on the DNA molecule. The processing of DNA samples without authorization and 
revealing the DNA based information about the health status of the individual may 
harm its employment career e.g. during hiring and firing process [1, 30]. 
Ear:  
Ear is used as a biometric to identify the person. The structure of the cartilaginous 
tissues of the pinna and the shape of the ear are the unique features of ear which 
distinguish the person from the other. Normally, the distance between the point of ear 
on the head and the salient point on the pinna are recorded for identification of the 
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people. However, this is not broadly applied across various applications of biometric 
systems due to its intrusiveness and being less distinctive in nature [1, 30]. 
  Face: 
 Face is the most commonly used non obstructive biometric which is historically and 
primordially used by human to recognize the people from each other. The face is used 
to recognize the individuals through static and controlled mug-shot verification in 
addition to dynamic and uncontrolled identification especially in the cluttered 
environment of the airport. The various attributes of face are used for the recognition 
purpose such as the positions of nose, eyes, eye-brows, lips, chin and their special 
relationships with each other. Furthermore, the global analysis of the face image is also 
utilized to recognize the face of the person by using the weighted combination of a 
number of canonical faces representing the face image [1, 30]. 
Although the performance of commercially available identification and verification 
biometric system by using the face image is sufficient, but the biometric applications 
used for this purpose impose a set of restrictions on the style of images for the accurate 
recognition of the face image [35]. For example, the biometric system requires the 
particular illumination method and the background of the image in order to recognize 
the face. The performance of face recognition based biometric system is drastically 
affected if they are presented with face images taken in different light and background 
view. Furthermore, there is also argument about the level of the confidence by which 
such applications area capable to recognize the person from other people based on the 
contextual information obtained from the face [37]. 
The performance of the given biometric system is judged by its capacity to detect 
automatically the posture of face in its right orientation, locate the face of a requested 
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person if there are many faces available in the database, and recognize the face from its 
general viewpoint. 
Facial, hand and hand vein infrared thermogram:  
  The pattern of heat generated by the hand, face and other body parts is characteristic 
to every individual, which could be imaged using the hidden infrared camera. This is 
non-obstructive method and works like taking the photographs of an individual 
secretly, as the device does not need the contact with the physical features of the 
human to execute its imaging operation. However, taking the image in the cluttered 
environment is really challenging. For example, if the person is surrounded by hear 
radiators, heat pipes, and heater or some other heat emanating surfaces, it becomes 
difficult to take the thermogram of the required person. The patterns of heat generated 
by the person and other heat emanating surfaces in the environment are likely conflict 
with each other, making it difficult to recognize the thermogram belonging to the 
required individual. In similar fashion, the near infrared camera takes the images of the 
pattern of veins in the clenched fist of the individual which is characteristic to each 
person. This technology can be seen widespread due to prohibitively high cost of 
infrared and near infrared camera [1, 30]. 
Fingerprint: 
The fingerprints are unique to very individual. Even the fingerprints from the identical 
twins vary from each other, though they share the identical genetic make-up. The 
pattern of fingerprints is developed during the seventh month of the fetal development, 
and consists of ridges and valleys on the surface of the tips of the fingers. Normally, 
the index finger of the right hand is used for the verification and identification of the 
person based on the fingerprints. The pattern of fingerprints has been used for 
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centuries to identify the individuals from each other apart from the salient features of 
the face [32].  
The widespread use of this biometric measurement for the identification has become 
widespread due to the cheap and affordable cost of the fingerprint scanner (~ $20 US 
when ordered in bulk quantity). The integration cost of these scanners in the system 
like the laptop or desktop computer is also marginal. The several applications employ 
the fingerprint scanner for the identification and verification the identity of the people 
at places like airports, the areas of high sensitivity requiring the restricted access, the 
national and international civilian institutions etc. This biometric system is highly 
suitable for both small-to medium scale identification events involving a few hundred 
users and the large scale recognition events involving millions of identities [30]. 
The major drawback of such applications is their requirement of extensive computing 
resources, especially when they are operated in the identification mode. The 
identification of the small fraction of the population through fingerprints based 
biometric system is highly challenging due to genetic, environmental, aging and 
occupational factors. For example, the people related to the manual work may have 
cuts and bruises on their hands, which make it difficult to identify them by matching 
their fingerprints with the cognate templates in the database [30]. 
Gait: 
The way people walk on the surface of the ground is called gait which is set of spatial-
temporal biometric measurements. The gait is behavioural trait and characteristic to 
every individual to some extent. However, it changes over the time due to age, injuries, 
fluctuations in the body weight etc. Therefore, it is not very distinctive trait like 
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fingerprints and face. Consequently, its application for the recognition of the person is 
restricted to only those low-security applications [30].  
The processing of the gait biometric for the verification purpose require the set of steps 
during the sample walk of the required individual. The application measures the 
several various joint movements during the walk and save them in video formats, 
which are recalled for verification on the request. The processing of these biometric 
measurements require the extensive input of data and the computational labour, which 
makes it expensive and less feasible to be applied in every situation for the verification 
of the people [1, 30]. 
Hand and Finger Geometry: 
The hand geometry based biometric system relies on the shape of the hand, the size 
and width of the fingers, the temporal-spatial relationships of the fingers with each 
other. The accuracy and reliability of these systems is fairly good, their installations 
can be found in hundreds of the places around the world for the verification of the 
people. Thus commercial available hand geometry based biometric systems can be 
purchased at the affordable cost [1, 30]. 
Furthermore, the hand geometry based systems can not be used to identify the person 
from the large population, as the hand geometry is less distinctive compared to voice, 
face and fingerprints. However, they are highly suitable for the verification of the 
persons. In addition, the hand geometry may be affected by the diseased condition like 
arthritis, the jewellery worn on fingers like rings. These limitations pose a challenge is 
H[WUDFWLQJWKHFRUUHFWLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWRQH¶VKDQGJHRPHWU\7KRXJKWKHVL]HV of the 
commercially available fingers based biometric system involving the index and middle 
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fingers are fairly smaller than those for the hand-geometry based systems, but their 
sizes are still larger than face, fingerprints and voice based biometric systems [1, 30]. 
Iris: 
The Iris is the characteristic feature of every individual, which is bounded by the pupil 
and the sclera on either side of the eye. The visual texture of the iris is formed during 
the fetal growth and developmental process, and it is kept in stabilized state for the 
first two years of life. The complexity lent to the textures of iris makes it characteristic 
feature to every individual, and that this can be utilized as a basis of recognition of 
individual from each other. The performance and accuracy of the commercially 
available iris based biometric system is fairly high [1, 30].  
Due to the promising results in terms of speed and accuracy makes this system to be 
deployed in large scale applications aimed to identify the individuals from the large 
population. Like fingerprints, the irises belonging to two identical twins are different, 
and this distinctiveness makes it highly suitable candidate to be used as the biometric 
characteristic for the identification purposes. The best feature of the iris feature that it 
can not be tampered with the surgical processes and it is easier to recognize the 
artificial or implanted iris. In the past, this technology remained very expensive and 
non-feasible to be deployed for the large scale identifications. However, the modern 
iris based biometric system are more cost-effective, efficient and user friendly [1, 30]. 
Keystroke: 
It is postulated that everyone has its own characteristic way of keying in the 
information. This is behavioural characteristic which may not be invariant and very 
distinctive like other biological traits such as fingerprints; therefore, this feature is not 
manipulated to identify the individuals. However, this may be useful in the verifying 
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the identity of individual from the sample population. This is non-obstructive 
discriminatory method which can take the information while the person keying in the 
information on the computer without his/her knowledge [1, 30]. 
Odour: 
It is well known fact that each body exudes a particular odour due to distinct chemical 
composition. The human also exudes a characteristic odour from their bodies, which is 
signature of every individual. This characteristic feature can be used for the 
identification of individual, during which the whiff of air around the required 
individual is captured and sprayed over the large array of sensors specialised for the 
detection of various chemical groups in the composition of the sprayed air. In this way, 
the variations in the chemical components of the human odour form the basis of the 
identification by the odour based biometric system. It is still unclear whether the effect 
of deodorant smells and various other chemicals in the surrounding air affect the 
accuracy and performance of such systems [1, 30]. 
Palmprint: 
The palm of each individual contains characteristic ridges and valleys structures, 
wrinkles and principal lines which are characteristics to each individual. Since the 
SDOP¶VDUHDLVODUJHUWKDQWKHILQJHUWLSVWKH\DUHPRUHGLVWLQFWLYHWKDQWKHILQJHUSULQWV
and carry the better identification and verification value.  
The applications employed to capture the bigger image because the area of the palm is 
larger is than the fingers. Therefore, the high resolution Palmprint based biometric 
system is bulkier and bigger than the fingerprint based biometric system, which makes 
them expensive to be installed everywhere. However, being bigger and special and 
containing more distinctive characteristics, the distinct image can be captured by even 
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the low-resolution scanners which are much cheaper than the high-resolution ones. 
Nevertheless, the application of high resolution scanner gives much clearer view of the 
hand geometry, wrinkles, ridges, valleys and principal lines, which increases the 
accuracy and performance of the Palmprint based biometric system [1, 30]. 
Retinal Scan: 
The retinal vasculature is an important part of the eyes which holds the special 
structural features characteristic feature of every individual, which makes the basis of 
its use in the identification and verification biometric system.  Like the iris based 
biometric system, it is also one of the securest biometric system as the user can not 
manipulate with retina of his or her eye. During the scan process, the user is asked to 
focus on the special point in the visual field in order to capture the image of the retina 
vasculature. This involYHVWKHXVHUV¶DFFHSWDQFHDQGHIIRUWWREHLQYROYHGLQWKHVFDQ
process; and that these factors seriously affect the acceptance level of the retinal scan 
among the subjects. Furthermore, the retinal scan can also reveal the presence of some 
medical condition such as hypertension, which makes it another deterring factor in the 
acceptance of retinal scan based biometric systems [1, 30]. 
Signatures: 
Signatures are used for the verification person in several legal, government and 
commercial transactions, since it is known that the way individuals put their signatures 
on the paper is unique to each individual. Although, the signatures are styled to each 
individual and considered to be an important behavioural biometric, but they are not 
invariant. They can be subject to variations due to emotional and physical states of the 
signatories. Even the signatures put by the same person in successive attempts may 
include the small variations. Moreover, the forgers can reproduce the same signature in 
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order to fool the system. The signatures also require the acceptance of the user, contact 
with the writing instruments and cooperation. These factors can deter its versatility in 
the verification of persons through biometric system [1, 30]. 
  
Voice: 
Voice is also used as a vital biometric for the recognition of the persons for centuries. 
In order to speak, the user uses his/her mouth, vocal tracts, lips, tongue, nasal cavities, 
and these appendages vary in the size in every individual. This makes the voice pattern 
of a person distinctive of those uttered by the other people. The voice or sound patterns 
may be affected by weather (cold, hot) and emotional conditions (sadness, happiness), 
from which it can be inferred that voice is also a behaviour biometric which is not 
invariant for a person. The voice is also undergoes variations over time, with age and 
diseased conditions. Because of these factors, voice is not universally used for the 
large scale identification of persons [1, 30]. 
Figure2.2 Examples of biometric characteristics: a) DNA, b) ear, c) face, d) facial thermogram, e) hand thermogram, f) 
hand vein, g) fingerprint, h) gait, i) hand geometry, j) iris, k) palmprint, l) retina, m) signature, and n) voice [1, 30]. 
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There are three types of the voice based biometric system: text-dependent, text-
independent, phone based biometric systems. In the text-based biometric system, the 
subject is asked to read through the pre-determined text in order to verify the voice 
pattern. This system is considered more accurate but is not safe because the 
professional forgers can copy the style of reading the text that fool the system. 
Similarly, the text-independent biometric system recognizes the person based on 
whatever the subject speaks during normal conversation. Though it is safer method in 
terms of offering protection against fraudulent practices, but it requires some 
intricacies in its design which are sometimes difficult to achieve. Phone voice based 
biometric system may be good alternative to the text-dependent biometric system if 
the quality of the voice is protected from degradation by using the standard quality of 
communication channels and microphone [1, 30]. 
The brief comparison between all the biometrics described above is demonstrated in 
Table 1.1 using seven factors which are required to qualify a certain biological trait to 
be a good biometric. From the comparison, it is clear that there is not a single biometric 
system which meets the seven-point criteria of the effective biometric system, which 
indicates the non-existent of an optimal system for the perfect optimal level of 
performance and accuracy. For instance, it is a well-known fact that fingerprints and 
iris based biometric system are more accurate than voice based biometric system. 
Nevertheless, the voice-based biometric system is preferred to the fingerprints based 
ELRPHWULF V\VWHP GXH WR VHDPOHVV LQWHJUDWLRQ RI FXVWRPHU¶V YRLFH LQWR WKH WHOHSKRQH
system during the tele-banking transactions. 
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2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Biometrics 
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of two important biometric 
applications are examined in detail: the commercial positive recognition applications 
which is capable to work in both identification and verification modes, and the forensic 
negative recognition application mostly employed by governmental agencies that 
require identification of the individuals asking access to the highly sensitive areas.. 
2.2.3.1 Positive Recognition in Commercial Applications 
Commonly there are two methods used to execute the positive recognition:  
Knowledge-based method: this method involves the allocation of PINS and passwords 
to the users to access certain facility. The option of setting password is given to the 
users who use words or digits, or mixed words and digits which can be easily 
remembered by them. Normally, the names of family members, birthdays, and 
favourite movies, names of schools or colleges attended by users are taken as 
passwords. According to a survey of 1200 British office workers, it was found that 
RIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVFKRVHQWKHLURZQQDPHVIDPLO\PHPEHU¶VQDPHVSHW¶VQDPH
as their passwords to login the system. Whilst the rest of participants had selected the 
names of their favourites stars (Darth Vader, Homer Simpson) to be their passwords.  
Such passwords can easily crack by password crackers using the simple brute force 
dictionary attack method [1, 30].  
It is considered to be highly advisable to set the different passwords for the different 
applications and to keep changing the passwords after certain time period. These 
practices confer the enhanced protection upon the system against any malicious attack. 
However, most of the people ignore these cautions and set the same passwords for all 
the applications to avoid headache of remembering different passwords, which 
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provides a weak security to their applications. If the hacker is able to break a password 
for single application, it is more likely that all applications would be hacked [1, 30]. 
For instance, the hacker may create a bogus website enticing the users to sign in to 
achieve some air miles or other monetary benefits. When the user enter the username 
and password to access the site, the passwords are hacked. The hacker may employ the 
XVHUV¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ XVHU QDPH DQG SDVVZRUG WR KDFN WKH FRUSRUDWH EDQN
accounts or some other sensitive information which can be used to threaten the user. 
Furthermore, the hacker need to hack a single password being used to operate the 
intranet of the company in order to hack the whole systems used by different 
employees. In this way, the single password option weakens the security of the overall 
system [1, 30]. 
Similarly, longer passwords are often considered to be a secure method to protect the 
system, which can be written by user on some paper or cell phone because of difficulty 
in remembering them. However, they are not secure and can be stolen easily by some 
malicious agent. These types of passwords can easily lost or forgotten, so the recovery 
of these passwords is done by the Help desk. The help face has to incur cost of US$38 
to recover a single password for the customer [1, 30].  In short, the short passwords are 
secure while the long passwords are more secure but easily forgotten or lost [1, 30]. 
Cryptographic techniques are developed to create the encryption keys using encryption 
method which creates strong and secure long passwords consisting of long words. The 
EHVWWKLQJDERXWHQFU\SWLRQNH\VLVWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WQHHGWREHUHPHPEHUHGE\WKHXVHUV
and that they are protected by simple passwords, thereby making the system highly 
secured and immune to fraudulent attacks [1, 30].   
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Token-based methods: in this method the special keys and chip cards are issued to the 
users for the identification purpose. If the keys or tokens are shared among the 
colleagues, it becomes difficult ti recognize who used the system using the shared key 
for his/her ulterior purposes. The problems associated with knowledge-based methods 
are also related to the possession-based personal recognition method. For instance, 
tokens or keys may be stolen, misused, a master key can be made to open several keys 
being used to operate a system [1, 30]. 
Biometrics-based recognition method: In view of insecurity and issued relating to the 
both foregoing methods, the system is exposed to greater risk for being manipulated by 
the malicious agents. Therefore, a biometric systems are developed for the 
identification are verification of the individuals. The biometrics can not be stolen or 
misused or hacked like the passwords or the tokens. The person requesting the identity 
or verification need to be present at the time of request processing, which makes very 
less likely that access is denies to the right person or provided to the false identity. The 
duplication of the biometrics is also difficult, and this makes the system more secured 
and reliable. Moreover, the computer network working on the biometric provides an 
equal level of security to all users, so it is difficult to break the security to all users 
even using the social engineering methods [1, 30]. 
In addition, the biometrics based recognition system confer incredible security level on 
the system, gives users the freedom from remembering the multiple passwords and 
carrying the keys/tokens in  pockets at all times [1, 30]. 
Probability of brute force attack on the biometric system 
The probability of brute force attack on the biometric system is possible. However, the 
success of such attack is dependent on the matching accuracy of the biometric system 
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being operated in the verification mode in a commercial application. Let us consider a 
scenario in which the application is working at 0.001% FMR. Under these conditions, 
most of the biometric systems are capable to deliver FNMR less than one percent 
(1%). These conditions can lead one to conclude that one of 100,000 brute force 
attacks are likely to succeed in fooling the system. This level of security is equivalent 
to that offered by the randomly chosen 5-digit PIN method which requires the 100,000 
brute force attacks (50,000 on average) in having success to access the password 
protect system [1, 30]. 
The probability of success is further reduced by the stringent requirements of the 
biometric applications. They normally require thousands of the biometric sample to 
allow the hacker succeed in breaking the system, which is extremely difficult in 
comparison with generating thousands copies of the PINs and passwords. Further 
protection can be granted by lowering the FMR and raising the FNMR values 
simultaneously of the system at the cost of greater inconvenience to the users. 
Moreover, the inconvenience is always faced by users whenever an attempt is made to 
provide higher security to the application, for example, the long passwords can 
increase security but simultaneously increase the inconvenience of remembering and 
correctly typing them to have access the system [1, 30]. 
However, several commercial based applications tried to operate the system in the 
identification mode rather than in verification mode in order to reduce the 
inconvenience to the users. They do not require the identity claim from the users. The 
speed of such applications is the biggest challenge, and furthermore, the accuracy is 
even worse than the speed in some situations [1, 30]. 
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Suppose a fingerprint based biometric application with 10,000 users operating in an 
identification mode. It requires the special hardware set up and the fast fingerprint 
matching algorithm to make identification within few seconds. If the FMR value of the 
application in verification mode is equal to 0.001%, then value of FMRN in 
identification mode will be equivalent to 10% (10,000 x 0.001%). This implies that if 
an imposter uses his/her 10 fingers on both hands for identification, he/she is more 
likely to succeed in gaining access to the system. This indicates that system is at 
greater risk of being manipulated by imposters [1, 30].  
The small-to-medium scale applications involving few hundred users may use single 
biometric based identification system, while the large scale applications involving 
thousands of users need much more sophistication and security precautions in their 
design. The multi-modal biometric systems are the best options to design large scale 
applications. In multimodal biometric system, combination of two or more than two 
biometrics are utilized in order to execute the identification of the user. For example, 
the combination of index fingerprint and face or the fingerprints from two fingers in 
combination can be used in multimodal biometric system [1, 30]. 
 
2.2.3.2 Negative Recognition in Government and Forensic Applications 
The negative recognition in government and forensic applications are designed to 
SUHYHQW WKH WHUURULVWV RU KLMDFNHUV IURP ERDUGLQJ SODQH RU FKHFNLQJ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
background. This is executed by operating the application in an identification mode.  It 
is real challenge to achieve the same level of accuracy with the identification mode of 
biometric systems as with the verification mode, primarily because of large number of 




In order to understand this idea let us suppose a scenario in which Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) is searching for 100 most wanted criminals, which means that 
database size is 100. The operating conditions of a commercial biometric system 
working in verification mode includes 1% FNMR and 0.001% FMR.  Given these 
operating conditions, the biometric system would fail to match the correct persons 1% 
time and would erroneously report the wrong person to be the correct person 0.001% 
time [1, 30]. 
Now consider the scenario when this biometric system is operated in the identification 
mode. The operating performance of the biometric system will be changed into 
FNMRN = 1%; FMRN = 0.1% (100 x 0.001%), which indicates that the biometric 
system has 99% probability to catch the right criminal out of the sample population. 
Suppose, if this biometric system is deployed as an identification system on US airport 
which enrols 200,000 passengers per day for the identification purpose, it is likely to 
generate 200 false alarms. Moreover, if face is used instead of fingerprints for the 
identification, the number of misses and the false alarms will spike considerably owing 
to the poor capability of the system to capture the high-quality face image in the 
cluttered environment of airport with the varying shades of light [1, 30].  
This indicates that deployment of automatic biometric system with single biometric 
option for the negative identification is likely to create problems for the security staff 
at the airport due to generation of false results. Multimodal biometric systems can 
significantly improve the accuracy of negative recognition in biometric applications. 
Basswords and PINs can further jeopardize the security level of biometric systems 
designed for negative recognition, therefore, the traditional biometric applications are 
not suitable for the negative recognition [1, 30].  
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Despite the low efficiency and accuracy of the automatic biometric application for 
negative recognition, this is the only option for the large-scale identification 
applications. These automatic biometric systems can be made more effective by 
converting them into semi-automatic applications. The semi-automatic status can be 
achieved by hiring  staff for manual examination of the false alarms generated by the 
system in order to make a final decision. For instance, only 5 FBI agents are required 
to manually examine the 200 false alarms by the system daily. In this way, the semi-
automatic biometric application can help to catch the criminal by combining the 
automatic and manual examinations of the given templates with those stored in the 
database [1, 30]. 
Similarly, the application for the negative recognition of the background checks and 
forensic criminal identification can also be operated in semi-automatic and cost-
effective fashion. For instance, in latent search mode, an Automatic Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) can reduce the number of fingerprint matches executed 
by staff members from millions to hundreds, and forensic experts examines the data to 
give final verdict on it [1, 30].  
Finally, it can be concluded that biometric applications for the negative recognition are 
the safest way to identify the required individual; and it does not infringe upon the civil 
OLEHUWLHV)RUH[DPSOHLIWKHV\VWHPKROGVDSHUVRQ¶VGDWDLQWKH³FULPLQDOGDWDEDVH´LW
will be recalled, otherwise he/she will not be remembered by it. Furthermore, 




2.2.4 Biometric Privacy Protection 
One of the important challenges in the biometric application is the protection of the 
data of users from being attacked or from the being leaked to the third party which can 
manipulate the data to blackmail or threaten the users. The attacks on the privacy of the 
users in the biometric applications have been addressed by the legislation in different 
countries, so that the flow of data within the country or trans-border can be prevented 
to protect the data privacy of the users. These laws has been developed and enforced by 
the developed countries to thwart the privacy violations at different data processing 
phases in the biometric applications [160].  
For instance, the legislation has been made in the European countries to prevent the 
storage of incorrect data of the users, the abusive or unauthorised data disclosure to the 
third part or unlawful storage of the data by any organization within the country. 
Different governing measures taken by European governing bodies such as OECD 
Guidelines, initiatives SDVVHGE\³&RXQFLORI(XURSH¶V&RQYHQWLRQRIWKH3URWHFWLRQRI
,QGLYLGXDOV´ EDVLFDOO\ JRYHUQ WKH SULYDF\ SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH XVHUV RI ELRPHWULF
applications. OECD Guidelines are related to violation of data disclosure to other 
countries. Similarly, EU issues tow important directives to prevent the violation of data 
privacy, which include 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC specifically designed for the tele-
communication sector ((European Parliament and Council, 1995, 1997) [160, 164, 
165]. Furthermore, the EU also issued another directive 2002/85/EC which prevent the 
privacy attack on the data of users from the internet-based applications (European 
Parliament and Council, 2002) [160, 166]. 
After carefully reviewing the data protections rules and regulations in different 
countries, it can be argued that there are some common elements in the framework built 
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by the governing bodies concerning the protection of data privacy in the biometric 
applications. These common elements include the security, anonymity, data leakage, 
unlawful storage of data, accuracy of data and specification of the data and processing 
of data fairly for all the registered users to the biometric applications (Biometric 
Working Group, 2002)[160, 161]. The laws and legislations also permits the users to 
access the data without any hindrance and to edit the personal data by adding or 
deleting functions provided on the interface of data for each users. The further 
obligations have been imposed on the persons involved in data collection, data 
processing and data storing. Without authorization, the controllers of the data can not 
amend or replace any part of the personal data of users [160]. 
According the forging elements of the privacy framework, the controllers of the 
biometric applications are only allowed to collect the data with specific purpose which 
should be mentioned along with the file of data. The data should be adequate without 
having the excessive inIRUPDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH XVHUV¶ SHUVRQDO KLVWRU\ (CNIL, 2001) 
[160, 163]. The data which is declared as incomplete or inadequate need to be erased 
by the data controllers. Regarding the element of anonymity, the personal data of the 
users should not be disclosed to the third party, and should not be stored longer than it 
is required for the processing of certain information (Frankel, 2000) [160, 167].  
According to the element of security, the data controllers are required to put in place 
reasonable technical, organizational and the legislative measures to prevent the 
unauthorised use of the user data, its disclosure to the malicious agents and occurrence 




At the design level, the biometric systems are required to comply with the legislations 
and laws regarding the protection of the data by considering all the foregoing elements 
of the data protection framework. The controllers of the system should define the 
personal data for the data manipulation purposes (Prabhakar et al., 2003) [160, 169]. 
The personal data is defined as a set of data which enables the identification of the 
person through assignment of the special numbers, codes or signs to the person to 
which the data belongs. It may contain the record of physical injuries, information 
about the health, employment, physiological and mental characteristics (Matsumoto, 
2002) [160, 170]. According to this definition, all the information retrieved from the 
users are stored in the form of users data templates which should be treated out of 
VFRSHRI WKHFRXQWU\¶V OHJLVODWLRQ7KHGHVLJQRIELRPHWULFDSSOLFDWLRQV LV UHTXLUHG WR
process the data anonymously in complaint with the privacy protection laws (Vaclav, 
M. and Zdenek,, 2000) [160, 171]. 
In short, the data protection issues can be resolved by making and complying with the 
legislations and laws which should be applied the architecture of the system and 
controllers of the biometric applications [160]. 
2.2.5 Multimodal Biometrics 
In this system, two or more than two uni-modal biometrics are integrated into single 
system in order to make it multi-modal biometrics, which can be operated either in 
verification or identification mode. These systems are useful and flexible in terms of 
allowing the user to set the modality or change the modalities for the given sample 
required to be identified or verified [38]. There are several advantages of multimodal 
biometrics, some of them are listed below: 




x They are flexible to accommodate the unusual traits which otherwise can not be 
processed by the uni-modal biometric system. 
x They are highly resistant to the spoofing attacks because of difficulty in 
penetrating through the functions and modalities of the system compared with 
uni-modal biometric system. 
Many approaches known as fusion exist for integrating multiple modalities. Fusion 
approaches can be distinguished in two ways.  First of all, fusion could be carried out 
at different levels. Hong et al. categorized multi-biometric recognition systems into 
three architectures based on biometric data fusion [38].  Modalities could be 
combined at the feature level, the score level, or the decision level.  Secondly, fusion 
could be based on rules or based on machine-learning approaches [39, 40]. 
The rule based approached adopted for the integration of multiple modalities into the 
biometric system include min score, max score, and simple sum [39, 41]. There are 
also machine learning approaches named for integration, which include vector 
machines, decision trees, multi-OD\HU SHUFHSWLRQ )LVKHU¶V OLQHDU GLVFULPLQDWH DQG
minimum cost Bayesian classifier [39, 42]. In addition, the implementation of the 
multi-modal biometric systems can be carried out using the combination of biometrics 
DQG FU\SWRJUDSKLF FRQFHSWV WHUPHG DV µ%LRPHWULF-&U\SWRV\VWHPV¶ 7KH ELRPHWULF-
cryptosystems contain cryptographic technique which allow the integration and fusion 
of the multi-modalities instead of the fusion approaches employed for this purpose.   
The fusion approaches require the calculation of weights of the modalities for the 
classification purpose, while the biometric-cryptosystems do not need to calculate 
these weights for all modalities, thereby allowing the flexibility to change or use any 
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to perform the flexible functions of recognition than the fusion approach based multi-
modal biometrics system. The various methodologies used for implementation of 
multi-biometrics system are described in section 2.2.6.  
2.2.6 Biometric Cryptosystems 
These are the biometric systems in which a cryptographic key binds monolithically 
with the template of the XVHUVWRUHGLQWKHV\VWHP¶VGDWDEDVHLQVXFKDZD\WKDWNH\FDQ
not be revealed unless the authentication of the perfect match is declared [43]. The 
binding of the key with the template meets the requirements of security, distortion 
tolerance and discrimination which are defined as follows [16, 44, 45]: 
Security: Security is promise of the biometric system that neither the key nor the 
template will be revealed to the hacker. 
Discrimination:  Discrimination is the capability of the biometric system that all the 
users enrolled on it are identified with their original identifies and different keys are 
issued separately to them. 
Distortion tolerance:  Distortion tolerance is the ability of the biometric system to 
tolerate the small variations in the input data at different times the same user claims 
his/her identity. Due to this ability, the biometric system is supposed to output the 
same key for the same user under different conditions and timings of the claim of 
identity. 








Three approaches have been reported to implement the bio-cryptosystem using the 
binding mechanism of the key with the template, which include biometric based key 
generation method, biometric based key release method and biometric based key 
revocation [16, 44]. 
2.2.6.1 Biometric Based Key Generation 
There are normally two established methods of generating the biometric keys from the 
sample: direct biometric key generation and the indirect key generation. In the direct 
key generation scheme, the biometric key is generated directly from the biometric 
samples without having requirement of matching with the template in the database 
(template free).  
However, in indirect key generation scheme, the key is embedded into the template of 
the biometric data such as iris or fingerprints. Whenever the user wants to gain access 
to the system, the given biometric data is matched with the biometric template. On 
successful matching, the key is released. In other words, in this method, the key is 
generated based on the input biometric information provided to the system. The major 
challenge in this method is maintaining the entropy of the key and the security of the 
biometrics data simultaneously [16, 44]. 
The literature in this area is sparse until now. Handful of empirical evidence can be 
found in the area of biometric based key generation method. The proposed 
Figure2.3 Uni ±Biometric Cryptosystem [16, 44] 
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methodologies can be bifurcated into two categories: Error-coding approach and 
6KDPLU¶VNH\VKDULQJVFKHPH approach [11, 44, 46]. 
2.2.6.1.1 Error Correcting Code Scheme 
In this scheme, the codeword and decoding functions are assigned to the templates of 
the user at the time of enrolment. The hash values assigned to codeword are employed 
directly as key or a seed to implement the key generation function. The biometric data 
stored in the database is used to calculate or retrieve the hash values or codeword at the 
time of authentication [44]. 
Typical error-correcting code based key generation methods are given below: 
Biometric Encryption Algorithm (BEA) 
Fuzzy Commitment Scheme (FCS) 
Fuzzy Vault Scheme (FVS) 
BEA utilizes the Fourier transform to match the fingerprint image to the template 
keys in the database, while FVS and FCS are normally applied to face, iris and 
fingerprints based biometric systems, and depend on the various unusual biometric 
traits to measure the closeness of the input data with templates, such as set distance 
and Hamming distance [38]. 
2.2.6.1.2 6KDPLU¶VSecret Sharing Scheme (SSS) 
The SSS, as described in [11], is a well-known and commonly used cryptographic 
method, which when given a secret, divides the secret into a number of unique shares. 
The original secret can be retrieved by using a sub-set of these shares. This technique 
is also referred to as Shamir¶Vk-n threshold scheme, whereby a secret is divided into n 
shares and k is the minimum subset size to retrieve the secret (i.e. at least k shares, 
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from a maximum of n shares, are required to retrieve the secret). Being able to 
reconstruct the original secret from any subset of shares (provided that the subset is 
greater the k) is a very useful property and is an important aspect of this 
implementation [11]$EDVLFRYHUYLHZRI6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVKDULQJVFKHPHIROORZV 
2.2.6.1.2.1 Secret Division 
This scheme was invented by Shamir and Blakely in 1979, which is actually two 
threshold-based SSS method (k, n). The general logic used behind the construction of 
WKLVVFKHPHZDVWRGLVWULEXWHWKHVHFUHWLQIRUPDWLRQDPRQJµn¶QXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWV
and to unlock this information DQ\FRPELQDWLRQRI µk¶SDUWLFLSDQWVZLOOEH UHTXLUHG
+RZHYHUDQ\µk-1¶SDUWLFLSDQWVWU\LQJWRXQORFNWKHLQIRUPDWLRQZRXOGQRWEHDEOHWR
DFFHVV WKH VKDUHG VHFUHW LQIRUPDWLRQ ,Q RUGHU WR GHILQH WKH VHW RI µk¶ SDUWLFLSDQWV
6KDPLU¶VVFKHPHXVHGWKHSRLQt method to define the mathematical lines and curves. 
For example, threshold any 2 points, 3 points, 4 points would be required to define the 
straight line, parabola and cubic curve, respectively. That is it takes k points to define 
a polynomial of degree k-16KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVKDULQJVFKHPHUHSUHVHQWV WKHVHFUHWDV
the coefficients of a Ní degree polynomial [11]. This polynomial is determined 
using Equation 2.3. 
 ?ሺ ?ሻ ൌ ෍ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?ൌ ൜  ? ൌ  ?ǡ ? ? 㼇? ? ? ? ൐  ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?ሺሻ א   ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
                          
Where: 
Zp denotes that the value is an element in a finite (Galois) field [0,p) where p is a 
prime number larger that a0 and n. 
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Once the random polynomial is defined, the shares are determined by taking n points 
sequentially along the polynomial. This will create tuples of [x, f(x)] where x = [1, n). 
Therefore the shares [D1, Dn) can be evaluated by using Equation 2.4 [11].  ? ?ൌ  ?ሺ ?ሻǡ ǥǥ ǡ  ? ?ൌ  ?ሺ ?ሻǡǥǥ Ǥ ǡ  ? ?ൌ  ?ሺ ?ሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ    
  
Where: 
Di is the ith share. 
Again the secret shares are elements of a finite field [0, p) and are therefore modulo p. 
This provides tuples of [i, Di]. Obviously D0 is the secret value, which should not be 
public and is hence not a share. 
2.2.6.1.2.2 Secret Reconstruction 
In order to recover the original secret, interpolation must be performed. As mentioned 
previously, D0 = a0 = secret and therefore can be retrieved by evaluating the 
polynomial to find f(0). To determine the polynomial and subsequently evaluate it, 
/DJUDQJH¶VLQWHUSRODWLRQDOJRULWhm was implemented as it is one of the most common 
PHWKRGV WR UHFRQVWUXFW WKH VHFUHW /DJUDQJH¶V LQWHUSRODWLRQ GHWHUPLQHV HDFK
coefficient of the polynomial from their respective shares to reconstruct the 
polynomial [11]/DJUDQJH¶VLQWHUSRODWLRQPHthod is presented in Equation 2.3 and is 
employed in Equation 2.5 to evaluate the polynomial when x =  0. 




S is the subset of shares. 
Di is the ith share (i.e. a tuple). 
Figure 2.4 shows the polynomial curve of the linear equation and the secret is the 
point where the line intersects with the y-axis. Namely, this point is the point (0,f(0)) 
=  (0, D0). Each share is a point on the line. Any two points determine the line and 
hence the secret. With just a single point, the line can be any line that passes the point, 
and hence the secret can be any point on the y-axis. [11] 
2.2.6.2 Biometric  Based Key Release method 
In this method, the biometric key is assigned to the template of the individual at the 
time of enrolment, which becomes stored permanently as a part of template in the 
V\VWHP¶VGDWDEDVH7KHNH\LVKLGGHQ into a template in such a way that it can not be 
extracted without the perfect match of the template with the input biometric data. The 
keys are normally saved with template along with user name and privileged accessed 
to the system. Whenever, the user claims the identity, the biometric system, the key is 
released on successful authentication of the input biometrics information [43]. The 
illustration of this process is shown in the Figure 2.5. 




The main features of the biometric based key release system include:  
1. 7KHXVHU¶VDFFHVVWRWKHV\VWHPVRWKDWELRPHWULFGDWDFDQEHPDWFKHGWRWKH
templates stored in the database. 
2. On successful match and authentication, the key is released. 
3. Decoupling of the key release and the authentication of the user. 
The storage of transform version of the original templates in the database. This 
measure is important as system stores the templates locally, and it raises the 
security concerns such as higher probability of theft of templates from the 
database. In order to resolve this issue, the system stores the transform version 
of the template. In the event of theft, the new transforms are generated from the 
original templates as shown in Figure 2.6 [43].  
Figure2.5 Biometric Based Key Release System [43]. 




2.2.6.3 Key Revocation 
In cryptographic method, the security of the system is highly dependent on the security 
of the key. If the cryptographic key is comprised, then the whole system will become 
useless and compromised [172]. The cryptographic keys are generated in random 
fashion, as explained in the key generation section in 2.2.6.1.  The users can nor 
remember the key generated by system because of length of key. If small keys are 
generated from the memory point of view, they will become vulnerable to attack. The 
smart card has been designed to remember these keys for each user. However, the 
chance of being lost or stolen, the smart cards were found to be insecure [173].  
The development of biometric authentication system [10] gave a major impetus to the 
security of the XVHUV¶ data and made identity secure. The authenticator is linked with 
direct physical biometric features of the users. The further developments lead to the 
formation of cryptographic based system which creates a string link between the 
biometric data of the users and the generation of the cryptographic key [50]. The 
biometric features are used in two ways: protection of the cryptographic key or 
generation of the key from the biometric information provided by the users. In the first 
scenario, the biometric key is protected by applying the different mechanism used to 
construct the biometric keys such as fuzzy vault scheme [174] or fuzzy commitment 
[45]. The enrolled biometric information of the user will gain access to the key in the 
case of complete match [172, 175].  
HowevHU LQ VHFRQG VFHQDULR WKH XVHUV¶ biometric data is enrolled on trial basis to 
generate key, later on the message is encrypted against the key. The key itself is 
discarded later on. When the user will provide the similar biometric data, the system 
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will revoke the same key against the biometric data after the encryption of the message 
[20, 130, 175]. 
Most of the cryptographic based systems face the problem of key irrevocability which 
is inherent to the biometric data of the users [7]. However the approach of revocable 
key is highly secured in the case of attack on the biometric system. Unlike the 
conventional biometric system the cryptographic based system with ability to key 
revocability FDQ HQKDQFH WKH SULYDF\ SURWHFWLRQ DV ZHOO DV WKH VHFXULW\ RI WKH XVHU¶V
data [20]. 
In this work, the cryptographic based system is being developed which will work on 
the principle of key revocability on the presentation of users data to the system for 
multiple times. This is the novel feature of the proposed cryptographic system 
developed during this research project. The key could be revoked at the time of 
decryption of message from the presented biometric data such as iris and fingerprints 
data without revealing the true data regarding the biometric data. 
2.2.6.4 Previous and Related Work in Bio-Cryptosystems 
During the last decade, various researchers tried to resolve the issues related to the 
integration of the biometrics system into the bio-cryptosystems. Though the number of 
the published works in this field is low and are representative of all the modalities 
being utilized to build the biometric systems, but they still highlight the important 
challenges and possible suggestions to combine biometrics and bio-cryptosystems 
together [43]. The following list of the related work has been presented below, which 
has been carried out in the domain of bio-cryptosystems. The details of these research 
works will be presented in the section 2.2.7.1 




x David et al [19] performed the error correction and cryptography using an 
offline biometrics-based identification scheme. 
x 7KHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIµIX]]\FRPPLWPHQWVFKHPH¶E\-eules and Wattenberg 
[45]. 
x Clancy et al [22] developed secure smart-card based fingerprint authentication 
scheme. 
x Manrose et al [21] generated the password hardening protocol using the 
keystroke dynamics. 
x Hoh and Ngo [48] generated the personalized cryptographic key based on 
Hashing. 
x Hao and Chan [38] performed the successful attempt to enhance the security 
and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems. 
x Dodis et al [44] developed the fuzzy extractors to generate the strong keys from 
biometrics and other noisy data. 
In short, the research works described above reflect the handful approaches made in 
this field, which tried to use bio-cryptographic approaches to resolve the issues related 
to the biometrics based identification system. Furthermore, the important limitation 
observed with these research works was that they only used the short versions of the 
keys which were less secure due to their susceptibility to the potential attacks [7]. They 
also could tolerate only small amount of variations in the query biometrics sample and 
provide the narrow insight into the practicability of the offered solutions [7]. Though 
many researchers devised the strategies to bind the key to the template, but problems 
associated with the biometric domain were not resolved sufficiently [7]. Similarly, 
there are some challenges associated with the use of cryptographic techniques such as 
the stringent requirement for the exact match of the key with the template. 
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Consequently the products designed previously only utilized the tamper-resistant 
hardware for the security to the biometrics systems [49]. This demands more 
comprehensive protocol based techniques using the marriage of biometrics and 
cryptographic methods to generate the secured key binding to the template. 
Subsequently, the two schemes: exception handling and Shamir secret sharing schemes 
were combined in this thesis (presented in Chapter 3) in order to implement the secure 
multi-modal biometric system. 
The method used in this thesis for implementing the multimodal biometrics system is 
based on the hypothesis that biometric modalities can not necessarily be converted to 
binary sequence of data for generating the key shares as is the case in a biometric-
based key generation technique, but instead can be used solely for the purpose of 
releasing the keys as in the case of a biometric based key release system. I have chosen 
to use the biometric based key release approach for a number of reasons which I will 
be discussing shortly. The biometric based key generation technique which is the 
traGLWLRQDO PHWKRG RI LPSOHPHQWLQJ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6KDULQJ $OJRULWKP LQ D ELR-
cryptosystem has a number of disadvantages in contrast to the biometric-based key 
release method and this is evident from the previous work already carried out in this 
field which I discussed in section above. 
2.2.7 Template Free Biometric 
The previous researchers tried to find an interaction between the two important 
security technologies: biometrics and cryptography [50]. Biometrics holds a great 
importance in terms of capturing the various aspects of the biometrics samples 
provided by the users such as iris, fingerprints, voice, face etc. The combination of 
cryptography into biometrics allows the user to obtain a unique signature to access the 
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data. The unique signatures are produced with higher degree of confidence and 
accuracy, which can not be forged or stolen like the PINs/token used by the traditional 
identification systems. The previous research works made attempts to alleviate some 
issues of security by attaching the IBM Transaction Security System or the signature 
verification pen to the unique signatures produced by bio-cryptosystems [8]. 
However, the major loophole of these techniques was their absolute reliance on the 
tamper-resistance property of the hardware to guarantee security. For instance, if the 
token is tampered, both template and the associated key will disappear, thereby 
resulting in the insecurity to the personal data of the users. The hackers can attack the 
V\VWHP IRU EUHDNLQJ WKH WRNHQV¶ VHFXULW\ OHYHO XVLQJ YDULRXV PHWKRGRORJLHV VXFK DV
API attacks on the software of the token normally associated with IBM design and 
exploitation of chip-testing technologies [51].  
Therefore, an attempt has been made to evolve more reliable combination of three 
technologies including biometrics, cryptography and tamper-resistance hardware. 
Nevertheless, the choice of algorithm is a challenging task, as they can increase the 
background noise of the biometric data which is used to give approximate match to the 
template data stored in the database. 
The users have often expressed their reluctance to enrol on the biometric system, 
SULPDULO\EHFDXVHRIWKHLUFRQFHUQVWKDWV\VWHP¶VGDWDEDVHKROGLQJWKHLUSHUVRQDOGDWD
is liable to attacks, opening some possibility of leakage of personal data of users to the 
malicious agents. This has limited the implementation of biometrics system as a 
favourite choice for several organizations working in both public and private domains 
of the society. However, if the users are provided with guarantee that their personal 
data will not be stored in the central database of the biometrics-based identification 
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systems, the implementation of these security technologies can find their way into 
almost every governmental or commercial organization [50, 51].  
This demands a research endeavour aimed to design the template-free biometric 
systems without having requirement of storage of personal data of users within the 
central database. The previous attempts made in this context utilized the mapping 
technique to convert the biometric data into the repetitive binary strings [20, 21, 52-
54]. Subsequently, these binary strings were used to design the encryption key which 
in turn was employed to open the direct hashing [54, 55] or look-up table [20, 52, 53]. 
Despite the inherent flaws and drawbacks of such methods, they offered a bright 
prospect of generating the template-free biometric system. 
The one of the core issues associated with the template-free approach is the high level 
of unreliability related to the individual bits of template data, which is further 
exasperated by a noise background generated by biometrics attributes during their 
measurements. However, the requirement of key demanded by the cryptographic 
method was another obstacle in the way of creation of template-free biometrics 
system. In order reduce the noisy background and exactitude demanded by the 
cryptographic method [21], many attempts had been made to derive the biometric key 
using key-stroke patterns [21] and various biometrics such as voice [20], fingerprints 
[52, 56], facial characteristics [53] and hand-written signatures [54]. 
Nevertheless, the resulting system produced the 20% FRR during verification stage, 
which reduced the feasibility and practicability of implementation of such systems in 
biometrics based identification applications. The biometric data contain some 
unchangeable attributes specific to the individual, therefore, they are resistant to 
changes in them. Key diversity is another challenge in the way of developing template-
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free biometric systems, as multiple keys are required to access various attributes of 
biometric data. The openness of the biometric data also raises some security concerns, 
for example poor quality images of the iris and fingerprints can surreptitiously 
obtained by hidden cameras, which can be used by attacker to steal the personal 
information of the users. Thus the greater level of reliance on the biometric system is 
more likely to increase the security concerns of both users and administrators [51]. 
Furthermore, the biometric data can be spread globally due to travelling of the 
individual to various countries. 
Given the public mistrust about the biometric systems and the foregoing issues 
associated with it, the current study is aimed at the derivation of biometric data from 
iris by addressing the associated issues with this process, as iris represents the most 
authentic source of biometric information specific to an individual with its greatest 
property of distinguishability.  Previous study carried out by Davinda and his 
colleagues [57] used error correction codes methodologies in order to derive the key 
from the iris code. Daugman et al [50] made a similar attempt to construct the 
template-free biometrics system by utilizing only the string of error correction data 
which could be used to acquire the biometric information without derivation of access 
key. They not only designed the two factor scheme to test the identification of token 
and biometric data but they also extended this scheme to three factors by including the 
password as a third factor. The drawback of their two and three factor scheme was that 
the secret key was embedded in the smartcard which was also susceptible to attacks 
launched by hackers. 
2.2.7.1 Previous and Related Work in Biometric Template Free  
In this section, the detailed survey of the previous work related to the construction of 
template free biometric system is presented [16, 20, 21, 52-54]. Monrose et al [21] 
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conducted a pioneering research work to build a key extraction model using the 
keystroke dynamics. They derived the binary string from the typing pattern of the 
SHUVRQDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\FRPELQHGLWZLWKWKHXVHU¶VSDVVZRUGWRH[WUDFWDKDUGHQHG
password. In the model, each bit corresponded to the discrete keystroke property, 
which accommodated a bit-feature variation by allowing the exercise of error tolerance 
property to some extent. Furthermore, they applied the concatenation method to 
generate the short strings of bits. In the follow-up research work, they improvised upon 
their previous model and constructed the reliable voice biometrics system by applying 
the discretization method [20]. The major improvements made by them in their feature 
extraction model included an increase in entropy of biometric key from 12 bits to 46 
bits, a fall in FFR from 48.4% to 20% [20]. 
Nevertheless, another biometric system based on the hand written signatures were 
developed by Hao and Chan, which produced 43 different hand written signature 
features defined by taking into consideration of various attributes of the users such as 
azimuth, velocity, pressure and altitude. Bits were produced for each feature using the 
feature coding method, and were further used to create a binary string. The salient 
features of their model of key extraction included an achievement of 40-bit key 
entropy, 1.2% false acceptance rate, 28% FRR [54].    
Fingerprints based biometric system is recognized as one of the historical and mostly 
used biometric system for the identification of criminals to solve the criminal cases 
[50, 51]. The pioneering work has been conducted by Soutar et al who developed the 
first commercial fingerprints biometrics system. They applied Fourier transform and 
majority coding techniques for the extraction of the phase data from the fingerprints 
sample and reduction of the feature variation element, respectively. Notably, unlike 
following the approach of assigning key to the fingerprints sample, they locked the 
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sample with a random key embedded within it, resulting in the creation of phase-phase 
product. The salient feature of their fingerprints based biometric system was that it 
required the presence of another genuine sample for the authentication purpose, which 
revolutionized the world of biometric technology by providing the facility of 
assignment of random keys to the fingerprints samples taken from the users. However, 
this system could not be supported by good quality performance data, which restricted 
its widespread applications. 
Similarly, Clancy et al [52] carried out research work on the generation of key from 
the fingerprints. They recorded the minutiae points of the fingerprints as real points, 
and created locking set of these points. Furthermore, they derived the locking key by 
applying the binomial reconstruction method on the locking sets, and hidden it by 
adding chap points in the locking key. The key was recoverable when the given sample 
of the fingerprints overlapped substantially with the locking set with the aid of 
application of the Reed-Solomon code. The peculiar feature of this model was the 
development of key with 64-bit entropy key, however, it yielded the outcome with 
30% FRR code which acted as an obstacle in its wide-spread application. 
Goh and Ngo [53] utilized the concepts derived from Soutar et al [16] and developed 
the face biometrics based identification system. They extracted the 18 projections from 
the face image by using the biometric locking approach of Soutar et al [16]; and 
subsequently they generated the single bits for each projection. Ultimately these bits 
were reduced to the strings by applying concatenation approach, which were further 
used to extract the binary code. The system was supplemented with the majority 
coding by applying approach devised by Davinda et al [57]. Moreover, they made use 
of the error correction approach involving polynomial thresholding in order to reduce 
the effect of feature variation. Interestingly, the resulting face biometric system 
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demonstrated the 80-bit key entropy and 0.93 FRR. However, they used the video 
camera to take images in continuous fashion rather than face database, and that it also 
caused the decrease in the feature variation. This left a question mark on the validity 
and implementation of system for face images taken from discontinuous fashion. In 
short, several researchers made attempt to devise the biometric systems with ideal 
FRR, but all of these works ended up with having 20% FRR with the exception of Goh 
and Ngo work, which was intolerable level to implement the system practically. The 
limitation of above works was the length of key which was very short and susceptible 
to attack. 
Furthermore, some theoretical knowledge can also be found in the literature in relation 
to extraction of key by reducing the fuzzy background and feature variations. Also, the 
suggestion of application of fuzzy extractor is made by [49] to extract the strong keys 
from biometrics with noisy data. Dodis et al [49] applied this approach in order to 
extract the key from the noisy data using the error-correction code and hash function 
on the sample input data.  They reported that leakage of the data from the sample input 
was negligible after the application of hash function. Hence, this approach is suitable 
for the biometrics data which involved high noisy data, and required to much hidden 
for the further processing. 
Byron [60] introduced some modifications in the fuzzy extractor scheme in order to 
apply the fixed permutation to iris before the application of hash function. The major 
utility of the Byron scheme was that different keys were derived from the biometric 
samples by using the different permutations, so if one key was promised, it did not 
affect the integrity of the other biometrics keys belonging to a particular biometric 
sample. Nevertheless, the drawback of this technique was not able to protect the data 
in the case of stealth of data. Another important research work was carried out by 
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Jeules and Wattenberg [45] who suggested the third part theory which gave the 
biometric key a separate domain independent of the biometric data by introducing the 
step of allocation of random key into the fuzzy commitment scheme and addition of 
XORs and redundancy to the iris code.  
Similar research work was carried out by Duagman et al who introduced some 
modifications into the Jeules and Wattenberg approach by inclusion of concrete coding 
scheme which gave the best outcomes. Moreover, they also generated a surplus secret 
password by using the token-like tamper-resistant smartcard; and they also generated 
the 140-bit entropy biometric key [50]. 
Due to these issues, therefore, we intended to carry out the study to design such a 
template-free biometric system in which biometric data can be mapped onto the 
repeatable unique binary codes/strings which will only open up the key in the presence 
of biometric prints. Moreover, in order to generate the secret key, Shamir secret 
scheme [11] will be applied in three points provided (Right iris, Left iris, and 
password). Hence, 2 points out of 3 are sufficient to release the biometric key by using 
linear equation technique and that gives the user the flexibility which will reduced the 
FRR. We propose the three-factor scheme including the smart card, password and 
biometrics. In this scheme, each component holds the crucial position to complement 
the system required for revealing the biometric data specific to an individual with 
opportunity of either updating or revoking the key; and all three factors would be 
required to compromise the integrity of key. In addition, we tried to achieve the goal of 
development of scheme which provided the flexibility in terms of creating the length 
(short and long keys) of biometric key; and furthermore, in the event of smartcard 
loss/stolen, there would not be much information available for attacker to access the 
information because only Y-coordinates are stored in the smartcard. Finally, the 
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scheme aims to reduce the FRR level of the system to increase its practicability in real 
life situations and this scheme will be introduced in Chapter 5. 
2.2.8 Performance Evaluation Strategies 
Two samples of the same biometric characteristic from the same person (e.g., two 
LPSUHVVLRQVRIDXVHU¶V ULJKW LQGH[ ILQJHUDUHQRWH[DFWO\ WKHVDPHGXH WR LPSHUIHFW
imaging conditions (e.g., sensor QRLVH DQG GU\ ILQJHUV FKDQJHV LQ WKH XVHU¶V
physiological or behavioural characteristics (e.g., cuts and bruises on the finger), 
ambient conditions HJ WHPSHUDWXUH DQG KXPLGLW\ DQG XVHU¶V interaction with 
the sensor (e.g., finger placement).  Therefore, the response of a biometric 
matching system is the matching score, S(XQ, XI) (typically a single number), that 
quantifies the similarity between the input and the database template representations 
(XQ and XI, respectively). The higher the score, the more certain is the system that 
the two biometric measurements come from the same person. The threshold time 
IDFWRU µt¶FRQWUROV WKHGHFLVLRQRI WKHELRPHWULF V\VWHP7KHELRPHWULF VDPSOHZKLFK
JHQHUDWH WKHPDWFKLQJ VFRUH HTXDO WRRUKLJKHU WKDQ µt¶ DUH UHJDrded as mate pairs ± 
belonging to the same individual ± and similarly those biometric samples which 
SURGXFHWKHPDWFKLQJVFRUHOHVVHUWKDQµt¶DUHGHFODUHGDVWKHQRQ-mate pairs [30]. The 
distribution of score values generated from the samples given by the same person is 
called the genuine distribution and those from different individuals is termed as the 




Figure 2.7 shows the biometric system error rates: (a) FMR and FNMR for a given 
threshold t are displayed over the genuine and impostor score distributions; FMR is the 
percentage of non-mate pairs whose matching scores are greater than or equal to t, and 
FNMR is the percentage of mate pairs whose matching scores are less than t. (b) 
Choosing different operating points results in different FMR and FNMR. The curve 
relating FMR to FNMR at different thresholds is referred to as Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC). Typical operating points of different biometric applications are 
displayed on an ROC curve. Lack of understanding of the error rates is a primary 
source of confusion in assessing system accuracy in vendor/user communities alike. 
During biometric verification, the system may show two kinds of errors: False match 
error and False non-match error. The false match error is displayed when the 
biometric system mistakenly shows that the two biometric measurements taken from 
the different individuals belong to the same person. This is also called false accept 
error. Conversely, when the biometric system mistakenly recognizes that two 
measurements from the same individual belonging to the different persons. This kind 
Figure2.7 Biometric system error rates [30]. 
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of error is also called false reject error. Every biometric system makes some trade-offs 
between the false match rate (FMR) and the false non-match rate (FNMR) [30]. 
The performance of the biometric system taken at the various points of the threshold 
µt¶ IXQFWLRQV LV GHPRQVWUDWHG LQ WKH IRUm of curve called a Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) Curve. Hence, the ROC is obtained by drawing the curve 
EHWZHHQ)05DQG)105IXQFWLRQVIRUGLIIHUHQWYDOXHVRIWKUHVKROGµt¶)LJXUH7 b) 
[30]. 
Mathematically, the error in a verification biometric system can be calculated by the 
following equation: 
 ? ? ?ൌන  ?൫ ?൫ ? ?ǡ  ? ?൯ห ? ?൯ ? ?ǡ ? ? ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 ? ? ? ? ൌ  න ?൫ ?൫ ? ?ǡ  ?൯ห  ?൯ ? ?ǡሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ ? ? ?
Where 
S  = The users whose identity need to be verified  
X1 = The stored biometric template  
XQ  = The acquired input for recognition 
H0 =  The input biometric measurements from the person do not belong to the same 
person as X1 template does 
H1 =  The input biometric measurements from the person belong to the same person as 
X1 template does 
 ? ? = distribution  ?൫ ?൫ ? ?ǡ  ? ?൯ห ? ?൯ 
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Besides the above errors, there are some other error rates which are utilized to evaluate 
the accuracy of the system including Failure to Acquire rate (FTA) (also known as 
Failure to Capture rate (FTC)) and Failure to Enrol rate (FTE)  [30]. 
The FTC is applicable to only those biometric systems which contain the automatic 
image capture facility. The Failure to capture error happens when the system rejects 
the poor quality image such as the faint fingerprints, occluded face etc. The increased 
)7(UDWHVKRZVWKHLQFUHDVHGOHYHORIFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHSHUFHLYHGV\VWHP¶VDFFXUDF\
FMR and FNMR. Similarly, the FTE occurs when the system fail to enrol the person 
for the identification due to poor quality of biometric measurements. Thus the system 
quality and accuracy can be increased by increasing the perceived components of the 
V\VWHP¶V DFFXUDF\ )05 )%15 7KH LPSURYHPHQWV LQ WKH )05 DQG )105
consequently results in higher rates of FTE and FTC. In this way, the all of the four 
rates ± FMR, FNMR, FTE and FTC ± constitute important specifications of any 
biometric system, and they are normally considered during the performance evaluation 
of the system [30]. 
The accuracy of the biometric system in the identification mode can be obtained by 
taking the consideration of the system in the verification mode under the following 
assumptions [30]: 
- The number of attempt for identification is made only once 
- A single biometric template is used to identify a specific person 
- The number of identities present in the biometric system is equivalent to N 
- Identification false match rate error = FMRN 
-
 The identification false non-match rate = FNMRN 
In the light of the above assumptions, the following approximations can be written: 
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 FNMRN ธ FNMR and FMRN = 1-(1-FMR)N ธ NຘFMR (the approximation hold good 
only when N.FMR<0.1). A detailed discussion on these issues is available in [32] and 
[33]. 
For a biometric database in which each entry is classified and indexed properly, the 
system searches only a small proportion of the database to search for the identity 
requested by the user. For this, the following formulations can be written: 
FNMRN = RER+(1-RER)ຘFNMR, where RER (Retrieval Error Rate) is the 
probability that Where 
RER = the probability of the template in the database matching with the input 
biometric measurements (fingerprints) is wrongly rejected. This happens when the 
biometric system is unable to retrieve the right template from the database, thereby 
generating the false non-match outcome. 
1-RER = the probability of the template in the database matching with the input 
biometric measurements (fingerprints) is retrieved 
FNMR = False non-match rate of the biometric system 
The above expression does not show the frequency of non-matches of the templates 
with given biometric measurements before the right match is made between the input 
and the stored template in the database [34]. 
FMRN = 1-(1-FMR)NຘP; where P (also called the penetration rate) is the average 
percentage of database searched during the identification of an input fingerprint. 
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The requirements of the biometric system for accuracy and consistency vary from 
system to system. Some biometric system such as forensic biometric system requires 
great stringency for FNMR as the authorities show much concerned to identify the 
right criminal for a specific crime, although they go to the extent to manually examine 
the potential non-matches generated by the system. On the other hand, for the accuracy 
of the biometric system designed to control the access of the people to a certain secure 
facility deepens highly on maintaining high FNMR in the system, even though the 
legitimate users sometimes face inconvenience due to this high value. However, there 
are several other civilian applications whose performance and accuracy lie in between 
FMR and FNMR, therefore, both parameters are considered during the design of such 
biometric system [30].  
For instance in some application used by banks such as the bank card 
verification, the high FMR means the high probability of false match from 
YDULRXV SHUVRQV¶ ELRPHWULF PHDVXUHPHQWV ZLWK WKH VDPH SHUVRQ WHPSODWH
and subsequently the loss of hundreds and thousands of the dollars while 
the high FNMR will likely cause the loss of a valued bank customer. The 
trade-offs between FNMR and FMR in the various kinds of biometric 
applications can be observed in the Figure 2.7b. 
2.2.9 Data Source and materials 
A number of biometric samples (preferably face, fingerprint and iris) are required to 
establish the identity of system users. Data experiments for fingerprints used the 
FVC2004 database, which is the Third International Fingerprint Verification 
Competition database [91]. For iris recognition, the CASIA-IrisV3 database was used, 
as created by the National Laboratory of Pattern Recognition (NLPR), the Institute of 
Automation (IA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) [92]. This database was 
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selected because it contains 22034 images taken from 700 individuals collected from 
1500 iris samples. For this research the images located in the CASIA-IrisV3-Interval 
section has been used because it contains the images collected from the two different 
sessions, which means that variations in the iris images between two sessions can 
easily be spotted and recognized by using this part of the iris images data [92]. For 
face recognition, the FERET (Facial Recognition Technology) database was used [93]. 
No special hardware or software equipment is required for implementation. Software 
requirements for developing the system are open to interpretation, and any software 
development tool or programming language can be used (e.g. Matlab). 
2.3 Summary 
In this chapter a survey of the literature regarding the biometric systems, the history of 
the biometric system was presented. It was discussed that password methods for the 
identification of the individual were prone to the attacks from the hackers. The 
characteristics of the biometric systems were explained with the view of highlighting 
the importance of the biometric systems in the identification of the individuals. The 
authentication and verifications functions with their mechanism were included in this 
chapter. All biometric systems share the following modules in their designs: sensor, 
IHDWXUH H[WUDFWLRQ PDWFKHU DQG V\VWHP¶V GDWDEDVH PRGXOHV 7KH ELRPHWULF V\VWHP¶V
errors were presented. It has been discussed that these errors may downplay the 
performance of the biometric systems. Further research is required to address the 
errors for improving the performance of the system. Furthermore, the comparison 
between various biometric systems showed that various human individualistic 
properties such as face, voice, fingerprints, iris etc. can be used to develop the different 




the conventional biometric systems. The template free biometric system can provide 
better security as hackers can manipulate with templates stored in the database, 
resulting in better performance and strong security and privacy features. The indirect 
key generation using Shamir Secret Sharing have the great promise to provide the 








,QGLUHFW .H\ *HQHUDWLRQ 8VLQJ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW
6KDULQJ6FKHPH 
3.1 Introduction  
There are multiple challenges faced by the biometric system which are mostly related 
to the security of biometric data stored or captured by the system. Biometric systems 
are susceptible to attacks from the malicious agents due to the loopholes in the security 
of the systems arising from lost or stolen keys mainly due to small length of keys. 
Several researchers tried to devise a various schemes by integrating the biometric 
system into the bio-cryptosystems in order to secure the biometric data stored within 
the system such as fuzzy commitment scheme [45], smart-card based fingerprint 
authentication scheme [22], password-hardening protocol, the personalized 
cryptographic key based on Hashing [38] etc. Though, these approaches improved the 
security to considerable extent by increasing the rejection rates at the cost of 
performance and key entropy using more than one biometrics, but the important 
limitation observed was that they only used the short versions of the keys which were 
less secure due to their susceptibility to the potential attacks [9]. Moreover, they could 
only tolerate the small amount of variations in the query biometric sample, which 
hindered their practical applications. Against the background of these challenges, the 
UHVHDUFKHUHQGHDYRXUHGWRGHYLVHDVFKHPHIRULQGLUHFWNH\JHQHUDWLRQXVLQJ6KDPLU¶V
Secret Scheme within a multi-modal biometric system.  
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In comparison with previous approaches in bio-cryptosystems, the proposed scheme 
will strengthen the security and performance of the multimodal biometric system, with 
its ability to derive an encryption key indirectly from biometric samples provided by a 
given user, using an exception-handling scenario. In such a system, no copy of the 
encryption key would need to be retained, and not all biometric samples of the related 
biometrics would be required, so enhancing both the system¶VVHFXULW\SRWHQWLDODQGLWV
practical usability. In the proposed scheme, an arbitrary subset of biometric modalities 
needs to be supplied by the user, thereby addressing those situations in which a given 
modality cannot be supplied. Further, an arbitrary (secret) encryption key may be 
associated with the scheme, which readily addresses the revocability issue when a key 
becomes compromised and allows for multiple independent encryption keys to be 
derived from the same biometric samples [61]. The proposed scheme will also confer 
WKHWKUHHSHUIRUPDQFHOHYHOVEDVHGRQ6KDPLU¶V6HFUHW6KDUHZLWKGLIIHUHQWassociated 
levels RI VHFXULW\ ZKLFK ZLOO HQDEOH WKH V\VWHP¶V DGPLQLVWUDWRUV WR WDLORU WKH
multimodal biometric system according to their own requirements. 
In this chapter, the proposed structure of the scheme is elaborated in detail. 
Furthermore, it will also introduce the modalities chosen to test the proposed scheme, 
and selection and justification of approaches used for the biometric feature extraction. 
3.2 Generation of Encryption Key using a Multimodal Biometric 
System 
The single biometric system that used one biometric modality requires the query 
biometric sample to process the key, if the user fails to provide the exact match, the 
system will not be able to identify the user. Similarly, the multi-modal biometric 
systems using various schemes have been previously constructed by different 
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researchers; however, they faced the similar problem of the rejection of identity claim 
by the system in the case of unavailability of a single modality out of multimodalities. 
In order to resolve this issue to increase the performance of the system, The researcher 
investigated a technique for the extraction of a secret key from a multimodal biometric 
V\VWHPXVLQJ6KDPLU¶V666DOJRULWKP6HFUHW VKDULQJ LV DQ HVWDEOLVKHG WHFKQLTXH IRU
protecting a given item of data by means of information distributed to several 
participants. The technique plays a fundamental role in protecting data or secret 
LQIRUPDWLRQ IURP LPSDFWV VXFK DV ORVV VSRRILQJ RU WKHIW 6KDPLU¶V 666 LV D
cryptographic method devised by Shamir and Blakely in 1979 [3], which divides the 
secret into parts and gives each unique part to a distinct participant. To reconstruct the 
secret, a predetermined subset of these components is required [1±4].  
However, the main challenge faced the researcher was employ five biometric 
modalities²face, index finger, thumb finger, right iris and left iris²to generate the 
points on the required polynomial while meeting the following criteria. 
1- The length of the biometric encryption key is unlimited. 
2- The number of successful biometric inputs required during the authentication 
process to release the secret shares is flexible, depending on which of the 
IROORZLQJYHUVLRQVRI6KDPLU¶VVW\OHKDVEHHQXVHG 
- Linear equation technique (needs at least two successfully biometric 
modalities out of five to release the secret shares for biometric encryption 
key extraction purpose). 
- Quadratic technique (needs at least three out of five). 
- Cubic technique (needs at least four out of five). 
However, the researcher was able to overcome this challenge to considerable extent, 
which will be described in detail in the later sections of this chapter. Another issue was 
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faced in the area of the biometric feature extraction, which might have been caused by 
two factors: the feature extraction method and the low quality biometric sample 
images. However, the following methods have been used to extract the biometric 
feature for each modality to generate the encryption key indirectly. 
3.2.1 Feature Extraction approaches for Face  
Face is considered to be one of the vital method methods used to identify the persons 
based on the recognition of their facial features, The accuracy of face localization, 
extraction and tracking of facial features are the critical factors for the implementation 
of applications like animation, face-based human identification, human-machine 
interaction (vision-based). As a result of last 30 years, various methods and approaches 
have been devised to extract the facial features efficiently and effectively.  These 
approaches can be categorised into three main groups. The first of these is the holistic 
approach, in which the whole facial region is used as an input to the system (e.g. 
Eigenface [69, 70], Fisherface [157], WISARD [158] etc.). In the second, feature-
based approach, only local features of the face such as nose, eyes and so on are 
segmented and then used as inputs for structural analysis (e.g. hidden Markov model). 
Finally, the hybrid approach uses both local features and the whole face [64, 65]. 
From these three approaches, the Eigenface based approach has been applied for the 
facial feature extraction. The researcher drew on the previous research work for the 
implementation, evaluation and calibration of this work [69, 70]. Eigenfaces represent 
the set of vectors used in computer based facial recognition. Furthermore, this 
approach has been chosen due to the following reasons: 
x There is no requirement to identify or locate facial components (eyes, lips etc.). 
x Feature size can be reduced significantly with minimal loss of information. 
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x Partially occluded faces can be reconstructed using Eigenfaces. 
x It is an efficient approach in terms of its speed, simplicity and learning 
capability. 
 
The subsequent sections describe the detailed analysis of Eigenfaces based feature 
extraction approach. 
3.2.1.1 Eigenface Approach 
The major goals of face recognition using the Eigenfaces method is to extract the 
salient features from the face image, encoding the features and compare them with the 
templatHVVWRUHGLQWKHV\VWHP¶VGDWDEDVH7KLVDSSURDFKLVRQHRIWKHZHOOLQYHVWLJDWHG
methods used for face recognition. It is also called eigenpicture, eigenvectors, principal 
component and Karhunen- Loeve expansion.  
Previous work on face recognition ignored the issue of face stimulus and assumed that 
predefined measurements were relevant and sufficient. This suggests that coding and 
decoding of face images should emphasise the significant local and global of features, 
which may or may not be related to facial features such as eyes, nose, lips and hair. 
However, they might have great implications for the final identification of the facial 
features [63-70] 
 The objective is to extract the relevant information in a face image, encode it 
efficiently and compare one face encoding with a database of similar encoded faces. 
One simple approach  for extracting the information content from an image of a face 
would be to somehow capture the variation in a collection of face images [64, 67], and 
ultimately using this information for encoding and comparing the individual face 
images with the template facial image. 
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Mathematically, the aim is to locate the principal components of the distribution of 
facial images, or the eigenvectors of the µFRYDULDQFHPDWUL[¶RI WKH FROOHFWLRQRI WKH
facial images, where each point/vector is treated as an image. Each eigenvector 
represents the variation among the set training facial images. 
$Q\HLJHQYHFWRULVEDVLFDOO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIµVHWRIIHDWXUHVWKDW together characterize 
the variations between the set of training facial images. This shows that eigenvector is 
made up of the less or more contributions from each facial image, resulting in the 
presentation of eigenvector in the form of ghostly face image which is called 
µHLJHQIDFH¶>69, 70]. The illustration of eignfaces is presented in Figure 3.1. Together, 
Eigenfaces provide a map of variations among the set of training facial images.  
Thus each individual is recognized by a set of eignepictures required to reconstruct and 
describe his/her face, which is extremely compact form of presentation in comparison 
with the images themselves. 
This approach involves the following initialization the following procedures for the 
face recognition [69, 70]: 
1. The training set of images from the individual is captured. 
2. The calculation of Eigenfaces from the training images is performed and only 
the M images having the highest eigenvalues are selected for further 
processing. The face space is defined from the collection of M images to obtain 
the feel of new faces. As a result of appearance of new faces, the Eigenfaces 
can be recalculated or updated. 
3. For each known individual, the corresponding distribution in M-dimenstional 
weight space is calculated their projection RIWKHLUIDFHVRQWRWKH³IDFHVSDFH´ 
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Following the initialization steps, the following steps are required to recognize the new 
facial images [69, 70]: 
1. The set of weights from the input facial image and the M Eigenfaces is 
calculated by projecting the input facial image onto each of the facial image. 
2. 7KHFORVHQHVVRIWKHZHLJKWVWRWKH³IDFHVSDFH´LVGHWHUPLQHGLQRUGHUWRGHFLGHXSRQ
whether the image is face. 
3. If the image is declared as face image then the weight patterns are classified to be 
known or unknown face. 
Each face image can be represented exactly in terms of a linear combination of 
Eigenfaces. The number of possible Eigenfaces is equal to the number of face images 
in the training set. The faces can also be approximated by usiQJ µEHVW¶ (LJHQIDFHV
which have the largest Eigen values and therefore account for most of the variations 
within the set of images. The primary reason for using fewer Eigenfaces is 
computational efficiency [69, 70]. The next step is to calculate the Eiginface which is 
presented in the subsequent section. 
3.2.1.2 Calculation of  Eigenfaces 
Training set of m images of size N x N are represented by vectors of size N2. Each face 
is represented by ī1ī2 ī3«īM. The feature vector of a face is stored in an N ×N 
matrix. Now, this two dimensional vector is changed to one dimensional vector. 
 
Figure3.1 Eigenfaces [69, 70]. 
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For example:  
 
 




Average face image is calculated by  
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A covariance matrix is constructed as: 
C = AATZKHUH$ >ĭĭĭM] of size N2×N2  
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Size of covariance matrix will be N2 ×  N2 (4 × 4 in this case). Eigen vectors 
corresponding to this covariance matrix is needed to be calculated, but that will be a 
tedious task therefore for simplicity we calculate ATA which would be a 2 × 2 matrix; 
in this case,  ? ? ? ൌ ቂ ?  ? ?  ? ?ቃ and the size of the matrix is M × M. Consider the 
eigenvectors vi of AT A, such that AT AXi  ȜiXi. The eigenvectors vi of ATA are X1 and 
X2, or 2 × 1. Now, multiplying the above equation with both sides, we get  
AAT AXi  $ȜiXi 
AAT (AXi Ȝi(AXi) 
With reduced dimensionality, eigenvectors corresponding to AAT can now be easily 
calculated, where AXi is the eigenvector DQGȜi is the Eigen value. 
The eigenvectors of the covariance matrix AAT are AXI, which is denoted by Ui. Ui 
resembles facial images that look ghostly and are called Eigenfaces. Eigenvectors 
correspond to each Eigenface in the face space and discard faces for which Eigen 
values are zero, so reducing the Eigenface space to some extent. Eigenfaces are ranked 
according to their usefulness in characterising the variation among the images. A face 
image can be projected into this face space by the equation 
k =  UT īk íȌ k=1,....,M, where īk Ȍ is the mean centred image. 
Hence, a projection of each image can be obtained as 1 for projection of image1 and 
2 for projection of image2, and so on. 
The test image, ī, is projected into the face space to obtain a vector,  as 
 8T īíȌ 
7KHGLVWDQFHRIWRHDFKIDFHFDOOHGWKH(XFOLGHDQGLVWDQFHLVGHILQHGDV  ? ? ?ൌ ȁȁ ? െ  ? ?ȁȁ ?Ǣ  ? ൌ  ?ǡ ǡ  ?, where k is a vector describing the kth face class. 
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A face is classified as belonging to class k when the minimum Ԗ ? is below some 
chosen threshold Ĭc otherwise, the face is classified as unknown. Ĭc is half the largest 
distance between any two face images: 
 Ĭc =  (1/2)maxj,k __j ík | |; j,k =  1,.....,M 
We have to find the distance between the original test image ī and its reconstructed 
image from the Eigen face īf  ? ?ൌ ȁห ? െ  ? ? หȁ ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ൌ  ? כ  ? ൅  ? 
,IĬc then the input image is not even a face image and is not recognised. 
If < Ĭc and NĬ for all k then the input image is a face image but is identified as an 
unknown face. 
If < Ĭc and k < Ĭ for all k then the input images are the individual face images 
associated with the class vector k. 
3.2.2 Feature Extraction Approaches for the Iris 
There are various available methods for performing feature extraction, including 
wavelet encoding, Gabor filters, Log-Gabor filters, Haar wavelet and the Laplacian of 
Gaussian filter. For present purposes, the 2D Gabor filter approach was chosen for 
extracting the iris features. This approach has been selected because it efficiently 
represents the local texture features of the iris with zero-crossing representation [71, 
74].  
However, the process of feature extraction from iris involves a number of steps which 
are localization/segmentation, iris normalization/unwrapping [71-74]. The detailed 
discussion on these steps will be provided in Chapter 5. In this section, the focus is 
placed on the iris feature extraction/encoding. 
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The iris code will be extracted by demodulating the unwrapped iris image using 
complex-valued 2D Gabor wavelets [73], where the 2D Gabor filter equation can be 
represented as follows: 
 ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻ ൌ  ? ? ? ቊെ ? ?ቈ ?ᇱ ? ? ?ᇱ ?൅  ?Ԣ ? ? ?ᇱ ?቉ቋ 㼇? ?ሺ ? ? ? ?ሻ  ?ᇱ ൌ  ? 㼇? ? ? ൅  ? ? ? ? ?  ?ᇱ ൌ  ? 㼇? ? ? െ  ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal plane wave along the direction  ? from the x-
axis, and  ? ?ᇱand  ? ?ᇱ represent the variance along x- and y-axes, respectively. In this 
project, frequency values are assigned five different values (2, 4, 8, 16, and 32); 
orientation values ሺ ?ሻare assigned four different angles (0°, 45°, 90° and 135°) [72, 
73]. 
Prior to applying a 2D Gabor filter to the unwrapped image, a mask will be created 
that will be used to identify non-iris pixels, corrupt areas and specular reflections by 
checking the grayscale intensities of the image. A 2D Gabor filter will then be applied 
to the unwrapped iris image and its corresponding masks, generating a real and 
imaginary part for both, which will then be used in the process of feature 
encoding/extraction. 
The extracted features are converted into a number of bits of information known as iris 
codes. It also produces a corresponding noise mask, which identifies corrupt areas 
within the iris pattern. This encoding process is achieved through the process of phase 
quantisation, in which there is a quadrant containing a 2-bit binary number; position in 




The extracted features are converted into a number of bits of information known as iris 
codes. It also produces a corresponding noise mask, which identifies corrupt areas 
within the iris pattern. This encoding process is achieved through the process of phase 
quantisation, in which there is a quadrant containing a 2-bit binary number; position in 
the quadrant cannot be determined by comparing the real and imaginary parts of the 
filter [73] which is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
In order to identify the similarity between two iris images, the Hamming distance 
between two iris images will be calculated. This is the chosen metric for comparison of 
templates. The formula for computing the Hamming distance is shown in following 
equation [73]. 
 ⨇?ൌ  ? ?෍ ? ?ໆ ? ? ? ? ? ? ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Where A and B are the iris codes for both two iris images provides. Whilst, the mask 
bits prevent non-iris artifacts such as eyelashes, eyelids, specular reflections, or other 
noise from influencing iris comparisons. To account for rotational inconsistencies, one 
template is shifted left and right bitwise, and a number of Hamming distance values 
are calculated from successive shifts. The lowest value will be taken, as this 
corresponds to the best match between templates. 
Figure3.2 Phase Quantization [73]. 
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3.2.3 Feature Extraction Approaches for Fingerprints 
The extensive available range of fingerprint detection techniques can be broadly 
categorised into three groups [75-83]:  
x Correlation-based matching: Two fingerprints are superimposed and 
correlations between corresponding pixels are computed for different 
alignments (e.g. various displacements and rotations). 
x Minutiae-based matching: minutiae are extracted from two fingerprints, and 
matching decisions are based on the number of pairings. 
x Ridge feature-based matching: Features are extracted from the ridge pattern. 
For  the current research work, the minutiae-based  feature extraction and matching 
technique will be adopted primarily because it constitutes the backbone of several 
fingerprints recognition studies [83], where it uses the termination points and 
bifurcation as local features of fingerprints for the accurate recognition of the 
sample[83].This approach also widely used, computationally inexpensive, and locates 
the maximum number of minutiae pairings between the input sample and template for 
matching purpose [83]. 
2.3.1.1 Minutiae-Based Feature Extraction and Matching Approach 
Fingerprint patterns are characterised by the existence of minutiae associated with the 
formation of ridges; there are more than 52 different types, of which seven are 
employed by human experts: crossover, core, bifurcation, ridge ending, island, delta 
and pore. Only two of these are currently used by automated systems: ridge endings, 
where a ridge terminates, and ridge bifurcation, which is where a ridge splits from a 
single into a double path [82-90]. 
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Each minutia is typically associated with an (x, y) position, representing a direction or 
orientation. Matching these minutiae leads to identification or verification of a sample 
fingerprint [82-90].  
During this process, first the fingerprint feature are extracted by the fingerprint 
grayscale image to a binary image, which will then be thinned (i.e. ridge line thickness 
reduced to one pixel), and necessary repair works will be performed. A simple image 
scan can then be used to detect those pixels that correspond to minutiae [82-90]. 
x A ridge pixel is a ridge ending if the number of ridge pixels in the 8-
neighbourhood is 1.  
x A ridge pixel is a ridge bifurcation if the number of ridge pixels in the 8-
neighbourhood is greater than or equal to 3. 
x A ridge pixel is an intermediate ridge pixel if the number of ridge pixels in the 
8-neighbourhood is 2. 
x [x,y, theta, associated ridge] are stored for each minutia. 
A post-processing stage (called minutiae filtering) will subsequently be performed to 
remove any spurious minutiae, which are generated by corrupted regions or as a result 








Figure3.3 A fingerprint gray-scale image; b) the image obtained after enhancement and binarization; 
c) the image obtained after thinning; d) termination and bifurcation minutiae detected [83]. 
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Following the minutiae based feature extraction from the fingerprint image, the 
matching between the minutiae in the template and the live fingerprint is performed. 
Each minutia will be represented by P ^[\ș` where (x,y) is the minutia location 
and ș is the minutia angle. Then, the template T = {m1, m2 «  Pm} and live 
fingerprint I =  {m´1, m´2«Pn}, where m and n denote the number of minutiae in T 
and I, respectively.  
A minutia m´j in I and a minutia mi in T DUH GHILQHG DV µPDWFKLQJ¶ LI WKH VSDWLDO
distance (sd) between them is smaller than a given threshold r0 and the direction 
difference (dd) between them is smaller than an angular tolerance ș0. The two 
fingerprints must be aligned in order to maximise the number of matching minutiae. 
Alignment of two fingerprints involves displacement (in x and y) and rotation (ș) and 
may involve issues of scale and distortion. The matching score is the maximum 
number of minutia matches for any of these possible alignments, and this will be used 
to identify a user [82-90]. 
3.3 Generation of Secret Key Shares for Biometric Modalities 
After following the feature extraction from the biometric modalities by applying the 
above mentioned approaches and creating biometric templates, the next logical step is 
to assign the secret shares to each of the modality from the actual biometric encryption 
key, which will allow the system to operate without storage of the biometric 
encryption keys in the authentication processes. This will lead to provide higher level 
of security to the biometric encryption key and the user personal data compared to 
systems based on template storage requirement. 
,QRUGHUWRJHQHUDWHWKHVHFUHWVKDUHV6KDPLU¶V6HFUHW6FKHPHKDVEHHQDSSOLHGZKLFK
is elaborated in the subsequent sub-section. 
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3.3.1 6KDPLU¶V6HFUHW6KDULQJ6Fheme (SSS) Algorithm  
SKDPLU¶V VHFUHW VKDULQJ VFKHPH DOJRULWKP [11, 13, 61, 62] will be used to generate 
secret key shares, each of which will be associated with an individual biometric 
modality. The appropriate shares will only be released upon the successful verification 
of each individual biometric modality. The SSS algorithm will also be used in 
recombining the secret key shares to reconstruct the secret; this will only be possible if 
WKHUHTXLUHGQXPEHUVRINH\VKDUHVDUHDYDLODEOH8VLQJ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWWHFKQLTXHVWKH
reconstruction process requires linear, quadratic or cubic equations. If, for instance, 
using a linear equation technique, only one of five biometrics provided at the 
verification stage was successfully released, the reconstruction process would be 
impossible and the user would be rejected because the linear equation strategy needs at 
least two points to be successfully verified in order to release the secret key. 
For present purposes, we will first define the threshold values of K, N and P when 
creating the SSS algorithm program, where  
K = Number of shares to be generated 
N = Number of shares required to reconstruct the secret 
P = A prime number 
The number of key shares to be generated will be equivalent to the number of modality 
options available in the system. The number of shares required to reconstruct the secret 
will be the number of modalities required for successful authentication. 
The program will generate a polynomial function f(x) of K-1 degree with random 
coefficients, where the constant is a secret key to be defined or generated. Once the 
polynomial is built, K shares (xi, yi) will be constructed. At the sample collation stage, 
these shares will be assigned to the various biometric modalities by linking them 
together in the database. At the verification stage, upon successful verification of any 
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chosen biometric modality, the key share associated with that biometric modality will 
be released. The SSS algorithm will then perform the necessary computations by 
combining the secret shares using the Lagrange interpolation method, or simply by 
VROYLQJ6KDPLU¶VHTXDWLRQ [11, 13, 61, 62], depending on the type of technique used to 
obtain the secret, in effect authenticating the user. If the number of secret key shares 
required for reconstructing the secret is not released because a user fails to verify the 
minimum required modalities, the SSS algorithm will be unable to reconstruct the 




secret shares points to release the secret key (S). However, the quadratic equation (2) 
requires at least three secret shares points to release the secret key, and the cubic 
equation (3) requires at least four. 
3.4 7KH 3URSRVHG 6FKHPH¶V $UFKLWHFWXUH IRU LQGLUHFW .H\
Generation and Key Release 
The overall architecture of the proposed multi-modal biometric system for indirect key 
generation is presented in the Figure 3.5 and 3.6. The individual points on a given 
Figure3.4 SSS three different techniques [11]. 
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polynomial are derived from five biometric modalities of a given person: face, iris 
(right, left), and fingerprint (thumb, index finger). After feature generation, the 
equation of the polynomial must be solved in order to retrieve the key, shown as the 
intercept on the vertical axis [11]. The number of modalities required to derive the 
secret is naturally governed by the order of the polynomial: a linear equation requires 
two points to solve, a quadratic equation requires three points, a cubic equation 
requires four, and so on.   
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the enrolment process, in which multiple samples of each 
modality are captured from a given user and a reference template for each modality is 
created in the database. Each reference template is associated with a point on the 
desired polynomial, which will be released during authentication. Figure 3.6 shows the 
authentication structure activated by providing samples from a candidate user. Each 
modality employs an algorithm for matching with the stored reference database. If a 
match is found, the corresponding coordinate point is released. The process concludes 
by employing the generated points to solve the polynomial equation, and to release the 
key if sufficient points are available. 




3.5  Performance and Experimentation Results  
The major thrust behind the development of the proposed scheme is to develop a 
robust multimodal biometric system which may perform without requirement of the 
storage of encryption key within the system, and perform equally well to authenticate 
WKHXVHU¶VFODLPHYHQZKHQKHIDLOVWRSURYLGHRQHWZRPRGDOLWLHVRXWRIWKHJLYHQVHW
of modalities to the multi-PRGDOELRPHWULFV\VWHP6KDPLU¶V6HFUHW6FKHPHZDVIRXQG
highly suitable to achieve this objective, which allows the generation of secret share 
and release by the secret key based on meeting two points on linear equation, three 
points on quadratic equation, and four points on cubic equation. This flexibility of the 
6KDPLU¶VVFKHPHHQDEled the researcher test various combination of biometric samples 
for evaluating the performance of the proposed biometric scheme. Based on the 
experimental conditions, three polynomial orders were used: linear, quadratic and 
cubic ZKLFK DUH UHTXLUHG E\ WKH 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW 6FKHPH DSSURDFK WR WHVW WKH
 
Figure3.6 Authentication process 
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performance of the proposed scheme when 2 points, three points and four points are 
provided to define linear, quadratic and cubic equations 
This section deals with the experimentation process, detailing the experimental results 
in terms of the false acceptance and rejection rates for the overall authentication 
system, for all users in an authentication scenario.  
3.5.1 Experimentation Data and Requirements 
For the purposes of this investigation, 300 pseudo-users were created from five 
separate, genuine biometric databases, taking the corresponding values from each 
database and deeming them to derive from a given virtual user. These databases are 
FVC2004 represented fingerprint samples [91], CASIA-IrisV3 presented iris samples 
[92] and FERET presented face samples [93]. For each person, three samples are 
employed for enrolment, and for testing, each user provided five samples. In the 
authentication phase, then, five tests were created for each user, and for each test, five 
samples were provided for all 300 pseudo-users, as shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.1 Example enrolment data. 
User id Samples Face 
Fingerprint Iris 




















Passive forgeries were also investigated by requiring each of the 300 users to try to 
gain access by falsely claiming the identity of each of the other 299 users, which was 
DGRSWHG WR FKHFN WKH V\VWHP¶V susceptibility to the attack. Table 3.1 shows the 
enrolment of a genuine user. There are eight samples per user for each modality (three 




Table 3.2 Samples for Testing 
 
Table 3.2 presents an example of the testing method, in which five tests were provided 
for each user; each test could cover five different modalities (face, thumb, index finger, 
right iris, left iris). The performance of the system for genuine users (Table 3.3) shows 
five tests for each user, with each test requiring five samples to be provided. 
Table 3.3 6DPSOHSHUIRUPDQFH¥LQGLFDWHVVXFFHVVIRUJLYHQPRGDOLW\RUSRO\QRPLDORUGHU;LQGLFDWHVIDLOXUH 
 
A set of thresholds for each component modality classifier²chosen randomly to test 
the results of FAR and FRR for each biometric modality²was used to extract the 
threshold for the polynomial cross curve between FAR and FRR, known as the equal 
error rate (ERR) (Table 3.4). 
 
 
User id Test Face 
Fingerprint Iris 


























   
User ID Test Face 
Fingerprint Iris Secret Share Techniques 








1 X ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
2 X ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
3 X ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
4 ¥ X ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 




Table 3.4 FAR and FRR results for each biometric modality separately. 
Biometric Modality FRR FAR ERR 
Fingerprint 5.9% 3.2% 4.89% 
Face 12.9% 6.2% 10.76% 
Iris 1.79% 0.034% 0.25% 
 
3.5.1.1 SSS Algorithm Requirement 
The major goal of this project was to develop a working LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI6KDPLU¶V
SSS Algorithm [11], representing the cryptographic aspect of a multimodal biometric 
system. The SSS Algorithm can be used to generate a number of secret key shares 
from a chosen secret (which could be any number), and these key shares are then 
bound to each biometric modality. Successful verification of each individual biometric 
modality should release the appropriate key share. A combination of the minimum key 
shares required (two) should reconstruct the original secret, leading to authentication. 
If the required number of key shares is not successfully combined, the secret cannot be 
reconstructed, and the user will be rejected by the system. 
Five different biometric modalities should be used to facilitate implementation of the 
SSS algorithm. Using the linear equation technique, the algorithm should be 
incorporated into the system in such a way that a user can only be authenticated 
following successful verification of at least two biometric modalities, based on their 
chosen options. If a user fails to verify at least two biometric modalities, they should 
be rejected by the system (and so on for the other techniques). 
3.5.1.2 Verification Algorithms Requirement 
In conjunction with the SSS algorithm for recognising a user, three individual 
verification algorithms should be implemented for use by multimodal biometric 
systems. These should include a face recognition algorithm, an iris recognition 
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algorithm and a fingerprint recognition algorithm. The algorithms should be able to 
identify a user by comparing a sample presented by the user against a stored template, 
making a decision on the basis of degree of similarity. 
3.5.1.3 Database Requirement 
A database should be created to accommodate storage of biometric templates for 
different users. Secret key shares created by the SSS algorithm should also be stored in 
the database and linked to the respective individual biometric modalities in the 
database. During the verification process, user samples presented to the system should 
be compared against their respective templates stored in the database, and the 
appropriate key shares should be released if verification was successful. 
3.5.1.4 Testing Requirements 
The system should be tested for technical performance of the SSS algorithm and of the 
individual verification algorithms. From these tests, overall performance of the system 
can be deduced and, most importantly for authenticating users, false acceptance rates 
and false rejection rates of the system can be tested. 
3.5.1.5  Software implementation of feature extraction algorithms 
In this work, three feature extraction algorithms have been used, named as Eigneface 
algorithm for face feature extraction, 2D-Gabor filter for iris feature extraction, and 
minutiae based feature extraction for fingerprints. The Shamir secret scheme algorithm 
also has been used for key generation indirectly form the multimodal biometric system 
used in this work. All these algorithms have been implemented using the software 
MATLAB. The codes for implementation of these algorithms have been generated by 
the researcher himself. In addition, in order to gain the expert knowledge about the 
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coding for feature extracting, the following sources have been consulted: AT&T 
Laboratories Cambridge (online source) implemented by Luigia Rosa [176] for the 
implementation of face recognition features and the fingerprints recognition 
implemented by Wuzhili [177]. However, the implementation of 2D-Gabor filter 
algorithm has been implemented in MATALB by researcher from the scratch. 
3.5.2. Experimentation Results 
The performance of the system is illustrated in Tables 3.1 to 3.6. Tables 3.3 and 3.6 
show sample results for the authentication system for genuine and impostor users (five 
tests for each user, each requiring five samples to be provided). In Table 3.3, the 
observed failure of one modality does not necessarily cause the system as a whole to 
fail; samples 1 to 3 (face failure) and sample 4 (fingerprint failure) demonstrate the 
exception-handling potential of the system. As shown in sample 5, multiple failures 
still lead to overall failure. A summary of the overall performance of the system for all 
quoted samples, in terms of the false acceptance and false rejection rates of the Shamir 
component of the system for the three polynomial orders, are shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 FRR and FAR results for authentication. 
 
Linear equation Quadratic equation Cubic equation 
FRR 1.8% 4.8% 8,2% 
FAR 5.2% 2.59% 0% 
 







Test Face Fingerprint Iris Secret Share Techniques 
Thumb Index 
finger 






1 2 1 x ¥ ¥ x X ¥ X X 
2 x ¥ ¥ x X ¥ X X 
3 x ¥ ¥ x X ¥ X X 
4 x X X x X X X X 
5 ¥ X ¥ ¥ ¥ X X X 
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Table 3.5 shows the results for three different polynomialVRI6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPH. 
The linear equation requires at least two points to generate the secret key S. The false 
rejection rate of 1.8% in the linear equation method is good by comparison with the 
quadratic and cubic techniques, but it must also be noted that the false acceptance rate 
is greater (5.2%) by comparison with the other techniques. At 0%, the false acceptance 
rate for the cubic equation technique is very good, as this technique requires at least 
four points to generate the secret key S. However, the false rejection rate is relatively 
high (8.2%). For the quadratic equation technique, the false rejection and acceptance 
rates are both intermediate. Because this technique requires at least three out of five 
points to generate the secret key S, it reflects a balanced probability in terms of both 
FRR and FAR. These results are very interesting, as they demonstrate the relative 
merits of the polynomial orders when considering the desired performance of the 
system. However, the outcomes of these tests are in part dependent on the quality of 
the biometric samples employed and on the algorithms employed for the individual 
modalities. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has explored the technique of secret sharing to allow an encryption key to 
be created from multimodal biometric samples. The results show the potential of the 
system for efficiently deriving encryption keys while also allowing for exception 
handling, which is currently a significant impediment to the practical deployment of 
biometric systems. This improved robustness property represents a significant 
enhancement. A further significant advantage of the proposed technique is that the 
biometric key itself need not actually be stored, which along with the unlimited length 





4.1  Introduction 
Biometrically constructed security is theoretically strengthened if an encryption key is 
extracted directly from biometric samples as provided by a given user. Such a system 
means that the retained encryption key would not be copied and also a template or 
reference sample would not be required, significantly enhancing potential system 
security. However, two probable weaknesses intrinsic to this scheme are that the 
generated encryption key would not easily be revoked and, where a user is unable to 
provide a biometric sample, the scheme would not be robust in this condition [41, 44]. 
This chapter introduces several schemes for integrating direct biometric key generation 
VFKHPHV ZLWK 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VKDULQJ DOJRULWKP >11] to directly address these two 
disadvantages of revocability and exception handling. Within the proposed scheme, 
individual points on a polynomial curve are directly derived from iris samples taken 
from an individual by applying a user function, which is created for each user to 
minimise the amoXQWRIGDWDVWRUHGDQGHQDEOLQJ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHWREHDSSOLHG
to derive the required key. The proposal is robust, in that the new technique generates 
an encryption key from biometric modality samples, using a minimal amount of stored 
data. The systeP¶VSRWHQWLDOKDVEHHQLQYHVWLJDWHGLQUHODWLRQWRSDVVLYHIRUJHULHV7KH
current chapter reports preliminary work on how an encryption key may be generated 
directly from the biometric modality by extracting points on a parabolic curve derived 
from actual biometric samples. These schemes returned negative results, indicating 
that the Equal Error Rate (EER) is high or that the level of performance or security is 
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low. Each scheme will be presented in detail, including an explanation of how it 
works, why this scheme might be used, and any feedback from it. 
 
Figure4.1 Three Different Scenarios for Direct Key Generation from Individual Biometric Samples 
Figure 4.1 shows how the direct key could be generated from individual biometric 
VDPSOHV DSSO\LQJ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH (DFK SRLQW LQ WKH FXUYH UHSUHVHQWV D
GLIIHUHQWELRPHWULFPRGDOLW\HQDEOLQJWKHELRPHWULFVHFUHWNH\JHQHUDWHGE\6KDPLU¶V
secret scheme. In the field of biometric encryption, this proposal must satisfy security 
considerations as well as level of performance flexibility. From the security point of 
view, this scheme uses a multimodal, template-free biometric system, and the length of 
the biometric encryption key is unlimited because, as shown in Figure 4.1, the y-axis 
extends to infinity. From a performance perspective, three different techniques using 
6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHDUHSUHVHQWHG/LQHDU4XDGUDWLFDQG&XELFHTXDWLRQV)RUWKH
multimodal biometric system in this proposal, at least two biometric modality points 
would be sufficient to release the biometric secret key in the linear equation technique, 
with three points needed in the quadratic and four points in the cubic. 
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4.2  Biometric modality 
Iris recognition is the chosen modality for these investigations, entailing pre-
processing, feature extraction and feature encoding and using the same methods in all 
schemes. 
4.2.1 Pre-processing 
The process of iris code extraction involves a number of steps: iris 
localization/segmentation, iris normalisation/unwrapping [71-73], and feature 
extraction/encoding [71, 73]. These were discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (section 
3.3.2). 
4.2.2 Feature Extraction 
Two methods of iris feature extraction have been used in these investigations. 
1- 2D Gabor Filter [73].  
In this approach, the iris code was extracted by demodulating the unwrapped iris image 
with complex-valued 2D Gabor wavelets [73], where the 2D Gabor filter equation can 
be seen in Eq.(3.1). 
Furthermore, Frequencies are assigned five different values (2, 4, 8, 16 and 32). 
Orientation values ሺɅሻ represent four different angles (0°, 45°, 90°, and 135°) [72, 73]. 
].  It can be noticed that different values and orientation angles have been selected for 
the experiments, because the functions of the Gabor filter to extract the iris features are 
not optimized, therefore, the parameters for extraction of high quality iris features for 




Encoding iris features by 2D wavelet demodulation, the resulting complex and 
imaginary parts form the 2D Gabor filter. Eq.(3.1) is then used in the process of phase 
quantization in generating the iris code [73]. 
2- Gray Level Co-Occurrence Matrix (GLCM) [94, 95]. 
As proposed by Haralick et al. [95], GLCM is one of the most widely-used approaches 
to extraction of textural features. The approach can be defined as follows. Suppose an 
area has Nc and Nr resolution cells in the horizontal and vertical directions, 
respectively, and Ng level in the gray tone. Let Lc =  {1, 2, .., Nc} be the horizontal 
spatial domain, let Lr  ^«1r} be the vertical spatial domain, and let G = 1, 2, .., 
Ng be the set of Ng quantised gray tones. The image I can then be represented as a 
function that assigns some gray tone in G to each resolution cell or pair of coordinates 
in Lr  Lc; I : Lr  Lc Ѝ G. Texture-context information is specified in a matrix of 
relative frequencies Pij with two neighbouring resolution cells separated by distance d 
occurring on the image, one with gray tone i and the other with gray tone j. Pij can then 
be described by Eq. (4.1): 
 ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?ሼሺሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻሻ א ሺ ? ?ൈ ? ?ሻ ൈ ሺ ? ?ൈ  ? ?ሻ  צ  ? ? ?ሺȁ ? െ  ?ȁǡ ȁ ?െ ?ȁሻ ൌ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?ǡ  ?ሺ ǡ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?ሽሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
where ș and d are the directions and distances between two pixels in the image, and # 
denotes the number of elements in the set. Traditionally, Haralick̓s features are 
fourteen in number; for the present analysis, we chose the first twelve texture features. 
Using GLCM to extract textures is sensitive to three factors: selection of window size, 
number of gray levels, and distance between pixel pairs. Window size was set at 8×8 
pixels, gray levels at 256 and the distance between pixel pairs at 4 pixels. 
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4.3  Investigative Methodologies  
4.3.1 System 1: Key Generation from Iris modality using mini-template 
The researcher faced the problem of generating the encryption key directly from the 
iris modality from the template free biometric system. It was tested whether the 
encryption key can be generated from the system using the mini-template ± a template 
which was reduced to a minimum possible data. The success of this system was 
supposed to enable the researcher to keep reducing the data stored in database unless 
the template free system can be generated. The following paragraphs will give 
overview of working principle of this system. 
The overall operation of the system is as follows. The individual points on a given 
polynomial are derived from the iris modality. After iris feature generation, extraction 
RI WKHSRVLWLRQRI³´FKDUDFWHUVRI WKH iris feature will be required for each sample, 
calling a function related to an enrolled user id. This is the novel property of the 
algorithm. The equation of the polynomial may then be solved to retrieve the key, 
which is represented as the intercept on the vertical axis [11]. The number of samples 
that are required to derive the secret is naturally governed by the order of the 
polynomial; a quadratic equation, as used in this scheme, requires three points to solve. 
The enrollment process requires capture of the iris sample from the given user, 
generating a bespoke function for each user. The explanation of the algorithm is as 
follows. 





0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
 
- Extraction of ones positions will be as follows: 
Sample 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
So, X 
Ones Position 2 3 4 7 8 10 
 
- To provide the Yn coordinates for three points [Y0 Y1 Y2], the following 
considerations must be taken into account.  
1. As was mentioned before, a quadratic equation requires three points to solve 
WKHSRO\QRPLDOFXUYHXVLQJ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPH 
2. The secret key should be controlled and flexible (shown as the intercept on the 
vertical axis).  
3. Xn = {X0 X1 X2} coordinates are derived from three iris samples in the 
authentication process; it will be discussed and explained later how Xn = {X0 X1 
X2} is calculated. 
4. Several sets will be applied to find the equal error rate, increasing the distance 
between the three points by adding a Z value taken from Table 4.4 to Yn 
coordinates, which will be described later. 
- So, Yn = {Y0 Y1 Y2}, points will be provided by the following algorithm:  ? ?ൌ  ? ?൅ ሺ ? כ  ?ሻǡ ? ?ൌ  ? ?൅  ?ǡ ? ?ൌ  ? ?
where YY is a limitation point for the vertical axis Y, serving as a secret key point, as 
shown in Table 4.1 below. 
Z is the value added to Yn coordinates to find the equal error rate, basically increasing 
the distance between the three points Xn,Yn. 
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Table 4.1 Deciding where the Secret Key will be Placed in the Vertical Axis Y (system 1) 
YY Limit points that could be place in the vertical axis to be a final point (Secret key) 
(0)^2, (1)^2 -5 ± 5 
(2)^2 0 ± 10 
(3)^2 5 ± 15 
 
The reason for the differences between Y0, Y1, and Y2 is to avoid errors that might be 
caused by the line equation curve and to extract the equal error rate (as mentioned in 
point 4 above) where all three points have the same Y coordinate. Controlling the 
secret key and making it more flexible, as shown in Table 1, means that if the secret 
key needs to be on the vertical axis between (-5 ± 5), by inspection 0 and 1 are in the 
middle, and by raising them to 2, they are equal to 0 and 1, which are still in the 
middle of the limit. In addition, if the secret key needs to be between 20 and 30, by 
raising 5 to 2 it is equal to 25, which still within the limit. 
Finally, the function for each user will be created as follows: 
User_id_F(x) =  {XL1 , Yn}. 
where XL1 references a matrix of ones positions from the sample that has been 





Figure4.2 Authentication Process 
Provide Iris Samples 
Iris Sample 1 













Call and identify user 
Function User_Id_F(x) 
= {X1 Yn} 
Sample (1) = {Sample (1) ± (Sample (1) ŀX1)} 
Sample (2) = {Sample (2) ± (Sample (2) ŀX1)} 
Sample (3) = {Sample (3) ± (Sample (3) ŀX1)} 
Shift right and left for all three samples. 
 
Covert all the position number to one and do sum 
for each one: 
Sample (1) = Sum ((Sample (1) / Sample (1)). 
 Sample (2) = Sum ((Sample (2) / Sample (2)). 
Sample (3) = Sum ((Sample (3) / Sample (3)). 
Do the same for shifting right 
As every sample will have three values (actual value 
and shifting right and left), the min value will be 
taken and these values divided by the number of bits 
in the iris feature (iris size). 
Sample (1) = (min ((Sample (1))) \ iris size. 
 Sample (2) = (min ((Sample (2))) \ iris size. 
Sample (3) = (min ((Sample (3))) \ iris size. 
X coordinates = {Sample (1), Sample (2), Sample 
(3)} 
X0= min(X), X1= median(X), X2= max(X). => 
order them descending. 
Apply  If condition 






Calling form User_id_F(x) Y coordinates Y0, Y1, 
and Y2, and increasing the distance between three 
points by following table YY. 
Three points will be extracted 
(X0,Y0), (X1,Y1), and (X2,Y2) 
 
$SSO\LQJ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6FKHPH WR VROYH the 
polynomial and derive a secret key 
Secret key is 
between a limit 












Figure 4.2 shows the authentication structure, which begins by providing iris samples 
from a candidate user. Each iris sample employs a feature extraction algorithm to 
extract iris features. After that, ones positions must then be extracted for each sample. 
Function User_id_F(x) will be called next. This function holds the XL1 matrix, which 
is the position of ones that came from the enrollment iris sample, for the user id for the 
claimed identity, applying the XL1 matrix with iris samples as per the following 
calculation and taking account of shifting the iris feature left and right as well: 
Sample (1) =  {Sample (1) ± 6DPSOH  ŀ ;/1)} Î 
Sample(1)_shift_left , Sample(1)_shift_Right. 
Sample (2) =  {Sample (2) ± 6DPSOH  ŀ ;/1)} Î 
Sample(2)_shift_left , Sample(2)_shift_Right. 
Sample (3) =  {Sample (3) ± 6DPSOH  ŀ ;/1)} Î 
Sample(3)_shift_left , Sample(3)_shift_Right.   (4.2) 
Convert all these samples from the position number to one and sum each sample 
separately as per the following calculation: 
Sample (1) =  Sum ((Sample (1) / Sample (1)). 
Sample (2) =  Sum ((Sample (2) / Sample (2)). 
Sample (3) =  Sum ((Sample (3) / Sample (3)).    (4.3) 
To find the closest sample to the genuine user, the min value from the three values 
from each sample will be taken and divided by the number of iris feature bits (K), as 
follows: 
Sample (1) =  (min ((Sample (1), Sample (1)_shift_left, and 
Sample(1)_shift_Right)) \K 
Sample (2) =  (min ((Sample (2) , Sample (2)_shift_left, and 
Sample(2)_shift_Right)) \K. 
Sample (3) =  (min ((Sample (3) , Sample (3)_shift_left, and 
Sample(3)_shift_Right)) \K      (4.4) 
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Moreover, Xn coordinate values will be {Sample(1), Sample(2), Sample(3)}; in 
descending order, X0 will be the min (Xn) while X1 will be the median (Xn) and finally 
X2 will be the max (Xn). 
Subsequently, the final step in determining whether these three points belong to the 
genuine user or to an impostor is to apply the following if condition: 
 ? ?ሺ ? ?൏  ?Ǥ ?ሻ  ? ?ൌ  ? ?  ? ? ? ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  ? ?ൌ  ?Ǥ  ? ? ? 
 This condition is used to test if the point is smaller or greater than 0.1 for the 
classification process of separating genuine from impostor users. If the point is a 
genuine user, the point will be left as is. However, if the point is greater than or equal 
to 0.1, then this point will be equal to zero to separate the point far away from the 
JHQXLQH XVHU¶V SRLQWV ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH IXQFWLRQ User_id_F(x) will also have the Y 
coordinates {Y0, Y1, Y2}, based on Table 4.1 DERYH $V D UHVXOW 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW
algorithm solves the polynomial curve to retrieve the key, shown as the intercept on 
the vertical axis. Finally, by checking the key and according to Table 4.1, if the key is 
between the limit that has been chosen then Pass (otherwise Failed). 
4.3.1.1 Performance and Experimental Results 
This section details the experimentation process, providing experimental results in 
terms of false acceptance and rejection rates for the overall authentication system for 
all users in an authentication scenario. 
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The investigation pertained to 300 users, using iris modality databases, with 18 
samples per user. Taking six samples for each user divided in two tasks, each set of 
three samples was used to create a user function and employed for testing. There were 
four tests for each user, each providing three samples and applying them seven times 
with different limitations, according to Table 4.1, WR GHFLGH WKH NH\¶V SODFH RQ WKH
vertical axis.  
Table 4.2 6DPSOHV3HUIRUPDQFH¥ Indicates Success for Given Modalities; X Indicates Failure)(system1). 
 
Passive forgeries were also investigated by employing 300 impostor users trying to 
gain access by claiming the identity of 300 genuine users.  
The data experiments for iris used the CASIA-IrisV3-Interval database [92].  This 
justification of the use of this database has been provided in chapter 2, 
Table 4.3 Passive Forgery Example (system1) 
User_Id 1 2 3 4 . ..30 
Claimed Identity  for user 300 59 58 57 « 
 
Table 4.4 shows a set of variances applied to increase the distance between three 
points in the polynomial curve to establish false rejection rate (FRR), false 
acceptance rate (FAR) and equal error rate (EER). 





Iris limitation key place in the vertical axis Table 2 
(0)^2, (1)^2 
-5 ± 5 
(2)^2 
0 ± 10 
(3)^2 
5 ± 15 
(4)^2 
10 ± 21 
(5)^2 
20 ± 31 
(6)^2 
30 ± 41 
(7)^2 
40 ± 51 
1 
 
1 x  ¥  X x x X X 
2 X x X X x X X 
3 ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
4 ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Number of Attempts 1 2 3 4 5 6 




An illustration of the performance of the system is shown in Tables 4.2 to 4.5 and in 
Figure 4.3. Tables 4.2 to 4.4 show sample results of the authentication system for 
genuine and impostor users: two tests for each user, providing three samples for each 
test. In the strategy in Table 4.4, six different points are applied to the polynomial 
curve to establish the variances in FRR and FAR. Each point in the strategy is applied 
in Table 4.2. Here, the result of a failure of one system limitation does not necessarily 
cause the system as a whole to fail (as shown in sample 1 test 1 with all limitation 
failure). A summary of overall performance for all samples, in terms of false 
acceptance and false rejection rate, of the Shamir component of the system for the 
three polynomial points strategy in Table 4.4 is shown in Table 4.5 and graphically in 
Figure 4.3. 
Table 4.5 Results of FRR and FAR for Authentication (system1). 
Number of Attempts 1 2    ERR 3 4 5 6 
FRR 55.8 % 19,3  % 7.3 % 3.6 % 3.5 % 1.25 % 
FAR 5.4 % 18.06  % 21.1 % 22.2 % 23.7 % 95.4 % 
 
Table 4.5 shows the results for six orders of y-coordinate polynomial points in 
attempting to generate the key secret. The number of attempts made to deduce FRR 
and FAR in the Table 4.5 were made based on the z-values showed in table 4.4, in 
order to test the impact of z-vales on the  False accept and False Reject rate (FRR and 
FAR) and quality of encryption key. The FRR in taking y-coordinates from Table 4.1 
is 1.25%, but the FAR is too high. By increasing the distance between the three points, 
the FRR is increased while the FAR is decreased. As a result, attempt numbers 2 and 3 
are the best result so far; in attempt number 2, 19.3 % FRR and 18.06% FAR. 
However, attempt number 3 showed that the FRR is much lower that attempt 2 at 
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7.3%, but the FAR has slightly increased as compared to attempt 2.  Hence, the equal 
error rate (EER) shows roughly 20 %   
These results are interesting, as they demonstrate the relative merits of the polynomial 
orders when considering the desired performance of the system. However, the 
outcomes of these tests are partly dependent on the quality of the biometric samples 
employed and the algorithms employed for the iris modality. 
The FRR and FAR ROC curve, showing how the performance of the system varies 
across six different techniques by increasing the distance between points in the 
horizontal axis, is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure4.3 ROC curve showing FAR and FRR performance of system 1 
 
4.3.1.2 Summary  
An attempt has been made to explore a new technique of generating an encryption key 
from biometric modality samples, using a minimal amount of stored data and 
examining the system reaction. Within the proposed scheme, the biometric template 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK HDFK XVHU QHHG QRW EH VWRUHG RQO\ WKH PDWUL[ RI ³RQHV´ SRVLWLRQV LV
stored, which does not identify the associated user. The results appeared negative; we 
considered the scheme to have failed for the following reasons. 
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- The EER was over 20% which is a considered as a high error rate. 
- It seems that the data stored in the mini-template, as we called it in this scheme, 
needs to be reduced. 
- Generation of the biometric encryption key was inaccurate. In this scheme, we 
extracted it at enrollment, but in the authentication we controlled by limitation 
in the y-axis, which affected the level of security and performance as reflected 
by a very high ERR.  
- The system is easy to hack. By looking at the authentication structures, a 
hacker can skip all the steps and go directly to Step 4 in the authentication 
process in Figure 4.2, providing any number under 0.1.  
On the other hand, a lot was learned from this scheme, as summarised in the following 
points. 
- In comparing any two iris samples, whether from the same person or not, there 
is a huge similarity between them. As evidence of this, any iris recognition 
system defines a threshold such that a Hamming Distance < 0.2 for example 
(which is the average threshold in public) identifies the iris provider as genuine 
or otherwise as an impostor. This indicates that the similarity between any two 
irises is more than 70%. 
- Iris image quality plays a fundamental role in helping any iris recognition 
system to extract the iris perfectly. 
- Iris feature extraction may result in significant similarity between users. 
4.3.2 System 2: Template free key generation from Iris modality using 
2D Gabor Filter  
The template free key generation approach was adopted in this work because it aims to 
reduce the data stored in the database so that hackers can not attack the privacy of the 
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data. This also intends to reduce the attacks on the security of the biometric system. 
This system stored the data in form vectors of numbers of the successful blocks against 
each XVHU¶VELRPHWULFVDPSOHZKLFKGRHVQRWLGHQWLI\WKHDVVRFLDWHGXVHUV. Hence, the 
success of this system will prevent the security and privacy attacks on the biometric 
system, along with increasing the performance of the system. 
In this scheme, a new approach was taken to the process of investigation, dividing the 
iris binary code as extracted by 2D Gabor filter and 2D wavelet demodulation [73], 
respectively, into many blocks. Each block was converted to a decimal number (binary 
to integer) by use of conversion tools. Blocks were chosen by dividing the training sets 
into two tasks, each with a number of training samples, to compare these two tasks and 
to specify blocks that were the same or close in vaOXH 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW PHWKRG ZDV
then applied to generate the biometric encryption key for placement on the y-axis. The 
Xn and Yn coordinates were specified as follows: 
- Xn coordinate: the value of the chosen blocks 
- Yn coordinate: the numbers of the chosen blocks 
The system architecture was divided into enrollment and authentication processes, 
which will be explained separately in detail. Each user had 20 iris samples, divided in 
two, with 8 samples for training purposes divided into two tasks with four samples in 
each. For the testing process, 12 samples were provided for three tests, again with four 
samples in each test. The enrollment process can be described as follows. 
1- The user is asked to provide 12 iris samples in three tasks, each involving four 
samples. 
2- Feature extraction is performed by the 2D Gabor filter method [73]. 
3- Iris binary code is generated by 2D wavelet demodulation [73, 96, 97]. 
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4- The logical operation XNOR is then applied for each task as in Figure 4.4. This 
is used primarily to pinpoint the invariable iris features (codes) in samples 
taken at different intervals from the same users and secondly to avoid high 
similarity percentage between two iris codes taken from different codes. This is 
novel step which has been introduced in the algorithm. 
 
5- To generate the similarity between samples for each task, the result code is 
sized in 7200 bit lengths, divided into 72 blocks of 100 bits, as it shows in the 
Table 4.6. This is also novel aspect of this algorithm which led the researcher 
to find the location of successful blocks. 
Table 4.6 Example of dividing the iris code to blocks (system2) 
No of 
Blocks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 « 72 
Task 1 10010 01100 10010 10100 10001 10111 10101 « 10010 
Task 2 10010 01100 10001 10010 10001 10011 10100 « 10010 
 
6- Conversion from binary to integer is applied for each block to generate its 
decimal number. 
Figure4.4 XNOR Operation for Four Samples in each Task ±system 2- 
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7- Suitable blocks (i.e. that are the same or close in value) for Task 1 and Task 2 
are identified using the following equation:  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ? ? ?ሻ ൌ   ? ?െ ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where n is the number of blocks. This shows the variance between two blocks 
for two tasks, with the suitable blocks achieving a value of 0 or close to 0. The 
setup threshold for our experiments is -10^20 < Sbn < 10^20 as shown in Figure 
4.5. 
 
Figure4.5 Blocks of Interest (close to 0) -system 2- 
Figure 4.5 shows the number of blocks that can be used for generating the 
VHFUHWNH\E\6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPH 
8- $ELRPHWULFHQFU\SWLRQNH\LVWKHQJHQHUDWHGE\6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHFXELF
style). As explained in Chapter 3, section 3.3, a cubic equation needs at least 
four points to create the key, so the successful blocks will be considered as 
polynomial points. Xn coordinates refer to the number of successful blocks and 
Yn FRRUGLQDWHVUHIHUWRWKHVXFFHVVIXOEORFNV¶YDOXHVDVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH 
9- User function will be created number of blocks for Xn. For example, if 
successful blocks = {1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 33, 63, 72}, these will be stored in the user 




Secondly, the authentication process can be described in the following steps: 
1- The user is asked to provide 8 iris samples, divided between two tests using 
four samples each. 
2- Pre-processing is performed for all testing samples. 
3- Feature extraction and encoding is completed. 
4- Each test undergoes XNOR to generate similarities between samples for each 
test. 
5- Each test is divided into 72 blocks of 100 bits. 
6- A binary converting tool is applied to convert the binary code in each block to 
a decimal number.  
7- The user function is called, carrying the number of the block of interest. 
8- 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH LV DSSOLHG WR UHOHDVH WKH NH\ XQGHU FXELF VW\OH
conditions (requiring at least four points to release the biometric encryption 
key). 
(a) (b)  
Figure4.6 Training Set Performance of system 2 
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4.3.2.1 Experimental Results  
In this section, we will cover the experimentation process, wherein we will provide the 
experimental result by determining the false acceptance and rejection rates for the 
overall authentication system for all users in an authentication scenario. 
The investigation pertained to 300 users, using iris modality databases, with 20 
samples per user. Taking eight samples for each user divided in two tasks, each set of 
three samples was used to create a user function and employed for testing. There were 
three tests for each user, each providing four samples. In total, 300 users * 3 testing = 
900. 
Passive forgeries were also investigated by employing 300 impostor users trying to 
gain access by claiming the identity of each of 300 genuine users. In total, 300 passive 
forgeries users * 300 genuine * 3 testing = 270,000. 
The data experiments for iris used the CASIA-IrisV3-Interval database [92].  This 
justification of the use of this database has been provided in chapter 2. 
Table 4.7 FAR and FRR performance (system2). 
Limkey 
Key limitation in y axis ( Limkey ± key < key < key + limkey ) 




FRR 0.1 4.4 7.3 8.2 16.7 41.8 61.6 
FAR 97.9 60.5 29.7 22.7 18 9.1 5.01 
No of 
attempts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Table 4.7 and Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the performance of the system. In Table 
4.7, there are seven different conditions of the key limitation strategy, increasing the 
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biometric key limitation that applies in the polynomial curve to establish the variances 
in the FRR and FAR. A summary of overall performance of the system for all samples 
in terms of the FAR and FRR of the Shamir component of the system for the four 
polynomial points strategy is shown in Table 4.7 and graphically in Figure 4.8. In 
addition, Figure 4.7 shows training and testing sets for User1, resulting in successful 
extraction of the biometric encryption key. 
Table 4.7 shows the result of seven orders of key limitation threshold in generating the 
key secret. The FRR on increasing key limitation is 0.1%, but the FAR is too high. By 
decreasing the limitation placed on the y-axis, the FRR is increased while the FAR is 
decreased. Attempts based on key limitation between -10^24 < biometric key < 10^24 
provided the best result so far. In attempt number 5, the equal error rate shows 16.7% 
FRR and 18% FAR. However, attempt number 4 showed a much lower FRR than 
attempt 5 (8.2%), but the FAR  increased slightly by comparison with attempt 5.   
 




These results are very interesting as they demonstrate the relative merits of the 
polynomial orders in relation to the desired performance of the system. However, the 
outcomes of these tests are in part dependent on the quality of the biometric samples 
employed and the algorithms employed for the iris modality. 
The FRR and FAR ROC curve in Figure 4.8 shows how the performance of the system 
varies across seven different techniques with increasing key limitation in the vertical 
axis. 
4.3.2.2 Summary  
An attempt has been made to explore a new technique for generating an encryption key 
from biometric modality samples, using a minimal amount of stored data and 
examining the system reaction. Within the proposed scheme, the biometric template 
identified with each user need not be stored; only the vector of the number of 
successful blocks is stored, which does not identify the associated user. Although 
interesting, the results were also disappointing; we considered the scheme to have 
failed for the following reasons. 
Figure4.8 ROC curve of FAR and FRR performance of system 2 
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- The EER shows roughly 20%, which is unacceptable for an iris recognition 
system.  
- We believe that thHGDWDVWRUHG³VXFFHVVIXOEORFNVQXPEHUV´DVZHFDOOHGWKLV
scheme) need to be further investigated because of the trick with the iris binary 
code, which contained just 0 and 1 values. It is not inevitable that the chosen 
blocks will be the same in every iris sample because iris localization, 
normalisation, segmentation and unwrapping will definitely affect the order of 
iris bits. Even if we consider the right/left shifting, the blocks still cannot be 
considered as standard in every iris sample for each user. 
- There was no accuracy in generating the biometric encryption key. In this 
scheme, the biometric encryption key was extracted during enrollment, but in 
the authentication phase, the key extracted will be tested by limitation 
conditions in the y-axis, which affected the level of security and performance, 
returning a very high EER.  
On the other hand, a lot was also learned from this scheme, as summarised below. 
- Iris binary code is a vector that depends on pre-processing and feature 
extraction, making it hard to name a block or digit in the vector that is standard 
for a particular person, appearing every time as 0 or 1. 
- Comparing any two iris binary code from the same person, the variance 
between them ranged from 5% to 25%, which is typical of the FRR in every 
iris recognition system. However, comparing two different iris binary codes 
from two different people, the similarity between them could be over 70%, 




4.3.3 System 3: Template free key generation from Iris modality using 
GLCM 
Due to failure of the system 2, the new approach has been adopted in which the 
encryption key was tried to be generated from the iris modality by using different iris 
feature extraction method called Gray Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) [94, 95]. 
In this scheme, feature extraction from iris modality using the GLCM and 
subsequently extracting the binary code by looking at derivatives, checking every 
interval in the GLCM matrix against the next interval. Simply put the derivative 
technique records whether the next interval increases or decreases. The reason for 
using another feature extraction method instead of the 2D Gabor filter (sections 4.3.1 
and 4.3.2) is to recover most of the area in the iris feature extraction field and to 
HVWDEOLVK WKHV\VWHP¶VUHDFWLRQDQGUHVSRQVH7R WKDWHQGZH WHVWHG WKHPHWKRGZLWK
template to assess FRR and FAR results and to decide whether this technique is 
suitable to be moved to a template-free system. 
4.3.3.1 Methodology  
This section introduces GLCM feature extraction, which will be applied in this 
scheme, and a derivative technique for converting the results of GLCM to binary code. 
4.3.3.1.1 System Architecture 
The architecture for this scheme will be divided into enrolment and authentication 
architectures, which will be discussed in detail in terms of the enrollment and 
authentication operations. 
4.3.3.1.2 Enrollment operation 
There are several steps in the enrollment process. 
1- The user is asked to provide iris samples. 
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2- Iris localization and normalisation methods are applied [71-73]. 
3- Iris feature extraction using GLCM is applied [94]. As proposed by Haralick et 
al. [95], GLCM is one of the most widely-used approaches to extracting 
textural features and can be defined as follows. Suppose an area has Nc and Nr 
resolution cells in the horizontal and vertical directions, respectively, and Ng 
levels in the gray tone. Let Lc = {1, 2, .., Nc} be the horizontal spatial domain, 
let Lr  ^«Nr} be the vertical spatial domain, and let G = 1, 2, .., Ng be 
the set of Ng quantized gray tones. The image I can be represented as a 
function that assigns some gray tone in G to each resolution cell or pair of 
coordinates in Lr  Lc; I : Lr  Lc Ѝ G. The texture-context information is 
specified in a matrix of relative frequencies Pij where two neighbouring 
resolution cells separated by distance d occur on the image: one with gray tone 
i and the other with gray tone j. Pij can then be described in Eq. (4.1): 
 
 
4- In subsequent experiments, the established experimental parameters for iris 
feature extraction using GLCM were used [95]. For this purpose, the biometric 
samples were converted into gray tones. The assumption was made that 28 = 
256 were enough to make the details of the sample visible to the human eye 
[95,159], therefore each biometric sample was stored in memory using 8-bit. 
As a result of GLCM method, the 8 x 8 matrix was generated. The number of 
gray levels increases the textural information, so is very important factor in 




GLCM method. However, the number of gay levels, the more computational 
cost [95, 159]. Hence, 256 gray levels were assumed to be enough to reveal all 
nuances of the samples in the current study [95, 159].The established 
parameters involve the window size set at 8 pixels, gray levels at 256, distance 
between pixel pairs at 1 pixel, and 4 different angle sets are used: (0°, 45°, 90°, 
135°) as shown in Figure 4.9. 
5- The resulting matrix of four different angles is added together as per the 
following equation  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ൌ ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?൅  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?൅  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?൅  ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
6- GLCMaddDgree is reshaped in one vector and the mean is extracted. For more 
details, in the enrollment process, the user will provide 3 sets, each sets has 3 
iris samples. Hence, the mean will be extracted from the 3 training sets for each 
user. In this step, a test is performed to examine the data after feature extraction 




As already mentioned, the user is asked to provide nine iris samples in the 
enrollment phase, to be divided into three sets, each of three samples. Iris 
features are extracted by GLCM; adding all the results together, the reshaped 
matrix can be plotted for each set as shown in Figure 4.10, extracting the mean 
from the three sets provided as plotted in Figure 4.10 (red plot). The results 
between training sets are quite similar for each user. In addition, the results 
across different users appeared positive, which afforded a hope that this scheme 
might work, as shown in Figure 4.10. 
7- Looking at derivatives (simply record whether next interval increases or 
decreases), a binary code was extracted from the mean of the reshaped 
GLCMaddDgree as follows:  ? ?ሺ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ ൏  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?ǡ ? ൅  ?ሻ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሺ ǡሻ ൌ  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Figure4.10 Training Sets Performance for 9 Users of system 3 
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8-  Following the limitation increasing rule or 6 bits rule as set in the experiment, 
if for example Mean_of_GLCMaddDgree =[110100]; Æ then, 
Mean_of_GLCMaddDgree =[111111], which means the curve values in the chart 
have increased. However, if Mean_of_GLCMaddDgree =[110000]; Æ then, 
Mean_of_GLCMaddDgree =[000000], which mean the values have decreased. 
Figure 4.11 shows the proposed derivative technique. 
 
9- %LQDU\FRGH LV WKHQH[WUDFWHG IURPWKHXVHU¶V WUDLQLQJVHWV WREHVWRUHG LQ WKH
database for authentication purposes.  
4.3.3.1.3 Authentication process: 
Here, the system is tested by asking the user to provide nine iris samples to be 
divided into three tests, each using three samples. The pre-processing method is 
stratified for the iris localization/normalisation and segmentation/unwrapping 
process [71-73]. Subsequently, the GLCM method is applied to extract iris 
features, and steps 5 to 8 in the enrollment process are applied in the same way to 
generate the iris binary code. Finally, the Hamming Distance method is used to 
Figure4.11 Derivative Technique Proposal (system 3) 
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check the FRR and FAR against the Hamming Distance template as described in 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 [73, 74]. 
4.3.3.2 Experimental results 
This section deals with the experimentation process, presenting the experimental 
results in terms of false acceptance and rejection rates for the overall authentication 
system for all users in an authentication scenario. 
For the investigation, there were 300 users, using iris modality databases, with 18 
samples per user. Taking nine samples for each user divided across three tasks, each 
had three samples for training sets and extraction of a template to be saved in the 
database and used in the authentication test. With three tests for each user, each 
providing three samples, in total 300 users * 3 testing = 900. 
Passive forgeries were also investigated by employing 300 impostor users trying to 
gain access by claiming the identity of each of 300 genuine users. In total, 300 passive 
forgeries users * 300 genuine * 3 testing = 270,000. 
The data experiments for iris used the CASIA-IrisV3-Interval database [92].  This 
justification of the use of this database has been provided in chapter 2. 




0.016 0.018 0.02 0.024 0.026 0.028 
FRR 42.888 18.777 11.444 7.222 3.666 1.444 0.777 0.777 
FAR 3.590 18.964 32.489 47.535 61.505 82.316 88.790 93.367 
 
Table 4.8 and Figure 4.12 present a summary of overall performance of the system for 
all samples in terms of the FAR and FRR, showing the results for eight orders of 
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threshold in terms of hamming distance. The result proved that this scheme has many 
dark points as the ERR with template is 18%, which is unacceptable for an iris 
recognition system. For more detail, the threshold for the EER is < 0.014, which means 
that similarities between two iris codes, whether or not they are from the same user, 
are extremely high at more than 90 %. However, the EER shows, surprisingly, that 
with a small threshold setting of 0.014, the FAR and FRR are equal at 18%. 
 
Figure4.12 ROC curve of FAR and FRR Performance of system 3 
The FRR and FAR ROC curve, showing how the performance of the system varies 
across eight different techniques by increasing the threshold on the horizontal axis, is 
shown in Figure 4.12. 
4.3.3.3 Summary  
In exploring this new technique, using GLCM feature extraction [94, 95], it proved 
interesting at the outset, but when applied with template stored, the results were 
disappointing. For that reason, it was not possible to move on in this scheme to build 
an iris system that could generate the biometric key directly from the iris modality, for 
the following reasons. 
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- The ERR appeared close to 18% with a system using a template, which is 
unacceptable for an iris recognition system. 
- We believe that the data stored (template) generated wrongly or that the 
scheme needs further investigation because the EER is 18% with small 
threshold set as shown in Table 4.8. 
- The false rate is affected by the quality of iris images and implementation 
algorithms. 
4.3.4 System 4: Template free key generation from Iris modality using 
feature distribution maps 
The failures of the generation of encryption key from the iris modality by using the 
Gabor Filter (System 1) and the GLCM (System 2) showed that there are some 
variations and gaps in the chosen schemes for these systems which led to the failure of 
key generation directly from the iris samples. Consequently, it was assumed that 
introduction of feature distribution maps instead of the derivatives technique used in 
system 3 could provide the successful results in terms of generating encryption key 
from the iris modality.  
This scheme investigated feature distribution maps using Gaussian distribution 
(normal distribution) [98-103] after extracting iris features by the GLCM method [94, 
95]. Before moving to generate a biometric encryption key from typical user 
normalisation maps taken from user samples, the normal distribution was tested to 
decide whether or not to use it by calculating the FRR and FAR. 
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4.3.4.1 Methodology of Feature Distribution maps 
The initial phase in the template-free biometric is the enrollment phase, which yields 
feature distribution maps for typical users of the system. Enrollment begins with 
presentation of known biometric samples from all users. 
 
Figure 4.13 shows the structures for enrollment and authentication. Enrollment begins 
with the user providing iris samples followed by pre-processing and feature extraction. 
Feature score normalisation and quantization are then applied. Feature binary code will 
be extracted by the Gray code method to be mapped in the distribution map. The 









































Figure4.13 Enrollment and Authentication Process of system 4 
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extraction follows pre-processing and then normalisation and quantization. Feature 
encRGLQJ LV JHQHUDWHG IRU FKHFNLQJ LQ WKH PDS¶V GLVWULEXWLRQ XVLQJ WKH +DPPLQJ
Distance algorithm [73, 74].   
4.3.4.2 Feature extraction  
In this scheme, as mentioned earlier, the GLCM method is used to generate iris 
features as described in section 4.3.3.1.2 [94, 95@ 7UDGLWLRQDOO\ +DUDOLFN¶V IHDWXUHV
include fourteen features; we chose the first twelve texture features for our analysis. 
Using GLCM to extract textures is sensitive to three factors: selection of window size, 
number of gray levels, and distances between pixel pairs. Specific window size, gray 
levels and distances of pixels pairs were set through a number of preliminary 
experiments. For GLCM, in subsequent experiments, the window size was set at 
8×8pixels, gray levels at 256, distances between pixel pairs at 4 pixels, and 4 different 
angles were set (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°), yielding a total of 192 features in one vector for 
each sample. 
4.3.4.3 Normalisation and Quantization 
The min-max normalisation technique is employed in all training sets for all users as 
given by [98, 99]:  
 ? ? ? ? ?ൌ  ? ?െሺ ? ?ሻሺ ? ?ሻ െ ሺ ? ?ሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Min and max sample score values are those of users within each feature space, where 
xi is the individual sample value, min(xi) is the smallest value of x in all users for that 
feature space, and max(xi) is the largest value of x in all users for that feature space. 
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A fixed quantization interval between 0 and 1 is used per feature space. For each value 
in the quantization interval, the mean and standard deviation per user is used to 
calculate the normal probability distribution function [100-103], given by 
 ?ሺ ?ሻ ൌ   ? ?  ? ?ቆെ ሺ ? െ  ?ሻ ? ? ? ? ቇሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
P(x) is plotted against the quantization space Figure 4.14. It should, however, be noted 
that because there are increasing overlaps in user characteristics, p(x) values are further 
converted into Gray code [104] to test the system by hamming distance and to 
establish the false rejection and acceptance rates in deciding whether the scheme has 
passed or failed.  
 
4.3.4.4 Experimental results 
This section deals with the experimentation process, providing the experimental results 
in terms of the false acceptance and rejection rates for the overall authentication 
system for all users in an authentication scenario. 
For the investigation, there were 300 users, using iris modality databases, with 18 
samples per user. Taking nine samples for each user divided across three tasks, each 
Figure4.14 User Distribution Maps (system 4) 
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had three samples for training sets and extraction of a template to be saved in the 
database and used in the authentication test. With three tests for each user, each 
providing three samples, 300 users * 3 testing = 900 in total. 
Passive forgeries were also investigated by employing 300 impostor users trying to 
gain access by claiming the identity of each of 300 genuine users. In total, 300 passive 
forgeries users * 300 genuine * 3 testing = 270,000. 
The data experiments for iris used the CASIA-IrisV3-Interval database [92].  This 
justification of the use of this database has been provided in chapter 2. 
Table 4.9 FAR and FRR Performance (system4) 
Threshold 0.39 0.40 0.42 (EER) 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.49 
FRR 89.78 60.00 24.00 2.22 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.00 
FAR 0.78 6.33 28.19 72.43 97.99 99.74 99.96 100.00 
 
A summary of overall performance of the system for all samples in terms of FAR and 
FRR is shown in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.15, summarising the results of 8 orders of 
threshold in term of hamming distance. The results demonstrate that this scheme has 
many drawbacks because the EER with template is 26%, which is not acceptable for 
an iris recognition system. In more detail, the threshold that got the EER is < 0.42, 
which means that the similarities between two iris codes, whether from the same user 
or not, is not close to 50% and this extremely low return will increase the FRR. The 
EER shows an expected result; in looking at Figure 4.14, SUHVHQWLQJDSORWRIXVHUV¶
probability distribution, it should however be noted that there are increasing overlaps 
in user characteristics. 
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The FRR and FAR ROC curve show how the performance of the system varies across 
eight different techniques by increasing the threshold on the horizontal axis as shown 
in Figure 4.15. 
 
 
Figure4.15 ROC curve of FAR and FRR Performance of system 4 
 
4.3.4.5 Summary  
In attempting this new technique using Gaussian distribution maps with iris feature 
extraction by GLCM algorithm, the results were disappointing. The EER of 26% was 
unacceptable, although we did achieve a scheme in which the biometric template does 
not need to be stored. As a result, this scheme needs to be studied again with a view to 
building an iris system that can generate a biometric key directly from the iris 
modality. However, this current scheme has failed, for the following reasons. 
- The EER (close to 26%) is unacceptable for an iris recognition system. 
- There was a lot of overlap in the normal distribution maps across all users, 
which caused increasing error rates as shown in Table 4.9. 
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4.4 Summary  
This chapter has introduced several schemes for integrating direct biometric key 
JHQHUDWLRQVFKHPHVZLWK6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVKDULQJDOJRULWKPand others [11] in order to 
directly address the two disadvantages of revocability and exception handling. 
However, these schemes returned negative results, which means that the false rate 
(rejecting or accepting) is high or that the level of performance or security is low. Each 
scheme was presented in detail along with an explanation of how it works, why this 
scheme was used, and what feedback arose from it.  
In summary, the study period has returned some negative results and disappointments, 
but much has been gained in terms of knowledge. In light of these issues, we opted to 
explore the design of two template-free biometric systems, in which biometric data can 
be mapped onto repeatable unique binary codes/strings in both, opening up the key 
only in the presence of biometric prints. The first system uses the Gray Level Co-
Occurrence Matrix method (GLCM) [94, 95] to extract iris features, and the second 
system uses the 2D Gabor Filter [73@ 7R JHQHUDWH WKH VHFUHW NH\ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW
Scheme [11] is applied to the three data points provided (right iris, left iris, and 
password). Two points out of three are then sufficient to release the biometric key by 
use of the linear equation technique, giving the user the desired flexibility while 
reducing the FRR. For both designs, a three-factor scheme is proposed, to include 
smartcard, password, and biometrics. Here, each component is crucial to the system 
required in revealing the biometric data specific to an individual, with the opportunity 
of either updating or revoking the key; all three factors would be required to 






%LRPHWULF 6HFXULW\ E\ D 'LUHFW .H\ *HQHUDWLRQ
6FKHPH 
5.1. Introduction 
The main focus of this Chapter is to investigate the template-free biometric system by 
generating the biometric encryption key directly from the biometric samples. This 
chapter will address the following research objectives: 
x To propose a multifunctional authentication system involving three modalities 
left iris, right iris and password. However, it should be acknowledged that 
password is not a standard biometric modality, but it is assumed to be a third 
biometric modality because the linear equation of Shamir Secret Scheme 
requires the three points to generate the key. Other biometric traits such as 
fingerprints could have been selected but their processing may take years to be 
completed, which is out of the scope of this PhD project. In order to avoid the 
lengthy and unnecessary prolongation of the project, the password has been 
assumed as a third biometric modality. 
x To apply the Shamir Secret Scheme to generate the biometric encryption key 
directly from biometric samples (three points). 
x To use a three factor scheme for increasing the security of the proposed system 
involving biometric, smart card and password. 
In this chapter, outcomes of experiments to accomplish aforementioned objectives are 
presented. Furthermore, this chapter will also present the major novel findings and 
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achievements obtained through these experiments including the successful generation 
RI IOH[LEO\ DGMXVWHG HQFU\SWLRQ ELRPHWULF NH\ OHQJWK HQKDQFHPHQW RI V\VWHP¶V
SHUIRUPDQFH DQG VHFXULW\ E\ XVLQJ OLQHDU HTXDWLRQV VXJJHVWHG E\ 6KDPLU¶V Secret 
Scheme, and reduction of the data storage requirement of the system.  
Recent work has explored the interaction between cryptography and biometrics, which 
are two complementary security technologies [50]. Biometrics is unique in the sense 
that it has the capacity to capture various forms of personal data such as fingerprint, 
iris and voice. The combination of biometrics and cryptographic techniques enables 
the user to access a signature that they have themselves created, with a high degree of 
confidence and accuracy. This makes it difficult for another person to generate the 
VLJQDWXUH E\ VWHDOLQJ VRPHRQH¶V WRNHQ RU IRU WKH XVHU WR FODLP WKDW D VLJQDWXUH KDV
been falsely generated from a stolen token when this was not the case.  
Abraham et al [8] showed that the approach combining both cryptographic and 
biometric methods has the potential to generate a digital signature with high level of 
security and assurance. For instance, if the system will recognized any attempt made 
by the attacker to use the stolen key to create a signature or the user trying to falsely 
reject the signature claiming that signature is stolen when actually it is not. Previous 
research has attempted to address some security-related issues by introducing the 
signature verification pen and the IBM Transaction Security System with attached 
signal processor [8]. The main drawback of this technique is its complete dependence 
on the tamper-resistance of the hardware; in any case of token tampering, both keys 
and template disappear. However, attackers can break the token by other methods²
VSHFLILFDOO\ $3, DWWDFNV RQ WKH WRNHQ¶V VRIWZDUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ,%0 GHVLJQ DQG
exploitation of chip-testing technology [51]. For that reason, an attempt has been made 
to evolve a more reliable combination of the three technologies: tamper-resistant 
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hardware, biometrics and cryptography. However, algorithmic combination is rendered 
problematic by the noisy background of biometric data, offering only an approximate 
match to the stored data in the template. Similarly, cryptography presents its own 
problem of requiring exactly the right key. These previously-offered products depend 
on specific types of hardware device [50]; instead, there is a need to generate a 
protocol-based and more general strategy for the combination of both metrics and 
cryptography. Users are often reluctant to have that data stored in a central database, 
but user resistance to the use of biometric technology can be mitigated by credible 
assurances that their data will not be stored in this way. This in turn requires 
investigation of template-free biometric technology. Previous research has made some 
attempts in this regard by mapping personal biometric information into repetitive 
binary strings [20, 21, 52-54], which are mappable into the encryption key leading to 
opening of direct hashing [54, 55] or lookup tables [20, 52, 53].  
The great promise of this approach was to create a system free of data storage 
concerns, but attempts to date at creating a template-free system have inherited several 
flaws and issues. The core drawback is the association of unreliability factors with the 
individual bits of information within the template. These issues have been further 
exacerbated by the noisy background created by biometric measurements of human 
physical attributes while the cryptographic requirement is to capture the exact key for 
further processing. Many attempts have been made to use keystroke patterns [21] and 
other human attributes²including voice [20], fingerprints [52, 56], facial attributes 
[53] and handwritten signatures [54]²for the derivation of biometric keys, in an effort 
to fill the gap between the noisy background of biometrics and the exactitude 
demanded by cryptography [21]. However, these attempts exhibit more than 20% FRR 
(False Rejection Rate) during verification, which is not practical for security 
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applications [43]. Biometric data contain non-changeable human attributes specific to 
an individual, and so they cannot be subjected to any alteration. Key diversity is 
another issue in accessing biometric data; the user may wish to obtain separate keys for 
his bank and account and to use a computer at his workplace, enjoying the flexibility 
of revoking any key without affecting any other.  
The openness of the biometric data is also a major problem, as the physical attributes 
of human beings such as low-quality fingerprint or iris data can be caught by any 
surface or hidden camera, respectively. By implication, a greater dependence on the 
use of biometric data leads to poorer levels of secrecy [51]. This means that it is not 
always safe to be reliant on biometric data on its own, especially with global 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VELRPHWULFGDWD²for example, those data may be in use 
in mXOWLSOH FRXQWULHV EHFDXVH RI WKH XVHU¶V WUDYHO SDWWHUQV )XUWKHUPRUH WKH NH\ WR
ELRPHWULF WHFKQRORJ\¶V VXFFHVV LV LWV VRFLDO DFFHSWDQFH DPRQJ VWDNHKROGHUV >43]. 
Public mistrust of the use of biometric data is a major issue for implementation; the 
fear that personal data will be misused arises especially where those data are stored in 
a central database, which is more prone to attack. Leakage of biometric data related to 
the health status of an individual and religious constraints in using such data are other 
obstacles to full application of biometric technology [51]. An earlier study by Davida 
et al. [57] followed this line of inquiry, attempting to derive a key from the iris code by 
application of error correction code methodology. A similar attempt was made by 
Daugman et al [50], in designing template-free biometric data containing only a string 
of error-correction data that could be used for the acquisition of biometric information 
but not to derive the key unless biometric prints were detected. They successfully 
designed a two-factor scheme that included biometric data and token, and they also 
demonstrated its further extension into a three-factor scheme by including a password 
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as well. The only known issue found with this scheme was that the secret locking key 
was embedded in the smartcard, which could be easily targeted by hackers. 
In light of these issues, we opted to explore the design of two template-free biometric 
systems, in which biometric data can be mapped onto the repeatable unique binary 
codes/strings in both, opening up the key only in the presence of biometric prints. The 
first system will use the Gray Level Co-Occurrence Matrix method (GLCM) [94, 95] 
to extract the iris feature and the second system will be used 2D Gabor Filter [73]. 
Moreover LQ RUGHU WR JHQHUDWH WKH VHFUHW NH\ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6FKHPH >11] will be 
applied to the three data points provided (right iris, left iris and password). Two points 
out of three are then sufficient to release the biometric key by use of the linear 
equation technique, giving the user the desired flexibility while reducing the FRR. For 
both designs, we propose a three-factor scheme, including smartcard, password and 
biometrics. Here, each component is crucial to the system required for revealing the 
biometric data specific to an individual, with the opportunity of either updating or 
revoking the key; all three factors would be required to compromise the integrity of 
key. 
5.2. Methodology  
This section will outline two different systems of direct key generation, where the 
chosen modality is iris modality. The first system will apply the GLCM method for iris 
feature extraction, while the second system will use the 2D Gabor filter algorithm. 
The major objective is to investigate the generation of biometric key from the multi-
modal biometric samples directly.  The selected modalities are left and right iris and 
password as three different modalities in order to investigate the multimodal biometric 
system. For direct generation, the critical step involves the features extraction from the 
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iris modalities, which requires the choice of the sound method for this purpose. Based 
on the elaboration of feature extraction methods in Chapter 4 section (4.2.2), the 
researcher has selected two important GLCM and 2D Gabor filter techniques for the 
iris feature extraction, which are successfully applied by the previous researchers in 
iris recognition domain of the biometric system [71-74, 95]. For this research work, 
two methods were applied and tested separately to compare the quality of the 
biometric encryption key extracted from the samples directly. 
5.2.1. System architecture 
The existing literature on template-free biometric system indicates the application of 
two factor scheme (biometric and smartcard)[50], three factor scheme (biometric, 
smartcard and password) [22, 50], and personal biometric mapping scheme involving 
the mapping of binary codes into strings/look-up tables [50]. However, for this thesis, 
the three factor scheme involving biometric, smartcard and password has been 
proposed and tested. 
The architecture of the proposed system based on the three-factor within a multimodal 
biometric for direct key generation is been presented in Figure 5.1 and 5.2. The 
important operations of this system are elaborated in the subsequent sections. 
5.2.1.1. Enrollment operation 
The aim of the current work was to build a multimodal biometric system with ability to 
generate the key directly from biometric samples. For this purpose, three modalities 
left and right irises and password were chosen. Iris has been selected for this thesis 
because it has zero-false accept rate according to several approaches described to 
construct the authentic and reliable biometric system in the literature [71-74], while 
password was taken as a third modality in terms of applying Secret Scheme which 
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requires three points to fulfil the linear equation, and furthermore to enhance the 
performance and security of the multimodal biometric system. 
In the enrolment step, as shown in Figure 5.1, the user will be asked to provide iris 
samples (left and right) and a password as the three modalities for creation of a 
multimodal biometric system. The iris samples provided will be processed by means of 
a standard iris pre-processing method that includes iris localization/segmentation and 
normalization/unwrapping iris imaging methods. Iris features will then be extracted; 
for present purposes, two systems have been created, each using different methods of 
iris feature extraction. 
 
Figure5.1 Enrollment Operation 
 The chosen feature extraction approaches are the GLCM algorithm and the 2D Gabor 
filter algorithm. The iris binary code will be extracted and put through the mapping 
function to pick up the nearest code, applying the Hamming Distance method, which 
identifies the code with the lowest variance to the provided iris code in the lookup 
table [20, 52, 53]. Finally, the biometric secret key will be provided to work with the 
three features that have been created in the different modalities (left iris, right iris, and 
password), allowing Shamir¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHWRJHQHUDWHWKHVHFUHWVKDUHVWREHVWRUHG
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in the smartcard after generating hash numbers for the left iris, right iris, and password 
by applying the hash function [105]. As a result, the smartcard and user biometric 
modalities (left iris, right iris, and password) in the authentication process will be able 
WRUHOHDVHWKHELRPHWULFVHFUHWNH\E\XVLQJ6KDPLU¶V6HFUHW6FKHPH 
 
Figure5.2 Authentication Phase 
 
5.2.1.2. Authentication Process 
Figure 5.2 shows the authentication process. First, the user will be asked to provide the 
three factors: iris modality (left and right), user password and smartcard. As mentioned 
in the enrollment phase, the smartcard carries the Yn coordinates (the secret share 
places in the y-axis), which must be provided, while the biometric iris samples (left 
and right) and the password will be considered as Xn coordinates (places on the x-
D[LV6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHZLOOWKHQEHDSSOLHGWRUHOHDVHWKHELRPHWULFHQFU\ption 
secret key. However, in this case, the linear equation technique has been used to 
release the biometric encryption secret key, using two polynomial points in the curve 
at least out of three (left iris, right iris and password. As a result, the biometric 
encryption secret key can be released by the biometric itself (left iris and right iris) in 
case the user password is forgotten. In addition, if the user fails to provide one of the 
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iris biometrics (left or right), the biometric encryption key can be released from the 
other two iris samples and the user password to prove experimentally that the 
combination of the three-IDFWRU VFKHPH DQG 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6FKHPH SURYLGHV ERWK
high security and performance. 
Authentication processing can be summarised as follows. 
1. Three factors will be provided by the user (iris biometric, password and 
smartcard). 
2.  Iris sample pre-processing is described in section 5.2.2. 
3. Iris feature extraction follows: 
- System 1 using GLCM [94, 95] 
- System 2 using 2D Gabor filter [73] 
4. Iris feature encoding will be applied: 
- System 1 using global mean as discussed in section 5.2.3.1.2 below 
- System 2 using phase quantization as discussed in section 5.2.3.2.1 below 
5. In both systems, the iris code will be checked in the lookup table, using the 
Hamming Distance method [71, 73] to identify the code with the lowest 
variance. 
6. Results codes for left and right irises from the lookup table, along with the user 
password, will be hashed by the hashing function to be considered as Xn 
coordinates. 





5.2.2.1. Localization/Segmentation of the iris image 
The iris region can be approximated by two circles²one for the iris/sclera boundary 
and one for the iris/pupil boundary. By using the circular Hough transform approach or 
'DXJPDQ¶VLQWHJUR-differential operator, the radius and centre coordinates of the pupil 
and iris regions can be deduced. In the Hough approach, an edge map is first 
generated, and from this, votes are cast in the Hough space for the parameters of 
circles passing through each edge point. A maximum point in the Hough space 
corresponds to the radius and centre coordinates of the circle as best defined by the 
HGJHSRLQWV ,Q'DXJPDQ¶VDSSURDFK DQRSHUDWRU LV used to locate the iris and pupil 
boundaries as well as the arcs of the upper and lower eyelids. Here, the Daugman 
approach will be used to deduce the pupil and iris regions as it is less computationally 
intensive and faster than the Hough approach and does not suffer from threshold 
problems [71, 73]. Figure 5.3 below shows a representation of the iris and pupil 
regions. 
 
Figure5.3 Iris and Pupil regions [71, 73] 
5.2.2.2. Iris Normalization/Unwrapping  
Extracted iris images are diverse in dimension and orientation, owing mainly to pupil 
dilation but also to varying imaging distances, rotation of camera, head tilt, rotation of 
eye and other factors. The normalization process is an attempt to counteract these 
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forces by remapping each point within the iris to a pair of polar coordinates (U ș), 
ZKHUHULVZLWKLQWKHLQWHUYDO>@DQGșLVWKHDQJOH>ʌ] as illustrated in Figure 5.4 
[71, 73]. 
 
Figure5.4 Unwrapping iris image [71, 73]. 
For the remapping from (x,y) to Uș: 
,[Uș\Uș      ,Uș with 
[Uș ±U[SșU[Oș 
\Uș ±U\SșU\Oș            (5.1) 
where I(x,y) is the iris image region,                
(x,y) are the original Cartesian coordinates,                 
Uș are the corresponding normalised polar coordinates  




Figure5.5 Iris normalization: (a) Segmented iris image (b) Rectangular polar iris image (c) Noisy iris image (d) 
Enhanced iris image [71, 73]. 
Figure 5.5 (a) is a textured polar image. Figure 5.5 (b), applied to the image containing 
only noise, is a second binary image of the noise, which will be used thereafter to 
quantify the amount of noise in the image (Figure 5.5 (c)). Since the resulting image 
lacks contrast, it is preferable to enhance the textured image before analysing its 
texture (Figure 5.5 (d)). 
5.2.3. Feature Extraction 
As already mentioned, two different feature extraction approaches have been 
applied: Gray Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) [94, 95] and the 2D Gabor filter 
algorithm [73]. System 1 uses GLCM and System 2 uses the 2D Gabor filter. 
5.2.3.1 System 1 Feature Extraction 
In this phase, several iris samples are first provided by each user. Pre-processing will 
be applied to extract the iris and unwrap it. A GLCM scheme will be applied to 
generate the iris features within different pairings of pixels and angles [95]+DUDOLFN¶V
first twelve features will be calculated and reshaped in one vector [94]. The features 
vector will be normalized within global min and max [98, 99] YDOXHV IRU DOO XVHUV¶
feature spaces, for which global max and min will be applied in the authentication 
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phase and stored. The vector feature is converted to binary code by a decision created 
IRUPFDOFXODWLQJWKHPHDQIURPHDFKRI+DUDOLFNIHDWXUHVIURPDOOXVHUV¶WUDLQLQJ
sets as the global mean, which will be stored. The global mean will be applied as an If 
condition during the enrollment and authentication phases for extraction of the binary 
code. 
5.2.3.1.1 Feature Extraction Using GLCM 
As proposed by Haralick et al. [95], GLCM is one of the most widely-used approaches 
to extraction of textural features. The approach can be defined as follows. Suppose an 
area has Nc and Nr resolution cells in the horizontal and vertical directions, 
respectively, and Ng level in the gray tone. Let Lc = {1, 2, .., Nc} be the horizontal 
spatial domain, Lr =  {1, 2, «1r} be the vertical spatial domain, and let G = 1, 2, .., Ng 
be the set of Ng quantised gray tones. The image I can then be represented as a 
function which assigns some gray tone in G to each resolution cell or pair of 
coordinates in Lr  Lc; I : Lr  Lc Ѝ G. Texture-context information is specified in 
a matrix of relative frequencies Pij with two neighbouring resolution cells separated by 
distance d occurring on the image, one with gray tone i and the other with gray tone j. 
Pij can then be described by Eq. (4.1). 
Traditionally, Haralick̓s features are fourteen in number; for the present analysis, we 
chose the first twelve texture features. Using GLCM to extract textures is sensitive to 
three factors: selection of window size, number of gray levels and distance between 
pixel pairs. We will set specific window sizes, gray levels and distances between pixel 




5.2.3.1.2 Feature Score Normalisation 
As previously reported, [106] normalisation is necessary in order to transform the 
scores of the various features into a common scale [99, 107]. In this case, 
normalisation is applied to the feature values of all users within a given feature space 
in order to reduce the effect of score variability. Therefore, normalisation is best 
performed when all calibration samples have been acquired in order to ensure that 
JRRGHVWLPDWHVRI HDFK IHDWXUH¶V JOREDOPD[LPXPDQGPLQLPXPDUH obtained which 
can be calculated by Eq.(4.9). (DFKIHDWXUH¶VJOREDOPD[LPXPDQGPLQLPXPLVVWRUHG
along with the global mean of each feature space, so that during operation the feature 
vectors can be normalised to the standardised range. Normalisation essentially 
standardises the feature space to a range of [0, 1] [98, 99]. Subsequently, feature 
vectors can be converted to a binary code by a global mean decision to enable the 
SUREDELOLWLHVWREHWHVWHGDQGWRUHOHDVHWKHXVHUVHFUHWNH\GLUHFWO\E\XVLQJ6KDPLU¶V
secret scheme. 
The feature vector must be converted to binary code according to a global mean 
decision, as follows equation (5.2): 
If (FV(fn*OREDOPHDQ'HFLVLRQIn))                 (5.2) 
FV (fn ) = 1;  
Else 
FV(fn ) = 0;                  
End   
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Where FV is the feature vector and n is the number of elements for which size of 
feature vector is 1*n. 
,WVKRXOGKRZHYHUEHQRWHGWKDWWKHUHDUHRYHUODSVLQXVHUV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQFUHDVLQJ
WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI RQH XVHU¶V XQLTXH LQIRUPDWLRQ EHLQJ VLPLODU WR WKDW RI DQRWKHU 7R
overcome this problem, values within the range of an acceptable percentage deviation 
from the highest probability point are considered most useful for generating the 
encryption keys for the user from that particular feature. 
5.2.3.2 System 2: Feature Extraction using 2D Gabor Filter Algorithm 
There are various available methods for performing feature extraction, including 
wavelet encoding [108], Gabor filters [71, 74], Log-Gabor filters [109, 110], Haar 
wavelet [111] and the Laplacian of Gaussian filter [112, 113]. For present purposes, 
the 2D Gabor filter approach was chosen for extraction of iris features. The iris code 
will be extracted by demodulating the unwrapped iris image using complex-valued 2D 
Gabor wavelets [73], where the 2D Gabor filter equation can be represented in 
Eq.(3.1). 
For present purposes, frequency values are assigned five different values (2, 4, 8, 16, 
and 32), and orientation values ሺ ?ሻ are assigned four different angles (0°, 45°, 90° and 
135°) [73, 74]. 
Prior to applying a 2D Gabor filter to the unwrapped image, a mask will be created 
that will be used to identify non-iris pixels, corrupt areas and specular reflections by 
checking the grayscale intensities of the image. A 2D Gabor filter will then be applied 
to the unwrapped iris image and its corresponding masks, generating a real and 
imaginary part for both, which will then be used in the process of feature encoding. 
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5.2.3.2.1 Feature Encoding  
The encoding process will produce a bitwise template, containing a number of bits of 
information known as iris codes. It will also produce a corresponding noise mask, 
which will identify corrupt areas within the iris pattern. This encoding process is 
achieved through the process of phase quantisation, in which there is a quadrant 
containing a 2-bit binary number; position in the quadrant cannot be determined by 
comparing the real and imaginary parts of the filter [73]. However, by using the 
process illustrated in Figure 5.6, it will be possible to generate the iris codes from the 
filters produced for the iris image and its mask. 
 
 
Figure5.6 An illustration of the feature encoding process [73] 
5.2.4 Mapping Function Creation 
This section will explain how the map function has been created and used in both 
System 1 (using the GLCM algorithm) and System 2 (using the 2D Gabor filter 
method). The mapping function will provide a lookup table [20, 52, 53] of binary 
VWULQJFRGHVVRWKDWHDFKFRGHLVRIWKHVDPHOHQJWKDVWKHXVHU¶VLULVELQDU\FRGH7KH
main purpose of creating a mapping function like this is to establish how both systems 
(1 and 2) will react, positively or negatively. However, the binary codes in the lookup 
table do not identify the associated user; here, the lookup table has been created by 
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unknown iris samples taken randomly to create one lookup table for all users, as 
shown in the example in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Mapping Function 
Mapping Function 










The lookup table could be extended and created in several styles, as follows: 
1- One lookup table for all user sets (as in Table 5.1), which is used in this 
research 
2- Separate lookup tables for each user set 
5.2.4.1. System 1: Creation and processing of mapping function using 
GLCM 
As mentioned in section 5.2, this research proposes to create a lookup table from 
XQNQRZQLULVVDPSOHVZLWKQRUHODWLRQWRH[SHULPHQWDOWUDLQLQJDQGWHVWLQJXVHUV¶VHWV
in order to establish the reaction of the system to the mapping function. The processing 
steps for mapping function creation in System 1 (using the GLCM method) are as 
follows. 
1- Unknown iris samples collection using irises taken randomly from database 
2- Pre-processing of iris samples as mentioned above in 5.2.2, involving: 
- Localization and Segmentation of iris images [71-73] 
- Normalization and Unwrapping of iris images [73, 74] 
3- Feature extraction using GLCM [94, 95]: 




- Feature vector normalized within global min and max values [98, 99] 
4- Encoding process to convert the feature vector to binary code by: 
- Stored global mean, as mentioned in section 5.2.3.1.2 
5- Binary code mapped into the mapping function 
5.2.4.2. System 2: Creation and processing mapping function using 2D 
Gabor Filter 
Here, the mapping function will be created as above, from unknown iris samples, using 
the 2D Gabor filter method as follows: 
1- Unknown iris samples collection, using irises taken randomly from database. 
2- Pre-processing of iris samples as explained in section 5.2.2. 
3- Feature extraction using 2D Gabor filter [73] 
4- Encoding of feature vector by phase quantization as discussed in section 
5.2.3.2.1.  
5-  Binary code mapped into the mapping function. 
5.2.5. Hamming Distance 
Hamming distance is a process for calculating the similarities between two binary 
codes, in which lower hamming distance denotes higher similarity [73, 74], as in the 
following equation: 
 ൌ ȁȁሺ ? ? ? ? ?8 ? ? ? ? ?ሻת ? ? ? ? ?ת ? ? ? ? ?ȁȁȁȁ ? ? ? ? ?ת ? ? ? ? ?ȁȁ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
where Code A and Code B refer to the iris codes, and mask A and mask B refer to the 
iris masks.  
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Hamming distance is generally used to differentiate between the genuine and imposter 
users in iris recognition based biometric system. This function is executed by 
comparing the binary codes coming from input and template iris samples. 
For the current research work, Hamming distance is used to obtain the string iris code 
from the lookup table that achieves the highest similarity with the user iris sample in 
the enrollment and authentication operations, applying a hashing function to that string 





The length of biometric encryption key can be generated with adjustable length due to 
placement of encryption key of y-axis which allows the researcher to have infinitive 
space on vertical-space to adjust the length of key. This is the novelty of the system 
which in contrast to other biometric systems provides the option to administrator to 
adjust the encryption key of any securable length. 
6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6FKHPH DOVR SURYLGHG WKH RSWLRQ RI DSSOLFDWLRQ RI OLQHDU HTXDWLRQ
which can be defined by supplying two points. This allowed the user a flexibility to 
give any two points (biometrics) out of three provided points to release the biometric 
encryption key 
As detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, this technique has three different styles: linear, 
TXDGUDWLF DQG FXELF HTXDWLRQV 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW JHQHUDOO\ XVHV WKUHH SDUDPHWHUV Xn 
Coordinates (places in the x-axis), Yn Coordinates (places in the y-axis) and the 
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biometric secret key (on the y-axis). Figure 5.8 below shows an example for the linear 
equation technique used here. 
 
Figure5.7 Linear Equation style 
Figure 5.7 shows that three points in the line (Xn,Yn) identify where the biometric 
secret key crosses the y-axis. The three points are provided by the left iris (x1), right 
iris (x2) and password (x3) as Xn coordinates while y1, y2 and y3 are the secret shares 
VWRUHG LQ WKH XVHU¶V VPDUWFDUG 7KH UHDVRQV IRU XVLQJ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH DUH DV
follows. 
1- ,QWKHHQUROOPHQWSURFHVVWKHXVHU¶VELRPHWULFVHFUHWNH\ZLOOEH produced and 
the Xn FRRUGLQDWHV ZLOO EH JHQHUDWHG WR DOORZ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW WR H[WUDFW WKH
secret share to be downloaded to the smartcard. 




3- In the authentication process, the linear equation technique enables release of 
the biometric secret key by two polynomial points out of the three shown in 
Figure 5.8 as in any of the following possible combination: 
- Left iris and right iris. 
- Left iris and password. 
- Right iris and password. 
)RUWKHVHSXUSRVHV6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWRIIHUVIOH[LELOLW\DQGVHFXULW\SHUIRUPDQFH 
5.2.7. Three-Factor Scheme Combination (Biometric, Smartcard and Password) 
This section details the elements of the three-factor scheme (Biometric, Smartcard, and 
Password), whose purpose is to achieve an acceptable security level as well as 
enabling less information to be stored on the smartcard.  
5.2.7.1. Smartcard 
There are three different types of smart card used authentication of the users, which are 
Mactch-on-Card (MoC), YesCard and NoCard. They may be susceptible to attack in 
traditional biometric systems, however by using symmetric encryption primitives, 
these attacks can be thwarted [114, 119]. Structurally, the smartcard chip contains a 
communication port for exchanging data and control information with the external 
world. It is the ideal container for cryptographic secrets such as symmetric secret keys 
and asymmetric private keys, and the use of a contactless smartcard chip is now 
mandatory for numerous travel documents [114, 119] and national ID programs. Here, 
the role of the electronic chip is to authenticate the document (something-we-have) 
using cryptographic tools [116, 119]. 
We set the goal of reducing the information stored on the smartcard in light of other 
approaches that used the smartcard with incorporated biometrics. These can be built in 
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two different ways. First, a biometric template can be saved on the smartcard for 
identification purposes, which is risky in terms of security because of the greater 
amount of information saved on the smartcard. The second approach saves an 
unlocking encryption key and a key locked by biometric modality, which still means 
that important information is available on the smartcard if an attacker succeeds in 
unlocking the key [116, 119]. In contrast to these approaches, our smartcard stores 
only secret shares (Yn coordinates) and does not itself provide any important 
inIRUPDWLRQ WRSRWHQWLDOKDFNHUV VKRZLQJ WKHVWUHQJWKRI6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPHDV
well as the strength of the combination of the three factors (smartcard, password and 
biometrics). 
5.2.7.2. Password 
A password is certainly the oldest and best known solution for providing user 
authentication. Although this sounds simple to use, care must be taken about how the 
password is communicated. A secure channel must be provided between the 
authenticator (the system or person controlling the authentication) and the applicant 
(the candidate user), notably at the primary exchange to set up the shared password. If 
these minimal precautions are not taken, very simple man-in-the-middle attacks such 
as eavesdropping become possible. Furthermore, it is also used to demonstrate the 
secret sharing primarily so that other selected biometric modalities can be considered 
but for ease of use, the example passwords are used.  
One of the most widely used password-based authentications is the PIN (Personal 
Identification Number) code, authorising the use of a banking card. In this case, 




For the purposes of this research, it was decided that the user should create their own 
password under several conditions, as follows: 
1- Minimum length 10 digits. 
2- Must contain one uppercase letter (A-Z). 
3- Must contain one lowercase letter (a-z). 
4- Must contain one number (0-9). 
5- Must contain one symbol. 
5.2.7.3. Biometric 
%LRPHWULF DXWKHQWLFDWLRQ KDV WKH DGYDQWDJH RI FKHFNLQJ WKH XVHU¶V XQLTXH SHUVRQDO
characteristics. The use of biometric data is now mandatory for numerous travel 
documents [115, 119] and national ID programs. Here, the idea was to use multimodal 
biometric systems to generate the biometric secret key directly. As investigation in 
each modality would be time-consuming, it was decided to use the iris modality, which 
can effectively be considered as two different biometric modalities (left and right iris). 
BecaXVH6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWILUVWVW\OHQHHGVWKUHHPRGDOLWLHVWRZRUNZHGHFLGHGWRXVHD
password as the third modality, as shown in Figure 5.8 above, to explore this new 
enhancement of biometric security by direct key generation. 
5.2.7.4. Three-Factor Scheme 
Three factor scheme involving biometric password and smart card has been tested by 
[73, 119], which is produced the significant high security level that is why the current 
study followed the same approach to enhance the security and performance of the 
system. It also allowed the system to perform with the biometric and smart card while 
missing the third factor (password). 
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Any combination of two from the three authentication factors will sacrifice at least one 
of the relevant security criteria. Something-we-know with something-we-are will 
sacrifice privacy because no personal device entails the use of a database to centralize 
all biometric data. Something we have with something-we-are will sacrifice a secret in 
the architecture since biometrics are public data. Something-we-have with something-
we-know will sacrifice real user authentication since there is no proof of a link between 
the user and their card or PIN code [119]. 
Moreover, some applications need to duplicate one factor in the authentication scheme; 
sometimes, we need to show both ID card and passport, or we need to present both 
face and fingerprints, or we need to enter a password to log in to a system and then 
enter another password to access the application we intend to use. For instance, the use 
of smartcard, PIN code, fingerprints and facial recognition is still three-factor rather 
than four-factor authentication (as is sometimes suggested in press releases and 
PDUNHWLQJ PHVVDJHV ,Q WRGD\¶V GLJLWDO ZRUOG PRVW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FKDQQHOV DUH
insecure as the first goal is to provide user convenience. When delivering a password 
or biometric data, particular attention must be paid to this communication channel to 
guard against very simple methods of bypassing authentication. The use of 
cryptographic tools is mandatory to ensure the security of any three-factor 
authentication; the ultimate solution is to combine three-factor authentication with a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, PKI is difficult and costly to set up, manage 
and maintain, and simpler solutions must be considered for providing secure 
communications over insecure channels [118, 119] and ensuring confidentiality and 
integrity of data [117, 119]. 
Here, three factors have been used in the following ways: 
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1- Iris modality (left and right) considered as something-we-are, where the user 
will be asked to provide their iris samples during the enrollment and 
authentication phases. 
2- Password as something-we-know, considered for present purposes as a third 
modality, where the user will be asked to create their password during 
enrollment and will then be asked to provide it during the authentication phase. 
3- Smartcard as something-we-have that will carry secret shares (Yn coordinates), 
XVLQJ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHILUVWVW\OHFDOOHGOLQHDUHTXDWLRQWHFKQLTXHZKHUe 
secret shares will be created in the enrollment phase and saved on the 
smartcard. 
5.3. Performance and Results of Experiments 
Experimental evaluation is now introduced to determine false acceptance and rejection 
rates for the overall authentication system for the iris database. A comparison will also 
be presented between the proposed systems and other related work. 
5.3.1. Experimentation data 
The data experiments for iris used the CASIA-IrisV3-Interval database [92]. This 
justification of the use of this database has been provided in chapter 2. 
 In this system, 300 users were created; each user had 20 iris samples, which were 
divided into two parts: 11 samples for the enrollment system and 9 samples for the 
authentication system [92].  
5.3.2. Experimentation Setup 
The proposed enhancement of iris security by a direct key generation system, which 
includes image pre-processing, iris feature extraction in both system 1 using GLCM 
[94, 95] and system 2 using 2D Gabor filter [73], feature encoding, mapping function 
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DQG 6KDPLU¶V VHcret scheme [11], was implemented on the MATLAB platform. The 
inner and outer iris area localization algorithm, the GLCM algorithm and the 2D Gabor 
filter algorithm were implemented from scratch. In the present experiment, 5000 tests 
were created, each providing 11 randomly selected samples for training and 9 for 
testing. 
In subsequent experiments, using GLCM, the window size was set at 88 pixels, gray 
levels at 256 and the distances between pixel pairs at 4 pixels. For each feature 
extraction, the first twelve Haralick features are calculated [95], and so the feature 
vector will be (4 angles * 4 pixel pairs * 12 Haralick features = 192 features vector). 
The proposed scheme for System 1 has been tested in standard iris recognition 
structures by using the template in a database to see the reaction to the proposed 
scheme (using GLCM) by ascertaining the Equal Error Rate (EER) performance, as 




Figure5.8 FAR vs FRR and ROC curve for FAR and FRR performance using GLCM 
Figure 5.8 shows the performance of FAR and FRR for the proposed System 1 (using 
GLCM methods), which shows that the EER is 13%, giving an accuracy rate of 90%. 
This seems close to standard iris recognition results using the same GLCM methods as 
Ying Chen et al. [94], who proposed a combination of GLCM feature extraction with a 
multi-channel 2D Gabor filter. The GLCM method showed an average accuracy rate 
(before combination) of 93%, suggesting that the proposed System 1 method seems 
close to standard iris recognition, using the same feature extraction method as 
proposed in Yin Chen et al. [94]. 
For the 2D Gabor filter, in view of its symmetrical character, we set four different 
direction values for ș = 0۬, 45۬, 90۬, 135۬, and six values of 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32 for the 




directions. The average result parameters will be taken to apply in the proposed system 
2. 
To generate the parameters for the average result, we tested the database for the 
proposed System 2 (using 2D Gabor filter in standard iris recognition structure) by 
providing a template in the database to compute FRR and FAR. The average results for 
FAR and FRR for each of the filters are shown in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 Average results of FRR and FAR for each filter of 2D Gabor filter 
2D Gabor filter 
(f) (ș) 0o 45o 90o 135o 
2 1.12% 0.02% 1.75 % 0.02% 1.12% 0.02% 
1.75 
% 0.02% 
4 1.91 % 0 % 2.3 % 0% 1.91 % 0 % 2.3 % 0% 
8 1.87 % 0.02 % 
1.92 
% 0% 1.87 % 0.02 % 
1.92 
% 0% 
16 1.34 % 0.02 % 1.6 % 0.02 % 1.29 % 0.02 % 1.6 % 0.02 % 
32 1.19 % 0.02 % 
1.45 
% 0.02 % 1.19 % 0.02 % 
1.45 
% 0.02 % 
 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
Average results for each filter 
 
Table 5.2 shows the parameters of the 2D Gabor filter obtaining the average result to 
be applied in the proposed System 2 scheme for direct key generation. The average 
result was 1.34% FRR and 0.02 % FAR leading to the chosen parameters, which are 
the direction values for ș = 0o and the central frequencies (f) = 16. Figure 5.9 below 





Figure5.9 FRR vs FAR and ROC curve of FAR and FRR performance using 2D Gabor filter 
Figure 5.9 shows that the EER for the chosen parameters for 2D Gabor filter is 0.2 %, 
ZKLFK FRPSDUHV IDYRXUDEO\ ZLWK WKH */&0 PHWKRG¶V (ER of 10%. Both methods 
were applied in the same database. Table 5.3 highlights the superior performance of 
the 2D Gabor filter method.  
Table 5.3 GLCM vs 2D Gabor filter in proposed scheme with template 
 GLCM 2D Gabor 
ERR 10% 0.2% 
 
5.3.3. Experimental Results and Discussion 
In this section, we have attempted to investigate direct key generation with a free 
template, using a multimodal biometric system in which we considered iris left and 
right as two different biometric modalities, with user password as a third modality, to 
visualise the proposed idea. 
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5.3.3.1. Experimental Results and Comparison of Systems 1 and 2  
In this chapter, two different systems have been used to investigate alternative 
perspectives on the problem at hand. Simply put, iris modality has been chosen in this 
investigation of different methods of feature extraction for optimal capture of the 
subject field. The two chosen variance features were the Gray Level Co-Occurrence 
Matrix (GLCM) [95] and the 2D Gabor filter algorithm [73], implemented as System1 
and System 2, respectively. 
The overall performance of both Systems 1 and 2 for all users was assessed in terms of 
false acceptance and rejection rates by performing several rounds of tests. Table 5.4 
shows the average FRR and FAR results of the 5000 tests for all training and testing 
sets in both systems; as mentioned in section 5.3.2, each user provided 20 different iris 
samples (11 samples for the training set and 9 samples for the testing set), divided 
randomly for all 5000 tests. The overall average performance results from these tests 
are shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Overall average results: FRR and FAR rates 
 GLCM 2D Gabor filter 
FRR 13.3999 % 1.7085 % 
FAR 9.3333 % 0.0120 % 
 
Table 5.4 shows that the 2D Gabor filter performed well by comparison with the 
GLCM method (1.7085% FRR versus 13.3999% FRR, respectively). In the 2D Gabor 
filter method, FAR was also much lower than for GLCM, suggesting that the 2D 
Gabor filter algorithm is more suitable for iris direct key generation in future work. 
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5.3.3.2. Comparison and Discussion 
The proposed three-factor scheme here can be compared with Daugman et al scheme 
[50] as discussed in Chapter 2, in which they used a two-factor iris modality and 
smartcard with freedom of extension to three factors [50]. Both their scheme and ours 
used a free template and three-factor scheme (biometric, smartcard and password). 
Their biometric secret key length was 140-bits with 0.47% FRR and 0% FAR. 
However, with an increase in key length to 196-bits, they achieved 3.65% FRR and 
0% FAR. Similarly, when key length was further increased to 224-bits, FRR and FAR 
were 12.22% and 0%, respectively [50]. This clearly demonstrated a tendency for FRR 
behaviour to increase with increasing key length values. In our scheme, using the 2D 
Gabor filter, the length of the biometric secret key was unlimited, with results of 
 )55 DQG  )$5 $GGLWLRQDOO\ 'DXJPDQ HW DO¶V VFKHPH VDYHG WKH
locked biometric secret key by XORing it with the iris code on the smartcard; the 
decoding process involved XORing the locking key with the presented iris sample 
[50]. By contrast, the smartcard in both of our schemes holds only the Y coordinates, 
making it impossible to get any information about the biometric secret key from the 
smartcard alone DQGFRQILUPLQJWKHUREXVWQHVVRI6KDPLU¶VVHFUHWVFKHPHLQHQDEOLQJ
XVHRIOHVVLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHVPDUWFDUGDV<FRRUGLQDWHV,QDGGLWLRQ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHW
scheme is of great help to the user if they fail to set up one of the iris samples, in that 
they can still access and unlock the key because, as explained above, two points out of 
three are needed in the authentication phase to generate the biometric secret key, using 
the linear equation technique. Furthermore, if the user forgets their password, they can 
still gain access by providing the left and right irises. In this way, all three factors are 
QHHGHG WRXQORFN WKHELRPHWULF VHFUHW NH\XVLQJ6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH >11]²or at 
least the two factors of smartcard and biometric samples, as the smartcard will provide 
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Yn coordinates for three points (left iris, right iris and password). In short, without the 
smartcard, the user cannot gain access, and one of left or right iris must be provided in 
DGGLWLRQ WR WKH SDVVZRUG WR DOORZ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH WR XQORFk the biometric 
secret key. 
5.3.4. Security Analysis 
This chapter has proposed two schemes based on three factors: iris biometric, 
smartcard and password. In the authentication process, three factors must be provided 
to release the biometric secret key, which means that two factors or one will not unlock 
the key, keeping the biometric secret key secure. Furthermore, if the biometric key has 
been discovered by an attacker, the key can be renewed because it is randomly 
generated, so blocking the attacker. On the other hand, this scheme makes the 
lock/unlocking key completely dependent on iris biometrics with support from the 
password and smartcard, making the iris biometric clearly dominant. For example, the 
key will not be released unless Xn and Yn coordinates are provided. Xn coordinates are 
generated from iris biometrics (left and right) and password. However, Yn coordinates 
are created by Xn coordinates and the biometric secret key, which Yn has downloaded 
to the smartcard. 
From a security perspective, the opportunities for an attacker to hack the system or 
release the key are as follows. 
1. Breaking and obtaining the biometric secret key²this is the most difficult 
option because, as mentioned above, the key length is unlimited. We tested the 
system within the key length range of 300±500 bits, which is sufficient. 
2. Acquiring the smartcard²this will not enable the attacker to release the key or 
to access any useful information because, as mentioned above, the novelty of 
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this system is the minimal information stored in the smartcard. Only Yn 
coordinates are stored, and at least two out of three inputs (password with left 
iris, password with right iris or left and right irises) must be supplied with the 
VPDUWFDUGWRXQORFNWKHNH\7KLVFRQILUPVWKHVFKHPH¶VVHFXULW\DV shown by 
the FAR of 0 %. 
3. Password known by the attacker²again, this will not help to release the key. 
As mentioned in 2 above, three factors are needed to release the key. In 
addition, this scheme uses a more difficult form of password creation (up to 10 
digits with numbers, capitals and small letters and symbols). Although the 
password can be captured, the attacker still cannot release the key because they 
have possession of just one of the coordinates in the x-axis, ensuring a 0% 
FAR. 
4. If both smartcard and password have been captured by the attacker, it is still 
impossible for them to release the key because, in the linear equation scheme, 
two points are needed, and the attacker still has only one point from x3 in the 
password and y3 in the smartcard. The other y1 and y2 coordinates in the 
smartcard cannot help them to discover the other x1 and x2 coordinates or to 
unlock the key; the biometric samples (iris left or right) are missing, and it is 
GLIILFXOW RU LPSRVVLEOH WR FDSWXUH WKH XVHU¶V LULV GDWD ZLWKRut being noticed, 
again affording a 0% FAR.  
5.4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the technique of secret sharing and combination of three 
factors within a free template scheme to allow an encryption key to be created and 
released from biometric samples with support from a smartcard and password. The 
results for System 2 confirm the potential for deriving encryption keys efficiently and 
 172 
 
directly from the three factors (biometric sample, smartcard and password). However, 
E\ XVLQJ WKH OLQHDU HTXDWLRQ YHUVLRQ RI 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH WKLV V\VWHP DOVR
enables the key to be released by providing at least two out of three of the required 
polynomial points (left iris sample, right iris sample and password). Furthermore, the 
length of the biometric secret key is unlimited, offering the flexibility of multiple keys 
for different applications for each user, so that an attack on one does not affect the 
RWKHU¶VDSSOLFDWLRQVJLYHQ WKHSRVVLELOLW\RI UHYRFDWLRQ ,QVXPPDU\ZHEHOLHYH WKDW
the scheme has reached the requisite security level or at the very least encourages 
further development of the scheme to further reduce the FRR 1.7085%, perhaps 
involving multimodal biometrics such as face, fingerprint and iris to generate the key 





Chapter 6.  
Conclusion 
The biometric systems serve as an identification tools in several organizations, which 
allow the access to the authorised people in the sensitive areas. The applications of 
these systems in the security of sensitive areas play an important part in the protection 
of key information or the material to be protected from the unauthorised access. 
Similarly, the organizations have provide the authorised access to sensitive strategic 
data sources which are key to the operations of the business and provide a competent 
advantage to the companies in the market.  
However, these biometric applications are often targeted by the spoofers, attackers and 
mal-practitioners to attack the security and privacy of these applications, and endanger 
the privacy and security of the people having their data stored in the system. 
Furthermore, the issues of key revocability and exception handling cause the biometric 
system to perform less efficiently and effectively, which are serious drawback of the 
existing encryption biometric systems In order to avoid these issues, the continuous 
research efforts are being carried out by the researchers in the field of biometric 
application using biometric system for generation of key from the biometric modalities 
directly.  
If the biometric key is generated directly from the biometric samples, then there will 
be less probability of the attack on the system because the hackers will not be able to 
hack or steal either encryption key or the templates, because of the fact that the 
encryption key and the template are not required to be stored in the database. Due to 
these issues associated with biometric systems, the current study has been designed to 
 174 
 
generate the encryption key directly from multimodal biometric system (left iris, right 
iris and password). 
Consequently, the purpose of the research presented in this thesis was to introduce a 
VFKHPHIRU LQWHJUDWLQJGLUHFWELRPHWULFNH\JHQHUDWLRQVFKHPHVZLWK6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW
sharing algorithm [11] in order to address the two disadvantages of revocability and 
exception handling. In the proposed scheme, an arbitrary subset of biometric 
modalities needs to be supplied by the user, which will address the situation where a 
given modality cannot be supplied. Furthermore, an arbitrary encryption key (secret) 
was generated by the proposed scheme to address the revocability issue and also to 
allow the multiple independent encryption keys to be derived from the same biometric 
samples. 
6.1  Findings 
For the first scenario presented in chapter 3, a technique of secret sharing was applied 
to allow an encryption key to be created from multimodal biometric samples. The 
results showed the potential of the proposed system to generate encryption keys 
efficiently while also allowing exception handling, which was considered a significant 
impediment to the practical deployment of biometric systems in the previous works. 
This improved robust property represents a significant enhancement of performance of 
the proposed system compared with the previous models. A further significant 
advantage of the proposed technique was that the biometric key itself was not required 
to be stored in the database which along with the length flexibility of the biometric 
encryption key further enhanced the security of the system. 
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Moreover, the proposed system circumvented the main challenge of employing five 
biometric modalities²face, index finger, thumb finger, right iris and left iris²to 
generate the points on the required polynomial while meeting the following criteria. 
1- The length of the biometric encryption key need to flexible i.e keys of varying 
lengths should be generated easily depending on WKHDSSOLFDWLRQV¶UHTXLUHPHQWV 
2- The number of successful biometric inputs required during the authentication 
process to release the secret shares should be flexible, depending on the 
IROORZLQJYHUVLRQVRI6KDPLU¶VVW\OHKDVEHHQXVHG 
- Linear equation technique (needs at least two successfully biometric 
modalities out of five to release the secret shares for biometric encryption 
key extraction purpose). 
- Quadratic technique (needs at least three out of five). 
- Cubic technique (needs at least four out of five). 
3- The main difference between this scheme and other multimodal approaches is 
that in other existing multimodal systems, if any of the biometric modalities 
failed to process or to provide the required biometrics, the system will reject the 
user. However, the proposed scheme presented in Chapter 3 solved this 
problem. 
In this way, the current research work provides the new avenues and prospects to 
develop more robust and highly secured and performance oriented multimodal 
ELRPHWULFV\VWHPEDVHGRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI6KDPLU¶VSecret Sharing Scheme. This 
scheme was uniquely applied to give the encryption key a flexible length which was 
not provided by the previous researches conducted in biometric encryption field. 
However, the limitation of the proposed was that it retained the template within the 
database like other related system. 
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On the other hand, second scenario which was created to focus on direct biometric 
encryption key generation from multimodal biometrics used in this: left iris, right iris, 
and user password. The proposed technique utilized these three biometric modalities in 
different combinations to allow an encryption keys to be generated and released from 
the biometrics samples with support of smartcard and password. In this way, this 
technique has the potential and prospect to implement the template-free biometric 
system. The results for System 2 in section 5.3.3.1 demonstrated the potential of the 
three-factor scheme (biometric sample, smartcard and password) for direct generation 
of key from three biometric modalities. However, by using the linear equation version 
of 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH this proposed system also enabled the key to be released 
from the input biometric samples by providing at least two out of three of the required 
polynomial points (left and right iris samples and password). Furthermore, the length 
of the biometric secret key made flexible in terms of increasing the length of key up to 
securable length, offering the probability of multiple keys for different applications for 
each user, so that an attack on one application could not affect the others. In summary, 
the scheme is expected to have reached the requisite security level or at least 
encourages further development of the scheme to reduce the FRR up to 1.7085%, 
perhaps involving multimodal biometrics such as face, fingerprint and iris to generate 
the key directly instead of the iris modality and password investigated here. 
However, the researcher tested the potential of several schemes on hit and trial basis 
whether they can be employed to generate the biometric keys directly from the 
biometric scheme, but they were proved to be ineffective in this context. The results of 
these trials have been presented in chapter 4. However, they gave the researcher some 
important lessons and knowledge about the development of multimodality biometric 
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system to be utilized for the next stages of the research, which is presented through 
following points: 
- In comparing any two iris samples, whether from the same person or not, 
there is a huge similarity between them. As evidence of this, any iris 
recognition system defines a threshold such that a Hamming Distance < 0.2 
for example (which is the average threshold in public) identifies the iris 
provider as genuine or otherwise as an impostor. This indicates that the 
similarity between any two irises is more than 70%. 
- Iris binary code is a vector that depends on pre-processing and feature 
extraction, making it hard to name a block or digit in the vector that is 
standard for a particular person, appearing every time as 0 or 1. 
Finally, the design of two template-free biometric systems researcher has been 
selected, in which biometric data can be mapped onto repeatable unique binary 
codes/strings in both, opening up the key only in the presence of biometric prints. The 
first system used the Gray Level Co-Occurrence Matrix method (GLCM) [94, 95] to 
extract iris features, and the second system used the 2D Gabor Filter [73]. In order to 
generate the secret ke\ 6KDPLU¶V 6HFUHW 6FKHPH >11] was applied to the three data 
points provided (right iris, left iris, and password). Two points out of three were found 
to be sufficient to release the biometric key by use of the linear equation technique, 
which not only gave a user the desired flexibility but also reduced the FRR. For both 
designs, a three-factor scheme was proposed, to include smartcard, password, and 
biometrics. Each component within the proposed system was required equally to reveal 
the biometric data specific to an individual, with the opportunity of either updating or 
revoking the key. The peculiar feature of the proposed system is that it cannot be 
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compromised until all three factors are provided to it. These two designs are presented 
in Chapter 5. 
6.2   Future Work 
The main aim of this research was investigate multimodal biometric system involving 
three different biometric modalities (Iris, Fingerprint and Face) in terms of generating 
the biometric encryption key directly from input biometrics samples. Furthermore, this 
research work considered the left and right iris as two different modalities while the 
password as the third modality to build the multimodal system capable to generate the 
ELRPHWULF HQFU\SWLRQ NH\ GLUHFWO\ E\ XVLQJ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW VFKHPH DOJRULWKP The 
further work can be undertaken on a small scale in the same direction on iris or the 
technique can be widened to include other modalities. 
This thesis, especially in chapter 5 presented a clear and robust that will provide 
further avenues for the future researchers to develop this area, which is given below: 
- Achievement of a reasonable OHYHO RI SHUIRUPDQFH XVLQJ 6KDPLU¶V VHFUHW
scheme which allows the generation of key directly from 2 out of 3/4 
modalities in linear equation technique. However, in quadratic 3 modalities 
are needed to generate the key out of 4 or 5 modalities and so on. 
- Attaining a sensible level of security by implementing the scheme with 
template free and with three factors scheme provided to the system 
(biometric, smartcard, password). 
- The length of the biometric encryption key is set flexible which means that 
key with substantial secured length can be generated; and that is the main 
novelty of this thesis. The researchers can apply this technique for 
generation of flexible keys for other biometric modalities. 
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- Minimisation of level of data stored in the smartcard, for example, the data 
in the smartcard is just the Yn coordinates which are not useful for the 
attacker to unlock the system because the biometric encryption key cannot 
be released using only  Yn coordinates themselves. This method may have 
the potential application in the smart cards for individual identification in 
military, banks and other organizations which require the access to sensitive 
areas using the smart card based individual recognition. 
- The direct key generation from the biometric samples has been tested in this 
work, which shows the potential of the system to be applied in the biometric 
application applications in military and airports which require the greater of 
level of security and privacy. As the proposed method does not require the 
storage of template and the encryption keys in the database of biometric 
systems. 
Therefore, this research work can be extended to study multimodal system in details to 
generate the biometric encryption key directly from different combinations of 
ELRPHWULFVLQFOXGLQJIDFHILQJHUSULQW LULVDQGYRLFHXVLQJ6KDPLU¶VVHFUHW WRUHOHDVH
the key with three different styles of flexibilities (Linear equation, Quadratic, and 
Cubic) as it shows in Figure 6.1 below while in this thesis, iris modality has been used 




Figure6.1 Direct Key Generation from Multimodal Biometric System by Shamir's Secret Scheme 
On the other hand, the new researcher might look at the maps distribution on iris 
modality in terms of solving the iris feature overlaps in feature space which might be 
helpful for reducing the number of important data stored in the maps distribution 
related to the users templates. Moreover, the future work can focus on developing 
maps distribution which might solve the potential overlaps of binary codes of iris 
samples obtained from different people, which is considered to be the main obstacle in 
designing template-free iris recognition biometric system. The researcher showed in 
the experiments that the similarities between two iris codes from different people may 
exceed 70% which is considered too high to generate the key directly without having 
DQ\GDWDVWRUHGWKDWQRWUHODWHGWRXVHU¶VWHPSODWHV 
The future research work may also consider different iris feature combinations for 
extracting the suitable iris feature for key generation with acceptable FRR and key 
entropy. For example, instead of using 2D Gabor filter alone or GLCM, the 
combination between these two will be a great idea in template free system which may 
lead to selection of a feature capable to generate the biometric key from it because this 
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thesis faced some challenges in generating such as the high percentage of similarities 
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